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Abstract
This project presents a mechanism for instrumentation of secure VoIP calls. The experi-
ments were run under different network conditions and security systems. VoIP services such
as Google Talk, Express Talk and Skype were under test. The project allowed analysis of
the voice quality of the VoIP services based on the Mean Opinion Score (MOS) values gen-
erated by Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ). The quality of the audio streams
produced were subjected to end-to-end delay, jitter, packet loss and extra processing in the net-
working hardware and end devices due to Internetworking Layer security or Transport Layer
security implementations. The MOS values were mapped to Perceptual Evaluation of Speech
Quality for wideband (PESQ-WB) scores. From these PESQ-WB scores, the graphs of the
mean of 10 runs and box and whisker plots for each parameter were drawn. Analysis on the
graphs was performed in order to deduce the quality of each VoIP service. The E-model was
used to predict the network readiness and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
was used to predict the network vulnerabilities. The project also provided the mechanism to
measure the throughput for each test case. The overall performance of each VoIP service was
determined by PESQ-WB scores, CVSS scores and the throughput. The experiment demon-
strated the relationship among VoIP performance, VoIP security and VoIP service type. The
experiment also suggested that, when compared to an unsecure IPIP tunnel, Internetworking
Layer security like IPSec ESP or Transport Layer security like OpenVPN TLS would improve
a VoIP security by reducing the vulnerabilities of the media part of the VoIP signal. Morever,
adding a security layer has little impact on the VoIP voice quality.
KEYWORDS: VoIP, security, performance, E-Model, CVSS, PESQ, jitter, delay, packet loss
rate, throughput.

Nomenclature
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header
API Application Program Interface
CA Certificate Authority
CBR Constant Bit Rate
CLI Command Line Interface
CODEC Coder/decoder
CoS Class of Service
CPAN Comprehensive Perl Archive Network
CPU Central Processing Unit
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System
DDoS Distributed DoS
Diffserv Differentiated services
DNS Domain Name Service
DoS Denial of Service
DRDoS Distributed Reflector DoS
DS0 a basic digital signaling rate of 64 kbit/s for one voice channel
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
2
3EF Expediated Forwarding
ENUM E.164 NUmber Mapping
ESP Encapsulated Security Payload
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
H.225 An ITU-T call signalling protocol (part of the H.323 suite)
H.235 An ITU-T security protocol (part of the H.323 suite)
H.245 An ITU-T capability exchange protocol (part of H.323 suite)
H.248 An ITU-T signalling protocol (part of the H.323 suite)
H.323 An ITU-T standard protocol suite for real-time communications over a packet network
HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IAX Inter-Asterisk eXchange
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICT Information and communication technologies
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
iLBC internet Low Bitrate Codec
IM Instant Messaging
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security, a set of protocol developed by the IETF to support secure exchange of
packets at the IP layer
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
4ISO International Organization for Standardization
ISP Internet Service Provider
ITU-R ITU Radiocommunication Sector
ITU-T ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
ITU International Telecommunications Union
KVM keyboard, video or visual display unit, mouse
LAMP LINUX Apache MySQL and PHP
LLQ Low Latency Queueing
M/M/1 An M/M/1 queue consists of a first-in-first-out buffer with packets arriving randomly
according to a Poisson process, and a processor that retrieves packets from the buffer
at a specified service rate.
M2E mouth-to-ear
MGCP Media Gateway Control Protocol
MitM Man-in-the-Middle
MNB Measuring Normalizing Blocks
MOS Mean Opinion Score, MOS provides a numerical indication (range 1 to 5, where 1 is the
lowest) of perceived quality of received media after compression and/or transmission.
Specified under ITU-T Recommendation P.800
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching
NAT Network Address Translation
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology
P2P Peer To Peer
PAMS Perceptual Analysis Measurement System
PAT Port Address Translation
PBX Private Branch eXchange, usually used on business premises to switch telephone calls
PESQ-WB PESQ-Wideband
5PESQ Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality
PHB Per Hop Behaviour
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PLC Packet Loss Concealment
PSQM Perceptual Speech Quality Measures
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
QoS Quality of Service
RED Random Early Detection
ROI Return On Investment
RTCP RTP Control Protocol
RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
RTT Round-trip Time
SA Security Association
SASL Simple Authentication and Security Layer
SCCP Skinny Client Control Protocol
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SDP Session Description Protocol
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SOX SOund eXchange
SPI Security Parameter Index
SPIT Spam over IP Telephony
SPL Sound Pressure Level
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
6TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
VAC Virtual Audio Cable
VAD Voice Activity Detection
VBR Variable Bit Rate
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
XML Extensible Markup language
XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
XORP eXtensible Open source Routing Platform
YMSG Yahoo Messenger
ZRTP Zimmermann Real-Time Transport Protocol
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Chapter 1
Introduction
”It does not matter how slowly you go so long as you do not stop.”
Confucius
1.1 Voice over Internet Protocol
Systems employing the Internet and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) are alternative to
the legacy landline telephony system. The services offered by these systems allow users to
communicate with their family members, friends, banks and business partners whenever they
are online. Particularly, the VoIP service is popular with the Internet users because charges are
bound into usually fixed access costs making the price of the long distance calls themselves
appear economical and even free. However, VoIP services have several disadvantageous:
i) Voice quality, although improving, is still not as good as the landline telephony [157,
159, 161]. This is because IP networks generally do not guarantee transmission quality.
In which case inadequate bandwidth or other network resources and excessive end-to-
end delay, jitter and packet loss rate may reduce voice quality.
ii) Reliability is related to the Internet reliability, which is less than the typical 99.999%
network availability for the traditional telephony [164]. It would not be much a problem
in urban areas whereby the Internet connectivity is relatively good but it creates more
concern to remote areas.
iii) A VoIP service is exposed to Internet security vulnerabilities, threats and attacks [166,
47]. There are security loopholes in the Internet which inevitable presence in the VoIP
system.
iv) A VoIP service uses resources such as CPU, memory and buffers of both end systems
and intermediate devices [90].
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v) A VoIP service consumes bandwidth thus reducing available bandwidth for other applic-
ations on the Internet [99, 88]. PSTN dedicates 64kbps bandwidth for a call whereas a
VoIP service shares available bandwidth with other applications.
1.2 Aim
The aim of this research is to provide information regarding the performance of a secure VoIP
to VoIP users, companies IT managers and VoIP service providers. This information can be
used by the relevant parties for decision making and creating IT policy within the companies.
As for the users they are able to choose which VoIP or Instant Messaging (IM) are most
suitable for communicating with their friends, family, business partners and banks.
1.3 Objective
The objectives of this research are three fold: First, to compare and contrast the performance of
VoIP services in the interest of the Internet users under different security configurations. The
service performance is reflected by the voice quality and security features that are deployed.
Voice quality is influenced by traffic performance such as end-to-end delay, jitter and packet
loss as well as network resources such as available bandwidth, CPU, host memory and buffer
size.
The second objective is to monitor the VoIP network performance from the perspective
of a company IT manager or network operator as VoIP services run side-by-side with data
packets sharing Internet resources and security vulnerabilities. The trend and the result can be
used to derive the company IT policy and for other decision making.
The third objective is to implement a test rig that is able to control experiments conducted
on several VoIP services. The test rig can be extended to cater for other VoIP services. This
is essential since most researchers estimated the performance of VoIP services instrumented
on software simulators or standalone test rigs. In this project, a live testbed is deployed in
order to produce more realistic results that are closer to real world problems. This objective
supports the first and the second objectives whereby without the test rig we could not measure
and analyse the performance of the VoIP calls. The next section describes the reasons that
motivate the research behind this work.
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Reasonable, good quality and secure VoIP services are beneficial to the public in the long run.
However, since VoIP applications are time-sensitive, they often get higher priority over other
applications on the Internet. Any attacks on VoIP applications will affect time-insensitive
Internet applications. As a result the Internet security problem is magnified with the imple-
mentation of VoIP [47]. This situation warrants a further investigation on the behaviour of
VoIP services over existing available resources.
VoIP research areas are not limited to the research on QoS, security or both QoS and
security, however these areas are the concerns to the end users because they related directly
to their conversational experiences on the application. Other areas such as system integration
and interoperability issues or integrating VoIP services into IPv4 and IPv6 for an ubiquitous
access to IP telephony services based on SIP protocol services, as discussed in [65] and [95]
respectively, are important but beyond the scope of our project. It is believed that security
in general contributes to the low voice quality in any VoIP services because of the added
delay it incurs due to extra security processing. For example, a secure network imposes less
security risk but increases the processing time in filtering and forwarding voice packets in
the network. Hence a secure network introduces extra delay. This delay might or might
not reduce the overall voice quality. If the balance between VoIP security and QoS could
be achieved, visually impaired persons would gain benefits from the embedded technology,
as more applications that are voice activated can be programmed and transmitted over the
Internet. As of now the relationship between VoIP security and QoS is scarcely documented.
A large number of measurements on various VoIP end-points, mouth-to-ear (M2E) delay of
commercial IP phones like Cisco, 3Com and PingTel and software based clients like Microsoft
Messenger and NetMeeting and others had been performed [81]. The research focused on the
effects of packet loss concealment (PLC), silence suppression, clock skew, hangover time
and jitter on these clients. They measured M2E delay by recording both the original and
output audio in a two-channel (stereo) mode. However, some testing could not be done due to
pairwise combinations of end-points. For example, Net2Phone only talks to other Net2Phone
clients. To automate delay estimation, they used their self-developed Adelay software.
VoIP QoS can also be used for capacity planning and to gauge the readiness of an access
network to handle VoIP traffic. For example, Mehmood et al. assessed VoIP quality over
access networks in Pakistan using a delay jitter measurement methodology for evaluating the
perceptual quality of voice calls using the ITU-T G.107 speech quality E-model [109]. Passive
measurements for voice calls in the presence of background Internet data traffic for G.723.1
and G.729a CODECs were carried out using a non-intrusive parametric model. The R-factor
and resultant Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) were calculated at different link loads and conges-
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tion hot spots were identified. The result in 2005 showed the inadequacy of access networks
for handling VoIP traffic in Pakistan. A recommendation was made to alleviate congestion by
increasing the bandwidth capacity in Pakistan access networks.
Other researchers studied the relationship of VoIP security and QoS by understanding the
signalling process and how to secure them and measuring QoS and security of VoIP system on
OPNET and ns-2 [134, 25]. The results could be used by network designers to design reliable,
fault tolerant, scalable and secure VoIP networks. With the underpinning architecture in place,
more reliable telephony services could be offered to the general public. This project builds
upon this research particularly on measuring the overall performance of a secure VoIP service
on the perceptual speech quality and users’ experience.
1.5 Contribution
Since the Internet offers a best-effort service in an open and scalable environment, it is import-
ant for one to understand how a time-sensitive service would behave under different types of
security restrictions. This project is a stepping stone for better understanding on how different
types of VoIP services work within the Internet environment.
Particularly, the research provides information pertaining to VoIP performances for three
different types of VoIP services. The VoIP services are based on different VoIP protocols.
For example: Skype is built on a proprietary protocol, Google Talk is based on the XMPP
protocol and Express Talk is a SIP based application. The information gained is useful for
the relevant parties to enhance the security of their current networks to prevent the invasion
of users privacy. The information gives them chances to choose which VoIP services provide
reasonable voice qualities even after additional securities are deployed.
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1.6 Thesis Organization
The next five chapters are organised as follows:
Chapter 2 Background, VoIP Protocols, VoIP Security Issues, VoIP QoS and previ-
ous work by other researchers are discussed.
Chapter 3 The potential research gaps that relate to the VoIP quality of service and
VoIP security are highlighted. The methodology and project framework
are presented. The project scope is discussed before the actual project
implementation that is described later in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4 The project implementation stages are discussed. The project framework
that was discussed in Chapter 3 are refined further and subdivided into
six implementation stages that include setting up network, monitoring
tools and packet interceptor, installing VoIP clients, writing scripts to
automate data collection, data collection and data processing, and last
but not least, validation and verification.
Chapter 5 The result of the experiments that have been specified in Chapter 4 are
compared. From the comparison, conclusions are made. Any problems
with the results are also highlighted.
Chapter 6 This chapter discusses the contribution to knowledge and the lessons
learned on the subject.
Chapter 7 This chapter concludes the thesis. It highlights the overall thesis process,
the research limitations and further studies on the subject.
Chapter 2
Related Work
”Study the past if you would define the future.”
Confucius
This chapter compares the network architectures, users’ experience, security and quality
of service between VoIP system and PSTN system. In addition, we take a look at the existing
VoIP protocols, security issues, and QoS. We also look at the available tools for assessing
voice quality. Then we study work by other researchers. Section 2.1 discusses the background
of the VoIP system and the PSTN system. Section 2.2 discusses the different types of the VoIP
protocols. Section 2.3 discusses the VoIP security issues. Section 2.4 discusses the VoIP QoS.
Section 2.5 highlights the tools for assessing voice qualities. Finally in Section 2.6 we look at
the research performed by previous researchers.
2.1 Background
This section highlights the differences and similarities between VoIP to the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) pertaining the network architectures, users’ experience, security
and quality of service. It is important to make comparison especially on the overall perform-
ance of a new system to a well known legacy system. In this context the overall performance
of a new system includes the quality of the audio signal, the system integrity, reliability and
scalability. However, since VoIP is treated as another application in the Internet, it is inevit-
ably important to discuss the Internet along with VoIP and PSTN. Generally, the new system
is expected to perform as well as, or better, than the legacy system in order to replace or work
side-by-side the legacy system. To date the VoIP service qualities have improved but still not
on par with the qualities of PSTN service. However, its tangible and intangible benefits ex-
ceed its incapability [71]. One of the tangible benefits of a VoIP service is reduced charges on
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long distance calls because the international toll charges induced by PSTN is not applicable
to Internet services. In addition, the intangible benefits include immediate support on VoIP
services once the IP network connectivity is available and lessening the burden of a network
administrator in monitoring multiple networks.
2.1.1 VoIP, Internet and PSTN
VoIP is a fast growing emerging technology. In term of services, it manages to position it-
self side-by-side with its counterpart: the PSTN. It attracts different parties, ranging from
hobbyists that use Internet to get free phone calls on a peer-to-peer basis and enterprise and
companies that want to reduce their operational cost. On the other hand, service providers
need to rollout new revenue generating services quickly by leveraging existing IP networks to
host VoIP services. At the same time they plan to deploy full scale VoIP network infrastruc-
tures in order to replace the PSTN network to reduce operational and administrative overhead.
By doing so their system administrators would only have to consider one system that hosted
voice, data and other media.
It is relatively cheap to make a long distance international call through a VoIP service
rather than a PSTN service. This is because network resources such as bandwidth, router CPU
and memory are shared between applications in the Internet. Hence, a VoIP service charge
would not include a relatively expensive trunk call charge that is normally associated with
a PSTN service. In the PSTN, a dedicated end-to-end link is provided to a call and other
calls would not be able to use the resources while the link is engaged. As a result of shared
resources, the perceived voice quality received at each end of a VoIP service is reduced. This,
however, does not prevent users from using VoIP services. To date there are approximately
two-billions internet users. The majority of these users are from Asia. The Internet is still
growing at a good rate, but the growth rate is not the same all over the world. The growth
rate will not increase again until broadband is further developed, and its price rates reduced
further [158]. VoIP users are also growing although most of them are hobbyist and IT-savvy.
Most users are taking advantage of low cost long-distance calls using PC-to-PC connectivity.
There are companies that have migrated their telephony services entirely to VoIP in order to
optimise the utilisation of their internal packet networks.
To use the services, VoIP users need IP phones or soft phones and also subscriptions to
VoIP service provider of their choice. They prefer using VoIP services to PSTN because
companies such as Skype offer free calls or impose relatively small charges to selected destin-
ations. Except for a minor adjustment on telephone types, users can still make land line calls
from their analogue phones, IP phones or softphones over existing IP-Based network. Users
have similar experiences that they are used to, as though as they are making calls using their
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Figure 2.1: End-to-end VoIP Data Processing
landline phones. In fact, VoIP behaves almost identically to PSTN when initiating, managing,
and terminating call sessions. The only different is that for a peer-to-peer VoIP, the end devices
are logically connected. When someone wants to make a call to a friend, he refers to his buddy
(i.e. contact) list for his friend account address. He also checks his friend connection status.
He will make the call if his friend is online. On the other hand, a PSTN service is between
two designated end devices. So even if the call is successful, it might be left unattended at the
other end of the line.
Figure 2.1 on page 28 shows a simplified end-to-end VoIP system process. It shows how
a signalling protocol establishes and manages call sessions. The process starts when a user
dials a destination number. A signalling protocol tries to establish a communication with
the destination phone. Once the call is setup, then a media control protocol negotiates on
media processing capabilities such as an audio or a video codec to be used for each media
type between two terminals. Then both users start their conversation as usual. Transparent
to them, their analogue voices are digitized then are transported over VoIP network and later
are decoded at the other end. The process of encoding, transporting and decoding continues,
until one of the users hangs up or there is a network problem that suddenly cuts off their
conversation. The main different between a VoIP call and a PSTN call is that it is carried
over IP-based network whereas a PSTN call is carried over a circuit-switched network. In
PSTN, a dedicated communications path is established for the duration of a conversation. No
new call can be made using the same channel as long as the path is still established. On the
other hand, the Internet is a best-effort public network without central administration that was
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Figure 2.2: PSTN versus Internet
originally designed for openness and scalability, refer to Figure 2.3 on page 30. The design
allows the network to grow rapidly. Resources are shared with several applications on the
Internet whereby a different communication path is established for each packet transmits over
the Internet. Hence, its applications are subjected to various kind of threats and attacks. VoIP
calls are treated as another applications on the Internet. Unless given higher priority, VoIP
calls must compete for network resources just like any other applications. The very different
architecture of VoIP to the traditional circuit-based telephony has resulted in significant secur-
ity issues. Keromytis suggested that VoIP system represent a higher complexity in terms of
its architecture, protocols and implementation which undoubtly would increase the potential
for misuse [87]. The PSTN was first introduced by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876 and its
services have been improved over the years. It is now a mature technology, with 99.999%
service availability [164]. Its equipment has been fine-tuned to provide good voice quality
over narrowband frequency of 300Hz to 3400Hz. Once a call is setup, the PSTN provides a
dedicated link between two parties. It seems secure, however, wiretapping is still possible at
the last mile.
Immature VoIP technology both introduces security risks and opens the door to more ex-
citing applications such as interactive shopping, streaming audio, electronic white-boarding
and CD-quality conference calls in stereo though it is believed that the quality of these ser-
2.1 Background 30
Figure 2.3: Internet Challenges and Opportunities
vices still needs improvement [12]. Although packet-based and unmanaged networks like the
Internet are ideal for delivering data such as e-mail or static Web traffic, the public Internet’s
best-effort service is less suitable for delivering interactive applications and time-sensitive data
such as a voice or a video streaming [110], similarly the Internet security needs are intensified
with the introduction of VoIP services in order to protect the two invaluable assets: data and
voice [91].
Figure 2.2 on page 29 shows the possibility of connecting both networks through gateways.
A gateway is a network device used to connect networks of different platforms (i.e. architec-
tures, infrastructures, topologies, technologies, codec types and environments). It is required
as an intermediate device to perform path selection, packet switching and codec negotiation
and transcoding if required. A gateway with a firewall is used to filter unwanted packets or
data. The packets would be queueing at the gateway to be processed. In which case there
would be a fixed delay due to the processing and variable delay that is caused by the queueing.
The source of delays and their effects to the VoIP quality are explained in Subsection 6.1.3. For
example, variable delays may cause voice packets to reach their destinations at unpredictable
time. This may result in conversational difficulty.
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2.1.2 Major Concerns For VoIP
Quality of service (QoS) and security are the two major concerns for the VoIP community.
It is believed that increasing security mechanism would result in poor performance of VoIP
services due to the additional processing of the security mechanism that would increase the
overall one-way delay [107, 91, 70]. On the other hand, without security mechanism in proper
places, VoIP services would be vulnerable and open to threats and attacks. VoIP architec-
tures are sensitive to network level attacks, protocol level attacks as well as management1
level attacks. An effective security mechanism is necessary for a secured VoIP environment.
There was no major incidents like a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attack or Denial of service
(DoS) attack that could jeorpadise VoIP services [1]. Nevertheless, DoS attacks are still one
of the main concern in VoIP. Mitigating DoS attacks on VoIP and other Internet applications
are essential since most proxies and network equipments are reachable on the Internet [9].
DoS attacks especially DDoS are difficult to mitigate [34, 131, 84]. Several researchers have
come up with solutions. For example, in order to minimize the DoS risk for servers, proxies
or any service equipment, Battistello et al. have designed a security protocol (i.e. Denial-of-
service Resistant Call Establishment Protocol) [9]. The protocol handles authentication and
key agreement and aims at guaranteeing secure VoIP call establishment between interconnec-
tion proxies of different domains. Another type of attacks is the Spam over Internet Telephony
(SPIT). Experts predict that VoIP operators will face problem with SPIT, a variant of an email
spam attack [118, 114]. SPIT is more intrusive since it is generated by automated softwares.
Unlike spam, the content of SPIT is hidden until the recipient of the call answers the call and
the disruption is done [118]. Since 2009, there are several solutions suggested to mitigate DoS
and SPIT attacks, especially on SIP based VoIP systems [83, 131, 114].
Securing and providing good quality services is nontrivial because VoIP calls are treated
just like any other applications on the best-effort Internet even though VoIP is a time sensitive
application [174]. The perceived voice quality is compromised, due to either lost packets
or excessive delay or jitter or combinations of these factors. There are many different types
of VoIP and IM to choose from. Currently the performance and behaviour of each service
over secure VoIP networks are not well documented. However, there are several efforts on
understanding the behaviour of Skype [45, 88, 44] and SIP [15, 149, 186].
2.1.3 Summary
The section gives the background of VoIP technology and its benefits to VoIP users, companies
IT administrators and VoIP service providers. Tangible benefits like reduction in long-distance
1All the activities, methods, procedures, and tools that pertain to the operation, administration, maintenance,
and provisioning of network resources.
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calls has attracted its users. On top of that, the overall reduction in network maintenance
cost might be the reason for a company to implement VoIP. Other benefits include intangible
benefits like ease of maintenance and fast deployment over existing company network. There
are many VoIP clients in the market. However, the performance and the behaviour of some of
these clients over secure VoIP networks are yet to be tested.
2.2 VoIP Protocols
VoIP turns the sender’s analogue speech into a digital representation and then transports the
signal into IP packets to the recipient. In order to be able to do that a set of communication
protocols is required to ensure a reliable interchange of data over a best-effort communication
channel. In a best-effort delivery system, there is no guarantee that the data is delivered to its
destination within a specified time limit. There is a possibility that data are lost during the
transaction. The performance demands of VoIP mean that an ordinary data network software
and hardware must be improved to support VoIP services. Many security issues are associated
with still-evolving VoIP technology, so it is difficult to develop a complete picture of what
a mature worldwide VoIP network will look like one day. Nevertheless, there are currently
many different architectures and protocols to choose from and eventually a true standard will
emerge. One of the current protocols is through TCP/IP protocols [91].
At the moment, most VoIP related protocols are assigned by the IETF for Internet com-
munications, and the IEEE and ISO, for other types. The ITU-T handles telecommunications
protocols and formats for PSTN. The ITU-R handles protocols and formats for radio com-
munications like WiMAX [33]. The different sets of standards are also being driven towards
technological convergence for the PSTN, radio systems, and Internet. These technologies
are inseparable and the services they offer complement one another. Ideally, communication
protocols are specified in such a way, that engineers, designers and software developers can
implement them without difficulty. One way to establish this objective is through protocol
layering [128]. Layering enables a mix-and-match of protocols that permit familiar protocols
to be adapted to support new services. Figure 2.4 shows a typical VoIP protocol suite. The
functions of the signalling and media control protocols are separated. In general, a signalling
protocol controls a call setup, establishment and tear down. A media control protocol controls
on how audio signals are being transmited, received and processed at the end points. It may
also negotiate on the codec type and on other resources like bandwidth, CPU and memory of
intermediate systems to carry out the task.
Figure 2.5 on page 33 shows how a digitized voice is carried over UDP/IP protocol. First,
the voice data are divided into small chunks. Then each chunk is encapsulated with a RTP
header before it leaves Application Layer to Transport Layer to form a voice data segment.
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Figure 2.4: VoIP Protocol Suite
Figure 2.5: Voice Data Processing of VoIP
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Then the segment is encapsulated with a UDP header before it leaves Transport Layer to Inter-
networking Layer to form an IP packet. Next the IP packet is encapsulated with an IP header
before it leaves Internetworking Layer to Network Access Layer to form a data frame. The
data frame is changed into bits of 0 and 1 pattern and is sent through Physical Layer and
over several other IP-Based clouds to a destination. At the other end, the process is reversed
whereby bits of 0 and 1 pattern is changed back to form a frame then to a packet then to a
segment. The process is repeated for several other segments. Then the voice segments are
assembled to form a complete stream if there is no error or no packet lost along the way. As
described above a voice data is carried by a RTP protocol over UDP which is connectionless
and best-effort. Therefore there is no retransmission for any voice data lost. During conver-
sation difficulty, a user repeats his sentence to be understood or he may terminate the call and
then redial to establish a new connection. There are several factors that affect the making of
a high-quality VoIP call. These factors include the speech codec, packetization, packet loss
rate, delay, delay variation, and the network architecture [55]. This section focuses on the
primary factors that are neccessary in making a successful VoIP call which include the call
setup signalling protocol, call admission control, security, and the ability to traverse NAT and
firewall. Consequently several VoIP protocols have been chosen for this study. They are clasi-
fied into Open Standard and Proprietary protocols. SIP and H.248 are examples of signalling
protocol available in Open Standard. XMPP is a protocol for Instant Messaging and RTP and
RTCP are protocols for call transfers that are also categorized in the Open Standard [10, 150].
Skype P2P, Cisco Skinny, Yahoo Messenger (YMSG) and IAX open source protocols are ex-
amples for proprietary protocols. The important features and characteristics of each protocol
are highlighted as depicted in Figure 2.6 on page 35. These features are extracted from RFC
documents and H.Series documents for those under IETF and ITU-T standards respectively.
For the proprietary protocols, books or other resources including online documents were re-
ferred to. These characteristics are elaborated in Figure 2.7 on page 36 and Figure 2.8 on
page 37.
2.2.1 SIP
SIP is a standard under the IETF [143]. Since the beginning, Internet Community prefers
SIP to H.323 protocol because its architecture is less complex and due to the fact that it has
been adopted by various standardisation organisations as the protocol for both wireline and
wireless world in the Next Generation Networks era [52]. It is a signalling protocol between
user agents and one or more proxy servers. However, SIP does not provide the service rather it
provides primitives that can be used to implement different services. The main purpose of SIP
is to initiate, modify and terminate sessions between two (or more) Internet end entities. There
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Figure 2.7: Open Source protocols
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Figure 2.8: Proprietary protocols
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are several types of entities that are defined in SIP: user agents, proxy servers, redirect servers,
and registrar servers. The proxy server is an intermediary entity that acts as both a server and
a client for making requests on behalf of other clients. The registrar is a particular server that
accepts user registration requests. The redirect server accepts requests and replies to the client
and provide a contact address for the called user [147]. SIP itself is independent of the type or
characteristics of the session and handles the session description as an opaque body. The actual
session description is handled by a companion protocol, SDP [64]. SDP stands for Session
Description Protocol. It is used to describe multimedia sessions in a format understood by
the participants over a network. For example, depending on this description a party decides
whether to join a conference or when or how to join a conference. SIP is based on the use of
textual messages, that are very similar to HTTP messages, aimed at session management and
parameters negotiation among SIP clients through SDP [157]. Nevertheless, SIP messages
may contain information that a user or a server wishes to keep private. However, the open
and distributed nature of the IP telephony architectures turn the establishment of a secure
environment for SIP into an extremely difficult task [52]. Notwithstanding, SIP provides its
own suite of security which includes Denial of Service prevention and authentication for User-
to-User and User-to-Proxy at both ends. SIP supports both IPv4 and IPv6 network addresses.
2.2.2 RTP
RTP is a transport protocol for real-time applications. RTP provides end-to-end network trans-
port functions suitable for applications transmitting real-time data, such as audio, video or
simulation data, over multicast or unicast network services. RTP does not address resource
reservation and does not guarantee quality of service for real-time services. The data trans-
port is augmented by a control protocol (RTCP) to allow monitoring of the data delivery in a
manner scalable to large multicast networks, and to provide minimal control and identification
functionality. RTP and RTCP are designed to be independent of the underlying transport and
network layers.
SRTP is a profile of RTP and RTCP. It provides confidentiality, message authentication
and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to RTCP to control RTP traffic. SRTP defines a set
of default cryptographic transforms and it allows a new cryptographic transformation to be in-
troduced in the future. It is suitable for a heterogeneous environment, hence, SRTP works well
with different types of signalling protocols. RTP and SRTP are under IETF standardization
[10, 150].
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2.2.3 H.323
H.323 is a framework for various pieces of protocols that fit together. H.225 defines call
signalling between endpoints and gateway. RTP/RTCP is used for transmit real time data
over IP networks. H.248.1 handles gateways and gatekeepers. H.245 controls establishment
and closure of media channels within the context of a call and to perform conference control.
H.235 is a recommendation for Security and encryption for H Series. H.323 is a standard
under ITU-T. It was the first Voice over IP standard [75].
Dalgic and Fang compared the functionality, QoS, scalability, flexibility, interoperability
and ease of implementation of H.323 and SIP [36]. H.323 version 2 and SIP are very similar
in term of functionalities and services that they can support. H.323 has fewer interoperability
issues since the supplementary services in H.323 are more rigorously defined. H.323 has
taken more steps to ensure compatibility among its different versions, and to interoperate with
PSTN. The two protocols are comparable in their QoS support for example similar call setup
delays, no support for resource reservation or Class of Service (CoS) setting, however, H.323
version 3 allows signalling of a requested CoS.
SIP’s main advantages are flexibility to add new features, and relative ease of implement-
ation and debugging. H.323 and SIP are improving themselves by learning from each other,
and the differences between them are narrowing with each new version [36].
2.2.4 MGCP
MGCP is a media gateway protocol. It is a master/slave protocol where the gateways are
expected to execute commands that are sent by Call Agents within a distributed system. It is
a standard under IETF [6].
2.2.5 Megaco
Megaco is another protocol similar to MGCP. However, it was a co-production between IETF
and ITU-T [60, 35]. Both protocols abide to the guidelines of the API Media Gateway Control
Protocol Architecture and Requirements2 [59].
2.2.6 XMPP
XMPP provides a generalized extensible framework for exchanging XML data. It is used
mainly for building instant messaging and presence applications that meet the requirements of
Instant Messaging / Presence Protocol Requirements [37]. To date it has been implemented
2RFC2805
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via a client-server architecture whereby a client utilizing XMPP accesses a server over a TCP
connection via port 5222 and servers also communicate with each other over TCP connec-
tions via port 5269. XMPP includes a method for authentication of a stream by means of an
XMPP-specific profile Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) protocol. XMPP
must support high security that is to provide mutual authentication and integrity-checking.
XMPP is a standard under the IETF.
Currently XMPP stanzas such as Jingle negotiation messages and service discovery ex-
changes are not encrypted or signed. As a result, it is possible for an attacker to intercept these
stanzas and modify them, thus convincing one party that the other party does not support
XTLS and therefore denying the parties an opportunity to use XTLS. This is a more general
problem with XMPP technologies and needs to be addressed at the core XMPP layer.
2.2.7 Skype
Skype is a proprietary P2P telephony network. Skype employed special techniques to deliver
state-of-the-art-IP-based telephony; Firewall and NAT traversal; Global decentralized user
directory; Intelligent Routing; Encryption of end-to-end instant messages; Supernode and
Simple User Interface [146].
As a proprietary protocol, any events that happen behind the scenes are beyond control of
the user or application deployer. Therefore Skype users are advised to apply security patches
regularly. Skype as a host program scans ports and IP addresses to identify if it is behind a
firewall or NAT devices. This action is believed to deliberately weaken the security of any
corporate firewalls because pinholes are created to allow communication through. Skype also
depends on the whole of Internet connectivity for efficient use of the Internet’s bandwidth and
processing power. It uses a network of supernodes, that can act as proxy servers for hosts that
are behind firewalls. Supernodes are selected among peers with large computational power
and good connectivity in terms of bandwidth, uptime and absence of firewalls [13]. Skype can
promote any of its clients to supernode status without the user knowledge. As a result, a voice
call can go through an unexpected path and through a risky and uncontrolled proxy server. On
top of that an enterprise that does not deploy any firewalls, could find that its Skype clients are
promoted to supernodes [30].
Bonfiglio et al. discovered that Skype adopted different types of voice codecs [13]. Some
are Constant Bitrate (CBR), while others are Variable Bitrate (VBR) codecs. Skype reacted
differently and changed its behaviours according to network conditions. The algorithm used
by Skype to perform selection between different codecs was unknown. All codecs were stand-
ard except for ISAC, a proprietary solution of GlobalIPSound. ISAC was the preferred codec
for end-to-end calls, while the G.729 codec was preferred for Skypeout (i.e. any call involving
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a Skype peer and a PSTN terminal) calls. Skype detected the change of network conditions
based on several parameters. For example, Codec Rate (i.e. the bitrate used by the source) and
Redundancy Factor (i.e. the number of past blocks that Skype retransmits, independently from
the adopted codec, along with the current block) were the preferred indicators used by Skype
before responding to the network conditions change. Other than that, Skype message fram-
ing time (i.e. time elapsed between two subsequent Skype frames) was frequently modified as
well.
2.2.8 Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP)
SCCP is a Cisco proprietary protocol for communication between Cisco IP phones and Call-
Manager Server. In this model, all the intelligence is built into the server, which is a Call
Manager in the Cisco IP Telephony solution. The client, which is a Cisco IP phone, has min-
imal intelligence. In other words, the Cisco IP phones have to do less work, thus requiring less
memory and processing power. The Call Manager, being the intelligent server, learns client
capabilities, controls call establishment, clears calls, sends notify signals e.g. message waiting
indication (MWI), reacts to signals from the client after the user presses the directory button
on the phone [132].
2.2.9 YMSG
YMSG is a proprietary network protocol used by the Yahoo! Messenger instant messaging
client. Communication is between client application and a server over TCP/IP on a default
port 5050 or others. User messages are sent in binary format in which text portions of the
data are transmitted in plain view. Hence, in this case, part of the message is exposed and
unprotected. However, authentication is on the login details. Different protocols are used to
transfer different data types on the Internet. File transfer, JPEG are via HTTP. Chat room
categories, rooms and lobbies are retrieved using HTTP as XML documents. VoIP is handled
indirectly by Yahoo server to avoid use by unauthorized users [183]. YMSG also supports
PC-to-PC voice and conference calls between friends. YMSG cannot run behind corporate
proxy servers and firewalls. However, YMSG works behind most PAT and NAT.
2.2.10 Inter-Asterisk eXchange version 2 (IAX2)
IAX2 is a P2P application-layer control and media protocol for creating, modifying and ter-
minating multimedia sessions over IP networks. Unlike Skype it was developed by the open
source community for the Asterisk PBX for VoIP call control. It is proprietary, but open
[40]. It is extremely flexible for other type of streaming media. It is an all in one protocol
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that combines both control and media services in the same protocol. IAX2 supports security
features by allowing multiple methods of user authentication and authorization during peer
registration. It also supply generic framework for native encryption [156].
2.2.11 Summary
The VoIP protocol types, implementation styles, protocol stack that they are in, security fea-
tures and protocols that are related of the selected protocols are observed. The survival of each
protocol could not be predicted, however, the trend is on the standard recommended by the
Internet community, IETF. For building instant messaging and presence applications, XMPP
might be the winner especially as it is used by Google in Google Talk Service. For signalling,
SIP is preferred over H.323 by the IETF community. H.323, however, was predominance in
the 90s. Skype P2P is believed to be much superior in term of its architecture, however, enter-
prises requiring total control and administration of its network might find it is a less desirable
choice. MGCP, Megaco, H.248.1 may be used as standards for media gateway. For transport,
TCP and UDP are the two most obvious choices.
IAX2 is an alternative end-to-end connection especially for Asterisk PBX community. It
has overcome the problem of intermediary NAT and firewalls by using the same stream for
data and control. In addition IAX2 may soon become a standard under IETF. An Internet-
Draft April 2007 was sent for IETF review.
So far the existing protocols seem sufficient to handle various part of end-to-end VoIP
communications. Nevertheless, since the technology is relatively new, the protocols are still
evolving and one standard that govern both IETF and ITU-T is still far away. In which case
it brings opportunities (i.e. more advanced features than PSTN) and security risk at the same
time. Unfortunately, until then, VoIP vendors will have to cater for both standard within their
hardwares and softwares. This give researchers an opportunity to explore further on how to
improve the security of VoIP network and to improve VoIP quality of service.
2.3 VoIP Security Issues
David Endler, chairman of the VoIP Security Alliance aptly argues that the VoIP security
issues affect not only carriers, service providers and enterprises but also consumers. Currently,
technologies like instant messaging and web services also started to feel its detrimental effects.
The problems though should be addressed by all parties involved. They are too complicated
to be solved by one party alone because every party is only responsible for a part of the
problem [58]. To appreciate the vulnerabilities and threats that are awaiting to emerge, one
needs to understand the threats and vulnerabilities of computer systems and networking. Most
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computers are connected with the rest of the world through the Internet and are therefore
vulnerable to attack.
Though it is rare, it is not impossible for someone to steal one’s identity and perform
transactions on one’s behalf. Friends, business partners or even banks might think that they
are communicating with an authorised individual. Whatever white collar crimes that can hap-
pen in the real world, they will give bigger impact in the virtual world since Internet has no
boundary. Somebody from Singapore for example might be breaking a law in China during his
visit in Malaysia. Computer Security was introduced in a later stage of the World Wide Web
development during the late 80s and early 90s. Identification, Authentication, Authorization
and Accountability are the parameters to ensure that only authorized personnel can get access
to authorized resources.
Vulnerabilities and threats that relate to a computer network soon will be threatening VoIP
services, after all VoIP is just another application on IP Network. This is consistently ex-
pressed in [166, 82, 47]. According to Lehtinen, vulnerabilities to computer networks in-
clude physical and natural disaster, on hardware and software, media, emanation3, communic-
ation and human [98]. Natural and physical disaster, unintentional, and intentional attacks are
threats to computer networks. Foreign intelligence agents, terrorists, criminals, corporate raid-
ers and crackers are few examples of outsiders that might try to steal unauthorized information
from the computer networks.
In addition, the computer networks are exposed to the threats from the company em-
ployees, former employees or contractors. For example, disgruntled employees impose high
threats, because they are authorised to access the company information through legitimate
means [133]. Their plans to sabotage the network could be executed undetected until the dam-
ages have been done. The statistics for the security research done between 1980s to 2000 for
13 incidents correlated with traditional IT world at the time whereby 70% of security breaches
were carried out by insiders [19]. Another study done between 2001 and 2003 showed that
70% of all events came from external, indicating a significant change in threat source since
then due to the increase in global connectivity at this point in time and onwards. For example,
the Internet users are growing at a good rate, however, the growth rate is not the same all
over the world. There are approximately two-billions Internet users whereby the majority of
these users are from Asia [158]. Further study on ”point of entry” on 14 internal incidents
and 25 external incidents showed that majority (i.e.36%) of the external security incidents
are from Internet and majority (i.e.43%) of the internal security incidents are from business
networks. This shows that there is high possibility for the vulnerabilities and threats from in-
ternal and external sources to interfere with the VoIP services because they are closely linked
3Emits electrical and electronic radiation
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to the Internet and business networks.
Fortunately there are several ways to mitigate these vulnerabilities and threats although
some of these methods may put the quality of service and performance of the system at risk
[120]. Computer Security, Communication Security and Physical Security are a few counter
measures to mitigate these vulnerabilities and threats. Everybody in an organization is ac-
countable to the well-being of the organization computer network and IT Assets. For example,
Computer Security is the responsibility of the company System Administrator. They should
be given appropriate authority to grant the right access controls to the right personnel at the
right time based on their roles in the company. On top of that the company top manage-
ment supports are important in order to ensure that every employee abide to the company IT
policies. There are several access control models available. Role-Based Access Control can
be configured to enforce Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control policies. Discretionary
Access Control and Mandatory Access Control are more traditional models. For Mandatory
Access Control only one administrative role is assumed. For Discretionary Access Control,
a more complex set of administrative roles is required. Role-based Access Control mech-
anisms are general enough to simulate both traditional methods [123]. On the other hand,
Communication Security is the responsibility of the service provider. Physical Security is the
responsibility of the building security and asset department of a company. Other employees
must ensure that their IT Assets are well looked after. Voice over IP Security Alliance Public
Release 1.0.24, October 2005 listed out VoIP Security and Privacy Threats, [166]. The threats
are Social Threats, Eavesdropping, Call Pattern Tracking, Traffic Captures, Interception and
Modification, Service Abuse, Intentional Interruption of Service, Physical Intrusion and other
Interruption like power failure. Figure 2.9 on page 45 shows the relationship between the
Internet Attacks and the VoIP Attacks.
Although there are many areas of concern, the thesis addresses the network layer security
and the media transport security only but not on the social engineering attacks, the physical
intrusion, the session security and other types of threats and vulnerabilities as depicted in
Figure 2.9.
2.3.1 Social Threat
Every individual, enterprise, goverment and country has the right for the protection against
social threats. Social threats consist of misrepresentations of identity, authority, right and
contents, theft of service and receiving unwanted contacts and contents like spam of subjective
or offensive contents, refer to Figure 2.11 on page 47.
Security and privacy are vital to social needs [166]. Planners should balance between
Return on Investment (ROI) and convenience of service when design IP network. Several
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Figure 2.10: Network attacks
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Figure 2.11: Social threats
models have been adopted in order to protect the privacy of any communications made within
the ICT community. The Basic Multi-party Freedom Model, for example, allows role shifting
between two or more parties that are involved in any interactive communications. In the
Privacy Model, everybody has the privilege over his communication system, protection from
unauthorized access, interruption, delay or modification. Security is used as a medium to
protect the right to have privacy. The Basic Social Responsibility Model determines the social
responsibility by examined both the intention and the impact of a person’s conduct before
any consideration being made on what a system should do either to deny, tolerate or permit.
Sometimes intentional and external control or interruption is justified because it adheres to
other more pressing social requirements, such as intercepting a communication system to
assist in a rescue or prevent a catastrophe.
2.3.2 Eavesdropping
An eavesdropping attack is defined as a method by which an attacker is able to capture the
entire signalling and/or data stream between several VoIP endpoints, however, the attacker
cannot or does not change the data itself [166]. The attacker, however, can reconstruct new
sentence from the data that he has gained earlier. In general, eavesdropping attacks are possible
in shared media such as Ethernet and wireless networks. The attacker configures the respective
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network interface in promiscuous mode. In this mode, the attacker’s computer graps any
packets sent on the network. If packets are unencrypted, the attacker can read the credentials
data including password [180]. Eavesdropping tools are easily available, for example tcpdump
and Wireshark [148]. In the context of VoIP, eavesdropping can be divided into call pattern
tracking, traffic capture, number harvesting and conversation, voice mail, fax, video or text
reconstructions, refer to Figure 2.12 on page 48. Wireshark and tcpdump can still be used to
sniff the VoIP packets. On top of that a microphone and an audio recorder might be used to
record any conversation between the two communicating channels.
In networks that do not use shared media or where packets are encrypted, an attacker may
be able to use a MitM attack to intercept communication between a client and a server. MitM
is a form of active eavesdropping where the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker.
By impersonating the server or an intermediary system, the attacker may be able to fool the
client into connecting with the attacker rather than the server. The attacker can then capture
the client’s credentials including the client’s identity and password. The attacker uses those
credentials to connect to the server, impersonating the client. In order to make the communic-
ation appear normal, the attacker relays packets between the client and the server. Nonetheless
the attacker can read, modify, inject, or drop any packet, even if the client and the server au-
thenticate and encrypt all packets [181]. MitM attacks compromise the integrity of the data
sent between any two communicating channels [92]. In general, most of the SIP messages
exchanged during a call-setup phase are not authenticated, and usually the communicating
parties do not apply source control [157]. On the same account, H.323 can also suffer from
MitM attacks.
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Figure 2.13: Interception and modification
2.3.3 Interception and Modification
In these class of attacks, an attacker can see the whole signalling and data stream between
two endpoints just like eavesdropping. However, the attacker can also modify the traffic as
an intermediary in the conversation [166]. Interception and modification consist of call black
holing4, call rerouting, fax or conversation alterations, conversation degrading, conversation
impersonation and hijacking, and false caller identification, refer to Figure 2.13 on page 49.
2.3.4 Intentional Interruption of Service
Intentional interruption of a service includes Denial of Services (DoS) and physical intrusion.
In particular, the VoIP Security Alliance categorizes denial of services into VoIP specific DoS,
network services DoS, DoS attack on operating system or firmware and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) [166], refer to Figure 2.14 on page 50. Unlike social threats, eavesdropping,
interception and modification attacks, this attack can disrupt the Internet system which affects
all related Internet services.
There exist several taxonomies of DoS attacks. For example, Farraposo et al. give a clas-
sification of DoS attacks that are associated with the TCP/IP suite and distinquish this classi-
fication with some other taxonomies in order to assist them in understanding the similarities
and differences in DoS attacks and the scope of the DoS problem [48]. Most of the attacks
use illegitimate packets, however, some techniques allow attackers to launch their attacks with
legitimate packets. Most DoS attacks on TCP/IP suite exploit the weaknesses that existed in
the TCP/IP protocol and architecture. For example, a flooding attack is launch by creating a
packet storm against the victim and an exploitation attack exploits TCP vulnerabilities during
connect phase by manipulating TCP/IP flags (SYN, ACK, RST and FIN) and timeouts.
In a similar interest, Peng et al. categorize denial of services into four different types
of bandwidth attacks [127]. They are DoS, DDoS, Distributed Reflector DoS (DRDoS) and
4Unauthorized dropping
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Table 2.1: Denial Of Services Attacks [127]
Type of
Attack
Description
Methods Of
Attack
Aims Possible Target
Denial of
Services
(DoS)
DoS attacks generally achieve their goal by
sending large volumes of packets arbitrarily
similar to legitimate traffic. that occupy a
significant proportion of available bandwidth.
Launch from a single or few hosts ( i.e. less than
10)
Protocol-Based
Bandwidth At-
tacks:
• SYN
Flood
• ICMP
Flood
Consume critical re-
sources in a net-
work service to pre-
vent legitimate users
from accessing the
service
CPU and memory
capacity in a server,
stack space in net-
work protocol soft-
ware, or
Internet link capa-
city
Distributed
DoS (DDoS)
Similar to DoS but attackers usually control
many hosts to generate the attack traffics.
DDoS is the most common Bandwidth attack.
Typically contains two stages:
Stage 1: Compromise vulnerable systems that
are available in the Internet and install attack
tools in these compromised systems. (i.e. turn-
ing computers into zombies)
Stage 2: Attacker sends an attack command to
the zombies through secure channel to launch a
bandwidth attack against targeted victims.
Application-
Based Bandwidth
Attacks:
• HTTP
Flood
• SIP
Flood
Similar to DoS Two important In-
ternet Applications,
namely World Wide
Web and VoIP.
Distributed
Reflector
DoS
(DRDoS)
Attacks
DRDoS is considered to be a potent and in-
creasingly prevalent Internet Attacks. DRDoS
attacks have the ability to amplify the attack
traffics.
DRDoS attack in three stages:
Stage 1: Compromise vulnerable systems that
are available in the Internet and install attack
tools in these compromised systems. (i.e. turn-
ing computers into zombies)
Stage 2: Attackers instruct zombies to send any
third parties spoofed traffic with the victim’s IP
address as the source IP address.
Stage 3: The third parties will then send the
reply traffic to the victim, which constitutes a
DDoS attack.
Amplification At-
tack:
• Domain
Name
Service
(DNS)
Ampli-
fication
Attacks.
Similar to DDoS but
obscure the sources
of attack traffic by
using third parties
(routers, web serv-
ers) to relay attack
to victims.
Web sites, DNS
servers, Computers
Infrastructure
Attacks
It is potentially catastrophic as the whole Inter-
net may be affected.
Example:
• Attack
on DNS
root
servers.
• Attack
on core
routers.
Disable the services
critical components
of the Internet.
All services that de-
pended on Internet
Infrastructure.
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Infrastructure attacks, refer to table 2.1 on page 51. DDoS is the most common bandwidth
attack. An attacker usually controls many hosts to generate the attack traffics. Once the
target systems have been compromised, an attacker sends an attack command through secure
channel to launch a bandwidth attack against targeted victims. In which case not only VoIP
is affected, but data network as well. Fortunately these bandwidth attacks can be mitigated
with the right filtering techniques like ingress/egress filtering, router-based packet filtering
and source address validity enforcement protocol.
VoIP specific DoS includes request flooding, malformed requests and messages, QoS ab-
use, spoofed messages and call hijacking [166]. For example, refer to Table 2.1 on page 51,
DDoS main targets are the World Wide Web and VoIP in particular the http and SIP protocols.
Once affected, a computer becomes a zombie which then would launch another bandwidth
attack to another victim. Request floodings are DoS attacks that involve overwhelming the
target with a number of legitimate and/or invalid requests. For legitimate request flooding,
the attacker must have a legitimate account with a SIP server. After logging in, the attacker
may continuously request for a SIP service from a target. The requests would be processed
normally but the target may appear busy to other users. This creates a DoS attack. However,
it can be easily traced to the attacker. In invalid request flooding, attacker is not required to be
properly authenticated by SIP server. An attacker overwhelms a SIP server by sending fake
requests or messages. In this kind of DoS attack the attacker identity is hidden [26].
Implementation flaws of SIP systems also create opportunities for malformed requests and
messages attacks. The vulnerabilities may be fixed through software patches as soon as they
are found. These kind of DoS attacks include disabling endpoints with invalid requests, inject-
ing invalid media into call processor, and malformed protocol messages. Spoofed messages
cause the call processing system to be disrupted in a number of ways. For example, a faked
call tear down distrupts services by causing a session to end prematurely, thus denying service
to the users. A faked response like a line BUSY may deny a victim from receiving any incom-
ing call. QoS abuse involves an attacker violating the QoS negotiated at setup, for example
codec type. This would have the effect of introduced latency which affects voice quality dur-
ing a call. Call hijacking includes registration hijacking, media session hijacking, and server
masquerading. Hijacking occurs when some transactions of a VoIP Service are taken over by
an attacker. The hijacked transactions may be signalling, media or both. For example, attacker
spoofs a SIP Response redirecting the caller to a rogue SIP address and intercept the call. The
attack leads to the service interruptions, thus denying service to the users.
2.3 VoIP Security Issues 53
Figure 2.15: Other service interruptions
2.3.5 Service Abuse
Service abuse could be from a customer or an employee of an ISP or a third party. For ex-
ample Premium Rate Service Fraud is a method whereby traffic is artificially increased for
the purpose of maximise billing. Improper Bypass or Adjustment to Billing are method to
avoid authorized service charges or for concealing other fraud by adjusting billing records.
Other improper access to services include various forms of identity theft where legitimate
credentials obtained without consent are exploited without concession of their rightful owner,
manipulating internal access into authentication systems like VoIP gateways, switches and act-
ive directories and various method of concealing fraud by spreading access across numerous
accounts to avoid exposure by fraud analytical analysis and reporting software [166].
2.3.6 Other Interruptions of service
Other than the intentional interruption of service, VoIP is also subjected to other types of
service interruption. Among a few are: loss of power supply, resource exhaustion like CPU
and stack overflow and packet delay that is caused by traffic congestion or processing delay
at a gateway, see Figure 2.15 on page 53. Since a VoIP service depends on the availability of
these resources, the interruptions have a profound effect on the overall VoIP performance.
2.3.7 Summary
There are six different categories of VoIP related security threats and attacks. Among others
are security threats that affect individuals privacy and attacks that affect the service quality.
This indicates that VoIP services can lead to more threats to Internet users. For example,
eavesdropping and MiTM attacks compromise one’s privacy and DoS attacks cause Internet
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and VoIP system to be out of service. Researchers should find ways to protect VoIP services
before it is too late.
2.4 VoIP QoS
There are several meaning of QoS. One is on the operation and the other is pertaining to
the measurement of service quality. Not to be mistaken, the term QoS sometimes is used to
indicate quality of a particular service. A QoS operation ensures that an application is able
to transmit data in an acceptable way, in an acceptable time frame so that the transmission
is not delayed, distorted, or lost. On the other hand, QoS measurement is related to end-to-
end service performance. It is a measurement on how good or bad a service quality is at any
point of data transmission over any selected network. The service quality can be determined
by measuring the service availability and the data throughput. The service is good if the
service availability is high and the data throughput is also high. One way to measure the
service availability is to calculate the service downtime for a given period and then calculate
the percentage of service availability for the given period. The data throughput could be
determined by measuring the amount of successful data transfer in a given time.
The main purpose of QoS operation is to differentiate between different types of traffic
and types of services. In which case the different types of service and traffic can be treated
differently. Figure 2.16 on page 56 emphasizes several relevant themes as regards to VoIP QoS
characteristics. QoS is important for time-sensitive data and interactive application like voice
and video streaming over best effort network. Customer satisfaction is important to service
providers therefore it is important for a serviced-based organization to maintain a specific level
of quality. Naturally, one would compare the quality of service provided by a new system over
the legacy system. So, what is the benchmark of this comparison?
Horacio de Oliveira from Telecommagazine.com in 2002 suggested that the quality of
telecommunication services depends on a combination of numerous factors such as the quality
of call setup, service availability and call quality [68]. Among the three, call quality was most
emphasized. Several methods and processes to measure the QoS have been derived. The
standard methods and processes were documented in QoS standard like E-Model, Perceptual
Speech Quality Measures (PSQM) and Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) to
name few of them [76, 159, 124, 139]. Other methods like Measuring Normalizing Blocks
(MNB) and Perceptual Analysis Measurement System (PAMS) are derived from PSQM and
Mean Opinion Score (MOS) respectively [169, 171, 136, 137, 140]. The overall objective
of measuring QoS is to find out whether the system operate within the tolerable response
time, loudness levels, frequency response, interrupts and noise level. In addition, it minimises
cross-talk and any noticeable echoes.
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One must understand why QoS is more important to VoIP services rather than PSTN ser-
vices. As mentioned before PSTN is a dedicated circuit-switched network. QoS was as im-
portant then as it is now. A circuit-switched network is not immune to propagation delay,
network noise and other errors. That was why sometimes users experience crosstalk over
PSTN network. However, the error or noise is still acceptable to the human ear. On top of
that, once a call is established, the line is dedicated to one traffic channel until it is termin-
ated. Hence, there was no network resource competition even though the call traffic is passing
through several discrete networks.
2.4.1 VoIP Metrics
VoIP is carried over a packet-switched network. The network is shared by variety of ap-
plications. No dedicated line is reserved to time-sensitive data and interactive applications
such as voice and video streaming. That is why Salah and Almashari encourage that, before
implementing VoIP services on a new or existing network, a corporate user should assess its
readiness [144]. They suggested that VoIP is bounded by two important metrics, first, available
bandwidth and second, end-to-end delay. Subsection 2.4.2 on page 61 describes the method
in calculating the required bandwidth in order to ensure that the VoIP service is good and its
user experience little or no disruption. This is consistent with the parameters suggested in the
E-Model [76].
The QoS operation cannot create bandwidth, it can only efficiently partition bandwidth
based on different parameters. Generally, VoIP requires an adequate amount of uninterrup-
ted bandwidth for transmission to be successful, and therefore can strain existing network
resources [119]. The QoS operations and algorithms is discussed in Subsection 2.4.3 on page
63. When there is a heavy traffic, the overall performance degrades and results in the traffic de-
gradation due to a one-way delay, jitter and packet loss. A delay is the elapsed of time observed
for a complete or an on-going task. The delay influences customer satisfaction because it may
cause conversational difficulty. The flow of any telephony conversations is bidirectional. If the
delay for the ongoing and the incoming traffics are consistent and within tolerance values, then
the calling and called parties would not experience any conversational difficulty. However,
when the one-way delay due to the propagation, transmission and queueing delays exceeds
150ms, then both parties would have problem understanding one another [43]. The situation
is deteriorated with the jitter and packet loss because in most cases, there is no retransmission
for any packet loss and jitter that causes an inconsistent delay. Packet loss concealment (PLC)
technique is used to minimise the overall effect of packet loss. For example, to compensate
for a single lost packet, a VoIP waveform CODECs, such as G.711, an end device typically
plays the previous packet. In case of a VoIP non-waveform CODECs, such as G.723.1, an end
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device typically uses forward error correction (FEC) to compensate for lost packets [3].
PSTN provides a dedicated mouth-to-ear transmission once a call is established. It is
a connection-oriented network where calls are assigned a constant bandwidth. The PSTN
rejects any new calls when there is an excessive traffic transmitted over its network. However,
this is not the case with IP network. The bandwidth is shared between several applications.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that VoIP services will have enough bandwidth for any
single new mouth-to-ear transmission. The problem with the end-to-end delay, jitter, packet
reordering and frame erasures in WAN is discussed by Kos et al. [90]. They also explained
the emerging techniques for solving those problems. However, other important issues for
VoIP such as codec types, VoIP signalling, protocols, securities and its compatibility with
PSTN network were not discussed.
It is believed that part of the poor VoIP performance is due to the TCP/IP design. TCP/IP
is designed to maintain network reliability and stability and equal bandwidth sharing among
applications within the IP network. The design is fine if its objective is to ensure that all
packets eventually reach their destinations. Nevertheless, it does no justice to time-sensitive
applications like VoIP and video streaming. Any delay, jitter or packet loss affect the quality
of such applications.
2.4.1.1 Bandwidth Sharing, Congestion Control and Time Sensitive Traffic
In order to maintain stability and reliability within a shared network, TCP control the transmis-
sion made from a sender to a receiver. If TCP granted every users to transfer data whenever
they wished, bandwidth would not be shared equally and network throughput is reduced in
response to the heavy traffic. The TCP protocol uses a variety of algorithms which basically
decelerate the sending application when congestion is discovered. It is designed to spread the
deceleration fairly evenly across every contending links, thus giving each link an equal share
of the available network bandwidth [5].
In order to measure the congestion, TCP uses two different mechanisms (i.e. Round-trip
Time (RTT) and packet loss). TCP cuts its transmission rate by half every time it detects loss.
This can contribute to another additional latency after the initial loss. Even small amounts of
loss can drastically reduce the TCP throughput. Designers of time-sensitive applications often
opposed this equal bandwidth sharing. They want better control over how network bandwidth
is assigned to applications so that highly time-critical data can get through quickly, at the
cost of less time-sensitive data. Many designers choose a UDP-based messaging system to
deliver their time-sensitive data because UDP does not automatically reduce the data transfer
rate in the event of congestion. Unfortunately, as many designers have discovered, UDP-based
messaging can cause instability in a congested network, sometimes leading to congestion onset
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being cleared prematurely. Since a network bandwidth is a finite resource, some measures
need to be taken to maintain stability when there are more time-sensitive messages to be sent
than the network can satisfied.
VoIP routers and switches require enough bandwidth capacity to support VoIP services.
Network vendors have developed mechanisms to calculate bandwidth for different type of
codecs [168]. For example, a VoIP over Ethernet with G.711 codec without compression, the
bandwidth is 95.2 kbps percall. However, VoIP over Ethernet with G.729A codec requires
39.2 kbps of bandwidth [119]. Compression reduces the amount of required bandwidth but
may induce additional latency due to coder/decoder processes at both ends. In addition, any
packet losses within compressed packets can seriously degrade the quality of VoIP services.
2.4.1.2 Data Reception
TCP only supports in-order delivery model. This means that a TCP receiver must add extra
delay to cater for queueing delay of a de-jitter buffer (also known as a playout buffer) whenever
data arrives out of order so as to put the data back in order. TCP also often unnecessarily
retransmits data that was already successfully received after out-of-order data is received.
There are two main causes of out-of-order data reception. The most frequent cause is packet
losses, either at the physical or network-layer. Another, less frequent cause of out-of-order
data reception is that packets can take different paths through the network whereby one path
might have more latency than the other.
There are several attempts to make TCP friendly towards time-sensitive application [29].
For example, popular applications such as Skype use TCP since UDP packets cannot pass
through restrictive network address translators (NATs) and firewalls [16]. TCP has tradition-
ally been considered inappropriate for real-time applications. This is because the congestion
control algorithm of TCP leads to a varying throughput for a real-time application and may
cause packets retransmission to arrive too late for playback and therefore the packets be-
come useless [179, 129]. Due to the characteristic of TCP that provides variability in the data
throughput, most applications use a de-jitter buffer at the receiver side to compensate for any
jitter at a trade-off of delays and packet losses. This method is used to improve the Quality of
Experience (QoE) of a VoIP user [184]. As with packet switched networks the packet queuing
delays are hard to predict. In order to mitigate the problem, a de-jitter buffer holds the VoIP
packets temporarily until their scheduled playout time is due [179]. Though the packets exper-
ience slightly longer network delays, they can still be used as long as they arrive at the listeners
node ahead of their respective scheduled playout time. However, the challenging issue of a
de-jitter buffer is to determine the right buffer size for the current network conditions whereby
a larger buffer size leads to a better sound quality, but it reduces any conversational interactiv-
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ity [179]. In which case, the buffer size adjustment can be treated as an optimization problem.
This buffer dimensioning could be incorporated into a VoIP application as only a weighted
sum operation is needed to compute the optimal buffer size. One solution is to use elastic
buffers. For example, these buffers may be constructed according to the prescribed rules from
fixed sets of basic building blocks [103]. The basic building blocks could be a component
that store values and a component that divide and recombine stream of packets, including a
method to construct arbitarry systems from the set of these basic components. Tree buffers
that consist of fan-out and fan-in trees are more flexible than linear buffers that only operate
at a maximum throughput at a single occupancy level. One research, the empirical evaluation
of a VoIP de-jitter buffer on Skype, Google Talk and MSN Messenger, shows that Skype does
not adjust its de-jitter buffer at all while MSN Messenger performs the best in terms of buffer
dimensioning even though both Google Talk and MSN do not adjust their buffer sizes appro-
priately [179]. The research also shows that the QoE of the three VoIP applications could
be better by improving their buffer dimensioning algorithms. As a solution, they proposed a
simple regression-based algorithm that computes the optimal de-jitter buffer size based on the
current network conditions. The issue with the approprite de-jitter buffer is still opened. How-
ever, many researchers concentrate on the dimensioning algorithm. For example, Wu et al.
suggested a simple algorithm that computes the optimal buffer size based on an objective QoE
metric that considers both of the conversational interactivity and the speech quality [179]. An-
other example by Perwej and Parwej that suggest a modified buffer algorithm that was based
on several existing adaptive buffer algorithms and the study on the network impairments to
obtain optimised voice quality [129]. However, buffering or caching introduces more latency
into the system. The buffer may be miscongured and would be either too large or too small.
If a de-jitter buffer is too small then a large number of packets may be discarded, which can
lead to a call quality degradation. If a de-jitter buffer is too large then the additional delay can
lead to a less conversational interactivity. A typical de-jitter buffer conguration is betweeen 30
milliseconds to 50 milliseconds in depth. Sweeney and Wijesekera suggested that a tradeoff
between packet loss and latency is required when sizing the de-jitter buffer and it is usually
sized to be one to two times the sample interval if a static de-jitter buffer is used [3]. In the
case of an adaptive jitter buffer, then the maximum size may be set between 100 milliseconds
to 150 milliseconds. If the buffer size exceeds 100 milliseconds then the additional delay in-
troduced can also lead to a conversational difficulty [129]. To overcome the additional buffer
delay, Gong and Kabal have proposed a quality-based playout algorithm with a forward-error
correction (FEC) design based on conversational quality including calling quality and inter-
activity [53, 54]. Their simulation results show that their algorithm is able to correct packet
losses and improving perceived conversational quality. They use the E-Model R factor as the
cost index to obtain playout delays which adapt with each talkspurt. They use sender-driven
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repair algorithms, in which a sender sends redundancy information, to mitigate the impact of
the missing packets due to the network impairments and buffer underflow without increasing
the buffer delays.
2.4.1.3 Multipoint or Single-point Measurement
The QoS measurement points should be considered in a network design. In general, the QoS
can be measured between two network edges or two network nodes, refer to Figure 2.17 on
page 60 (i.e. between points A and D or B and C or E and F). Multipoint measurement requires
precise synchronization of clocks of the devices used to measure performance. If time stamps
are used in packets, careful clock synchronization is needed between the devices in order to
calculate delay to both directions.
Figure 2.17: QoS measurement points
Other than network edges and network nodes, another measurement points are user ter-
minals. Kim et al. introduced the development of a terminal agent for QoS measurement that
is suitable for a Next Generation Network (NGN) environment [89]. The terminal agent, in-
stalled in the user terminal (i.e. IP-based audio and video phones), as a software or hardware
chip, measured the quality index for voice and video related multimedia services, such as R-
value, MOS value, call success rate, one-way delay, jitter and packet loss. The terminal agent
also applied the packet capturing method when using the actual service, and analysed SIP,
RTP, and RTCP protocol headers of the received packet. SIP, RTP and RTCP are discussed in
Section 2.2 on page 32. In some cases, it is more appropriate to have a single-point measure-
ment point. A single-point measurement provide end-to-end performance information, which
can be used to find QoS. This setup enables the possibility to measure round-trip time (RTT).
The end-to-end performance information is a valuable QoS metric and gives direct insight into
the total performance of the system. For example, RTT is one of the parameter required to
estimate the R-factor in E-model.
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2.4.2 Bandwidth Calculator
A VoIP service requires enough bandwidth to generate a good quality call. However, there are
a number of factors that affect a VoIP bandwidth requirement. In addition, the VoIP service
coexists with other Internet applications. The data applications including any VoIP data that
exist on the Internet are either transmitted over TCP or UDP transport modes, some might
be delay sensitive, some produce traffics that are either bursty or benign in nature, others
are lightweight or eat up bandwidth and so forth [160]. Voice traffic is smooth, benign and
very predictable. For example, uncompressed voice traffic with G.711 codec requires about
80kbps to 95.2kbps of steady bandwidth per call depending on which TCP/IP protocol layers
encapsulate the voice payload [119]. The voice traffic would not demand for more bandwidth
unless there is another call in which case the bandwidth required is the multiplication of the
number of calls on the communication link. However, a voice traffic is very sensitive to delay,
jitter and packet loss. Video traffic, on the other hand, is predictable, bursty and bandwidth
greedy. The video traffic is also sensitive to delay, packet loss and jitter. However, generally
video traffic normally gets lower priority to a voice traffic. Data traffic characteristics vary
from one application to another. For example, FTP traffic is bursty but insensitive to delay,
jitter and packet loss. However, there is another type of data traffic that is smooth and requires
uninterrupted bandwidth, for example data traffic from a citrix server to a client. This type
of traffic is again sensitive to delay, jitter and packet loss. In case of a voice traffic, there
are several factors that influence the bandwidth requirement. First, the codec type, the voice
payload size and the coder delay. Second, the network topology and the third is the number of
calls made on the communication link. The details of these factors are elaborated in the next
Subsubsection 2.4.2.1.
2.4.2.1 VoIP per call bandwidth
Traffic engineering is an important mechanism for Internet network providers seeking to op-
timise network performance and traffic delivery by dynamically analyzing, predicting and reg-
ulating the behavior of data transmitted over that network. A major objective of a traffic engin-
eering is to minimise or eliminate high-loss situations. The techniques of traffic engineering
can be applied to networks of all kinds including wireless, PSTN and internet [176, 187].
Typically, traffic engineering involves converting a legacy 64 kbps voice channel to an IP
throughput needs. The conversion factor varies depending on the codec, IP version, and the
payload size. The IP throughput calculation should include IP overhead and user signalling
packets [3]. In case of the VoIP traffic, the IP throughput needs is related to the VoIP per call
bandwidth requirement.
VoIP per call bandwidth requirement naturally depends on the codec used. When cal-
2.4 VoIP QoS 62
culating the bandwidth, one cannot assume that every channel is used all the time. Normal
conversation includes a lot of silence, which often means no packets are sent at all. So even
if a user voice call sets up on multiple 64 kbps RTP streams over UDP over IP over Ethernet,
the full bandwidth is not used at all times. A codec that sends a 64kbps stream results in a
much larger IP network stream. The main cause of the extra bandwidth usage is the IP and
UDP headers. VoIP sends small packets and so, many times, the headers are actually much
larger than the data part of the packet. To overcome this problem there are many techniques
available, for example Junaid in his paper entitled ”Emerging Methods for Voice Transport
over MPLS”, suggests that other than to compress its frame headers, to reduce the bandwidth
consumption, different voice packets within a same connection are multiplexed together into
one MPLS frame. Similar techniques can be applied to other types of IP networks. The popu-
lar techniques are headers compression, silence suppression, packet loss concealment, queue
management techniques, and encapsulating more than one voice packet into a single frame [3].
However, some of these techniques introduce other side effects, for example, silence suppres-
sion might have a negative effect on the packet loss rate, despite of the fact that it significantly
reduces the load on the channel. In addition, encapsulating more that one voice packet into a
single frame would increase the overall delay caused by a Coder delay [32]. Nevertheless, in
general, these techniques would produce relatively higher, but acceptable, end-to-end delay.
Many vendors or reseachers used similar method of calculating the VoIP per call band-
width [3, 119, 31]. Table 2.2 on page 63 shows a few samples of the calculation. The calcula-
tion assumes the following conditions:
i. voice calls are symmetric and that no voice conferencing is implemented
ii. signalling traffic is ignored, mostly generated by the gateway or the gatekeeper prior to
establishing the voice call and when the call has been completed
iii. header size is based on Layer 2 header, IP version 4 header, TCP or UDP header and
RTP header or cRTP header
iv. voice payload size depends on the type of codec in used
v. without packet loss concealment
vi. without silence supression, However, the bandwidth requirement is reduced by fifty
percent if VAD is set on the sender codec
vii. for every sample period there is only one packet and each packet can contain multiple
frames
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Hence the calculations:
Total Packet size = (L2 header) + (IP/UDP/RTP header) + (voice payload size)
Packet per seconds = NumberOfPacketPerSample
(NumberOfFramePerPacket)(SamplePeriodInSeconds)
whereby Packet per seconds represents the number of packets that need to be transmitted
every second in order to deliver the codec bit rate,
hence, Bandwidth = Total Packet size(bits) x Packet per seconds
Table 2.2: VoIP per call bandwidth calculation
Codec type G.711 (PCM) G.729A (CS-CELP) G.729 G.723.1A (ACELP)
Sample period 20ms 10ms 10ms 30ms
No. frame per packet 1 frame per packet 2 frames per packet 2 frames per packet 1 frame per packet
Header compression No No Yes - cRTP No
Codec bit rate 64kbps 8kbps 8kbps 5.3 kbps
L2 header Ethernet-38 bytes Ethernet-38 bytes Multilink Point-to-
Point Protocol-6
bytes
Ethernet-38 bytes
RTP/UDP/IP header 40 bytes 40 bytes 2 bytes 40 bytes
Voice payload size (bytes) 160 bytes 20 bytes 20 bytes 20 bytes
Voice payload size (bits) 1280 bits 160 bits 160 bits 160 bits
Total Packet size (bytes) 238 bytes 98 bytes 28 bytes 60 bytes
Total Packet size (bits) 1904 bits 784 bits 224 bits 784 bits
Packet per seconds 50 pps 50 pps 50 pps 33.3 pps
(1000/20) pps (1000/10)/2 pps (1000/10)/2 pps (1000/30) pps
Bandwidth per call 95.2 kbps 39.2 kbps 11.2 kbps 26.1 kbps
2.4.3 QoS Operations and Algorithms
There are three basic operations of QoS, refer to Figure 2.18 on page 65. They are listed as
follows:
i. Classification and marking of packets. Classification and marking is a system of identi-
fying packets or traffic flows and assigning certain parameters within the packet headers
in order to group them. Once the traffic is identified, it can be marked or colored into
groups so that QoS policies can be applied to them. Random Early Detection (RED)
and Weighted Random Early Detection are examples of QoS classification and marking
algorithms.
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ii. Policing and shaping traffic to regulate it with an acceptable rate. Policing and shaping
are QoS components used to limit traffic flow. Policing drops or remarks traffic that
exceeds limits, but shaping regulates the traffic back to a defined rate by delaying or
queuing the traffic. The idea of policing is to drop any traffic in a network that exceeds
a limit. This is to avoid one application dominating the entire available bandwidth. This
is an analogy to a set speed limit on a motorway where lorries and heavy vehicles might
have different lanes and speed limit to cars. VoIP applications are rather vulnerable
during periods of heavy network usage or spikes [162]. Shaping traffic on the other
hand is applied on a low speed network. This is something like a traffic officer redirects
cars to avoid road maintenance on a four-lane traffic going through a two-lane.
iii. Queuing and scheduling to ensure that high priority packets, (i.e. time sensitive packets
such as VoIP packets), get better treatment over other data packet with less error, delay
and packet loss. Queuing theory for QoS consisting primarily of scheduling algorithms
like Weighted Round Robin, and Weighted Fair Queuing, and Class-Based Weighted
Fair Queuing, and Priority Queuing, etc.
QoS operations are applied on high-speed networks. QoS algorithms are derived to support
QoS operations. For example, Floyd and Jacobson presented the RED gateway algorithm for
congestion avoidance in packet-switched network [50]. RED gateways keep the average queue
size low while allowing occasional bursts of packets in the queue. RED statistically drops
packets from flows before it reaches its hard limit. This causes a congested backbone link to
slow more gracefully, and prevents retransmit synchronization. This also helps TCP find its
’fair’ speed faster by allowing some packets to get dropped sooner keeping queue sizes low and
latency under control. The probability of a packet being dropped from a particular connection
is proportional to its bandwidth usage rather than the number of packets it transmits. The most
effective detection of congestion can occur in the gateway itself. The gateway can reliably
distinguish between propagation delay and persistent queueing delay. RED gateways can be
useful in controlling the average queue size even in a network where the transport protocol
cannot be trusted to be cooperative. RED gateways are designed to accompany a Transport
Layer congestion control protocol such as TCP.
2.5 Tools for Assessing Voice Quality
The goal of QoS operation is to provide preferential delivery service for applications that
need it by ensuring sufficient bandwidth, controlling latency and jitter, and reducing data
loss. Without preferential QoS, the intrinsic QoS for most packet-switched networks does
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Figure 2.18: QoS operations and algorithms
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not support adequate perceived QoS [66]. Before going further, let differentiate the following
terms: Preferential QoS, Intrinsic QoS and Perceived QoS.
i. Preferential QoS ascribes both class of service (CoS) and type of service (ToS). The ba-
sic goal of CoS and ToS is to achieve the bandwidth and latency needed for a particular
application. CoS enables a network administrator to group different packet flows, each
having distinct latency and bandwidth requirement. ToS is a field in an IP header that
facilitates CoS.
ii. On the other hand, intrinsic QoS refers to those characteristics that can be measured by
a provider without reference to user perception of quality even though they affect user
perception. Some metrics that can be measured include delay, jitter and packet loss rate.
iii. Perceived QoS is what users experience as to the effects of intrinsic QoS on their com-
munications activities, in their environments, in handling their demands and how they
react to that experiences in light of their personal expectations. In the end, users de-
termine whether they are satisfied with the services based on the two attributes of a
voice service, i.e. connection quality and connection usability. Connection quality is
determined by what is heard over the connection and connection usability is determ-
ined by what is experienced in conversational exchanges over the connection. In short,
user perception of the voice quality is subjective and dependent on tastes, dislikes and
expectations of each individual user.
Since, users experiences are very subjective, measuring their satisfaction is nontrivial.
There are essentially two approaches for assessing voice quality: subjective and objective
methods. Subjective methods, refer to Subsection 2.5.1 on page 67, employ human listeners
to evaluate voice quality and can evaluate all relevant aspects of voice quality. On the other
hand, objective voice quality methods such as the PESQ algorithm seek to estimate certain
voice quality aspects as perceived by human beings. Figure 2.19 on page 71 shows the rela-
tionship between the subjective and objective methods. Another classification is on monitoring
schemes. It is difficult to measure QoS and performance statistics of traffic conveyed by the
Internet because it is generated by a wide variety of applications, which have different char-
acteristics and different quality requirements. Conventional monitoring schemes to measure
QoS and the performance of networks are classified into active monitoring and passive mon-
itoring [4, 112]. Both types have draw backs. Passive monitoring technique is carried out by
observing network traffic flows. They consist of capturing packet headers and analysing them.
The best example of a capture tool is tcpdump. Measurement can be performed at microscopic
level on each packet travelling across the measurement point or at macroscopic level whereby
measurement performed on some traffic flows. The problem with passive measurement is on
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the high volume of data being captured. Active monitoring is performed by sending probe-
packets to a network. The measurement flow travels from source to destination. Upon reaching
its destination, it is possible to calculate metrics by analysing them. The main drawback of
active measurements is that additional network traffic is introduced. This invasive character-
istic can potentially modify the properties of the network that are being measured. Aida et al.
had derived a mathematical foundation for a hybrid technique that enabled them to measure
detailed QoS information for individual users, applications, and organizations, in a scalable
and lightweight manner [4]. The results of their simulation showed that their technique gave
accurate QoS estimations with only a small amount of extra traffic for active measurement.
The measurement clasifications, (i.e. subjective versus objective and/or active versus pass-
ive), influence the type of tool and method to be used in measuring voice quality in order to
determine the perceived QoS.
2.5.1 Mean Opinion Score
The Mean Opinion Score (MOS) is the most widely used subjective measure of voice quality
and is recommended by the ITU-T Recommendation P.800, ”Methods for subjective determ-
ination of transmission quality”. A MOS value is normally obtained as an average opinion
of quality based on asking people to grade the quality of speech signals on a five-point scale
(Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor and Bad) under controlled conditions. In voice communication
systems, MOS is the internationally accepted metric as it provides a direct link to voice quality
as perceived by the end user. The main disadvantage of subjective MOS measurement is that
it involves relatively a large number of test participants and extensive sampling requirements.
Therefore it is labour-intensive and relatively expensive and cannot be used for long-term or
large scale voice quality monitoring in an operational network infrastructure. This has made
objective methods very attractive for meeting the demand for voice quality measurement in
communication networks.
2.5.2 Perceptual Speech Quality Measure
The Perceptual Speech Quality Measure (PSQM) is an objective measure of speech codecs
quality recommended by ITU-T P.861 standard. The PSQM scope is limited to assessment
of telephone-band speech codecs only [124]. The PSQM measure is calculated by comparing
source waveforms recorded in the clear, with the test waveforms that have been encoded and
decoded through the codec being tested. Two steps are involved. In the first step both source
and test inputs are transformed into speech waveforms that would result from frequency filter-
ing and shaping at the sender and receiver sides of a telephone handset including some noise.
The outputs (at the earpiece) are processed through a model of hearing to create their internal
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representations, comprising the sound information as it would be sensed by human ear. The
source and test inputs are differentiated by the different in the frequency spectra between the
two. There is still some limitation of PSQM. For example, it is difficult to determine the cor-
relation between PSQM and MOS because there is a need to derive such mapping functions
for individual languages and individual subjective tests in advance.
2.5.3 Measuring Normalizing Blocks
The Measuring Normalizing Blocks (MNB) method is developed by the US Department of
Commerce in 1997 and has been proposed as an alternative technique to the PSQM [39, 170].
It is recommended for the impact evaluation of some parameters that affected the signal such
as error due to the communication channel or error due to the lower than 4kbps bit rate codec
[72]. The MNB algorithm comprises of two stages (i.e. a simple perceptual transformation,
and a distance measure that uses hierarchies of measuring normalizing blocks) [61]. MNB
transforms speech signals into an approximate loudness domain through frequency warping
and logarithmic scaling. It assumes that these two factors play the most important role in
modeling human auditory response. The algorithm generates an approximated loudness vector
for each frame. The overall speech distortion was estimated from a linear combination of 11 or
12 MNBs calculation. The weights for each MNB are optimised with a training data set. Sim-
ilar to PSQM, MNB falls under P.861 standard. The P.861 was recognized as having certain
limitations in specific areas of application, for example it has been found to be suitable for
assessing only a limited range of distortions [140]. It was replaced by P.862, which contains
improved objective speech quality assessment algorithm that covers a wider range of network
conditions, including analogue connections, codecs, packet loss and variable delay.
2.5.4 Perceptual Analysis Measurement System
Perceptual Analysis Measurement System (PAMS) is a psychoacoustic measurement tech-
nique very similar to PSQM developed by British Telecom for their internal use.
It is used as a tool to calculate a frequency spectrum error surface of test sensation to
source sensation. PAMS is an objective measure of distortion by calculating the average of
different varieties of differences exhibited in error surface using a regression techniques to
fit test results developed from extensive in-lab subjective testing. There are several distinct
features of PAMS over PSQM techniques as follows:
i. PAMS uses specially designed source waveform, a proprietary artificial speechlike test
stimulus (ASTS).
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ii. PAMS produces two measures of voice quality. First, is the estimation of a MOS for
listening quality and sampled. Second, is to establish formulae for predicting MOS for
listening effort that allow distinction between voice quality heard and usability of the
connection for service attribute testing.
iii. PAMS provide procedures for checking and realigning the source and test signals that
is important in the packet-switched environment. The most obvious source was adjust-
ments in the de-jitter buffer created by an adaptive de-jitter control.
PSQM and PAMS share a similar limitation. Both PSQM and PAMS rely on subjective user
testing under controlled conditions to establish the relationship between the measures
calculated and predicted MOS.
2.5.5 Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality
Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) is an objective measure of speech quality
recommended by ITU-T P.862 standard. It is the result of integration of PAMS and PSQM99,
an enhanced version of PSQM. It is considered as an objective method for end-to-end assess-
ment of narrow-band telephone networks and speech codecs. It is used across a wider range
of network conditions, including analogue connections, codecs, packet loss and variable delay
[139]. The range for PESQMOS is also a five-point scale between 0 (bad) to 5 (Excellent).
PESQ assumes that a subjective listening level is a constant 79dB SPL at an ear reference
point. A gain is applied to both original and degraded signals to bring them to this level. It
compensates for any filtering that takes place in the network. It aligns both signals before
comparison. Alignment comes in three stages. First the alignment of utterances. This is to
detect any delay over major sections of the degraded signal compared to the original signal.
Then the alignment of overlapping speech frames in order to detect any variable delay over
the length of an utterance which is important in packet-based networks. The third stage is
performed after an auditory transform has been calculated to realign any speech frames with
very large disturbance and to improve the models accuracy which may not be correctly identi-
fied by the earlier time alignment process. PESQ measures audible errors that occurred in the
degraded signal. A quality score is calculated based on these errors [102].
There are some limitations of PESQ that are in common with PAMS that limit their applic-
ability on packet-switched due to psychoacoustic test procedures [138, 11]. PSQM, PAMS and
PESQ should not be used as a stand-alone gauge of quality of packet-switched voice services.
Application of PESQ may reveal poor prediction of MOS value for end-to-end call across
hybrid transport. MOS value reflects the effects of both noise and waveform distortion. It is
imposible to predict whether the poor quality is due to attributes of the circuit-switched net-
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work or packet-switched transport or both. In July 2011 a new objective listening algorithm
standard, (i.e. P.863), substitues the P.862 standard , refer to Subsection 2.5.7 on page 70.
However, the PESQ measurement tool is used in this research. Subsection 4.6.1 on page 103
describes how the tool is used in the research.
It is important to highlight that PESQ is not really able to adequately align signals with
the type of jitter found in VoIP systems. Hence, this may cause some higher variations in the
results than might be expected. Moreover, although P.863 POLQA addresses these issues but
it was not available when the experimental work of the thesis was carried out.
2.5.6 E-model
E-model is a planning tool for use in transmission planning that assigns a certain equipment
impairment factor to each piece of equipment in the transmission chain. It is a recommenda-
tion of ITU-T G.107 standard. E-Model was initially designed by ITU-T for defining the QoS
of the PSTN. The model estimates the conversational quality from mouth to ear as perceived
by the user at the receive side, both as listener and talker [76, 108].
The output of an E-model calculation is a single scalar, called an R factor, that is de-
rived from delays and equipment impairment factors. Once the R factor is obtained, it can be
mapped to an estimated MOS. The range of the R factor is nominally from 0 (poor) to 100
(excellent). However, values of below 50 are generally unacceptable and typical telephone
connections do not get above 94 (i.e. Ro is approximately 93.4), giving a typical range of
50 to 94 [80]. The E-Model algorithm is explained further in Subsection 3.3.3 on page 84.
Although an E-model is an excellent planning tool, it can never replace real measurements on
the final network, since it has to make some very wide range of assumptions.
2.5.7 Objective Listening Quality Assessment
Another measuring tool is the Objective Listening Quality Assessment (OLQA). It is a stand-
ard under ITU-T P.863 Recommendation. It has replaced ITU-T P.862 Recommendation since
July 2011 [77]. It describes an objective method for predicting overall listening speech qual-
ity from narrowband (300 to 3400 Hz) to superwideband (50 to 14000 Hz) telecommunication
scenarios as perceived by the user in an ITU-T P.800 or ITU-T P.830 Absolute Category Rating
(ACR) listening only test. Unlike the PESQ which was developed for narrowband frequency,
the OLQA supports two operational modes, one for narrowband and one for superwideband.
The algorithm compares a reference signal with a degraded signal as a result of passing the
reference signal through a communications system. The output of the algorithm is a prediction
of the perceived quality of the degraded signal. P.863 was not available at the time of the start
up of our work, hence was not used in the research.
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Figure 2.19: VoIP QoS Assessing tools
2.5.8 Summary
In this section VoIP QoS have been discussed. It is believed that two major areas that need
emphasized here are bandwidth allocation and end-to-end delay. Several telephony QoS as-
sessment tools like E-Model, PSQM, MNB, PESQ and PAMS were mentioned, refer to Fig-
ure 2.19 on page 71. It is stressed that QoS is more important to VoIP than PSTN due to the
nature of their respective networks. The parameters that affect QoS like jitter, codec types,
VoIP protocols, available bandwidth, data size, end-to-end distance, echo and errors were also
highlighted. In the latest development , there is the ITU-T P.863 Recommendation (OLQA)
for predicting overall listening speech quality for narrowband to superwideband signalling
frequencies. P.863 substitutes P.862 standard since July 2011.
In the next section, several previous works by other researchers are presented. These
researches provide a general idea on the type of research that worth pursuing.
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2.6 Previous Work
Research on VoIP QoS and VoIP security have inspired a few interesting research areas. There
are three main streams: QoS, Security, both QoS and Security. However, they are not the only
research interests. There are others such as research on integration and interoperability among
diversified VoIP technologies, research on standardization of functionalities and protocols, re-
search on how to cater for emergency numbers and many more that are equally important.
Research on VoIP QoS is mainly on how to improve any selected existing QoS algorithms
or inventing new algorithms, study on different codec types, measuring VoIP performance
or finding out the impact of a particular VoIP architecture. On the other hand, research on
VoIP security focus on VoIP security issues that are related to SIP signalling, TCP/IP layered
security like TLS, DTLS, IPSec and SRTP, encryption and decryption and authentication tech-
niques, VoIP Forensic and IDS/IPS and security assessment of the underpinning architecture
based on the existing standards. For the QoS and Security, the research is related to the de-
velopment of lightweight security algorithms that they do not consume too much bandwidth
and other resources and also the impact of a particular security mechanism on the overall VoIP
performance. Many more related researches can be found in [86].
In the next subsections several examples of related research works by other researchers of
each stream are presented.
2.6.1 Quality of Service (QoS)
Peh et al. proposed a procedure to evaluate the maximum number of ongoing calls that can be
supported by the hybrid network while maintain the call quality at the desired level using the
ITU-T specified E-model. WiMAX and WiFi is set up and used as a testbed to study the VoIP
Performance on a hybrid wireless network [126].
Pitts et al. performed an exploration on how Random Early Detection (RED) algorithm
that was developed to improve the congestion avoidance behaviour of TCP/IP traffic can also
benefit real-time interactive applications [130]. A RED controlled buffer, modelled as an
M/M/1 queue gives explicit formulas relating load, performance, and RED configuration para-
meters. Results for VoIP show that RED regulates the mean delay and delay variation under
congested conditions, and that the new analysis accurately bounds performance.
Muppala et al. conducted a study on the performance of VoIP traffic aggregates over
differentiated services (Diffserv) enabled network using expedited forwarding (EF) per hop
behavior (PHB) [115]. The delay and jitter performance of the VoIP traffic generated by
different standard voice codec algorithms, both under Diffserv with EF PHB and with best-
effort service were compared for both homogenous and heterogenous voice traffic aggregates.
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Lakaniemi et al. performed a study on a system for measuring application-level VoIP QoS
whereby a simple method for combining measurement data with speech coding simulation
software was derived [94]. This method enable reliable evaluation of subjective speech quality
being measured based on MOS.
2.6.2 Security
Recreating a crime scene using a network forensics approach can be an invaluable way of
investigating the source of the jitter, delay, or other ”call quality crime” [162]. It involves
storing all data and voice packets that cross a network in order to go back and identify the
problem, but it can prove invaluable, as network administrators hardly have the time to sit
idly, waiting for something to happen.
Leung and Chan reverse-engineered Skype, a popular peer-to-peer voice over IP applica-
tion [99]. Skype’s ability to traverse NAT and bypass firewalls, as well as induced bandwidth
burden due to the super node mechanism, make Skype a considerable threat to enterprise net-
works security and availability. Because Skype uses both encryption and overlays, detection
and blocking of Skype is non-trivial. With the forensic knowledge gained, enterprises are able
to regulate or block Skype activities over their networks.
Hermant et al. offered solution to detect and overcome hybrid floods [151]. They offered
the VoIP Flooding Detection System, an online statistical anomaly detection framework that
generated alerts based on abnormal variations in a selected hybrid collection of traffic flows. It
viewed collections of related packet streams as evolving probability distributions and measur-
ing abnormal variations in their relationships based on the measurement of variability between
two probability distributions.
Abdelnur et al. presented a security management framework for VoIP network [1]. This
framework is capable to perform advanced security assessment tasks for such a network. The
developed tool and some of its key components was highlighted. The learned experience while
implementing the framework on a internal testbed was revealed.
2.6.3 QoS and Security
Most existing VoIP security solutions neglected the other important attribute of VoIP techno-
logy, the VoIP QoS. In most cases it seems impossible to have a secured VoIP services with
excellence QoS. A firewall deployment at network gateway for example refrains any calls
setup, therefore closes up any end-to-end transmission being made. However, a few research-
ers are able to address some of the problem which had both security and QoS features, by
balancing out these two criteria into one particular algorithm, refer to [107] for details.
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Ranganathan and Kilmartin analysed the performance of secure SIP-based VoIP networks
[134]. They examine the options for securing VoIP networks and the impact of these options
to the performance of secure networks. Though the test was on OPNET simulation, the know-
ledge gained apparently can be used by network designers when considering a real secure
VoIP networks. Cha et al. analysed the effect of a security protocol on the performance of
SIP particularly on the call setup delays that occur with various security protocols [25]. Sev-
eral simulations were performed on ns-2 for three security protocols and three transport-layer
protocols suggested for SIP.
Leckie investigated the impact of DoS attacks on SIP infrastructure, (i.e. on an open source
SIP server) that posed a serious security threat to the quality, reliability and availability of VoIP
operations [97]. He identified four attack scenarios that could exploit the vulnerabilities in the
existing SIP authentication protocols and demonstrated the practical impact of these attacks
on the target server. His experimental results showed that the current SIP implementation was
highly vulnerable to DoS attacks and countermeasures were required to form more resilient
servers. He also proved that authentication alone was not enough to mitigate the vulnerability
of the target servers, instead it contributed to the DoS attacks.
2.6.4 Summary
In this section three different kinds of research areas are highlighted. A few examples of each
area are presented. Previous work by other researchers inspire new researches on VoIP. Since
the subjects are broad, the research area is scoped into VoIP standards that are governed by
IETF, ITU-T and proprietary sevices like Skype, Google Talk and YMSG. An investigation
and comparison on the performance of these services under stringent VoIP security mechan-
isms would be a topic of interest. The result of the investigation could help system adminis-
trator and network designer to understand better the relationship between VoIP security and
performance. Next, in chapter 3 we discuss the methodology on how we conduct our research.
Chapter 3
Methodology
”Read: In the name of thy Lord Who createth, Createth man from a clot. Read: And thy Lord
is the Most Bounteous,Who teacheth by the pen, Teacheth man that which he knew not. ”
Al-Quran:Chapter 96 verses 1-5
This chapter describes the strategy and methodology of our project. The instrumentation
framework, test scenarios and a method for testing, analysis and verification processes are
presented. Subsequently, the project scope is defined. Section 3.1 introduces several perform-
ance criteria that are related to VoIP services. In section 3.2 the instrumentation framework
has been put forward. Section 3.3 defines the testing method that is tailored for the project.
Section 3.4 summaries the discussion of this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
The methodology is depicted in Figure 3.1 on page 76. The process starts by identifying test
scenarios, setting up monitoring tools, setting up IP VPN, setting up VoIP services, setting
up packet interceptor tool, monitor service performance, analyse data until validation on the
result. A new framework is proposed in order to assist the testing, analysis and verification
processes, taking into considerations the conditions that are discussed in Subsection 3.2.1 on
page 78. For example, we exclude NAT and firewall implementations from our testbed so
that we can reach the VoIP servers without difficulty. The framework defines the requirement
of our testbed architecture, hence, we have left some details regarding the implementation.
Details of the implementation are available in Chapter 4 on page 87.
Services like Skype, Google Talk and YMSG are popular among their users. These ser-
vices are deployed differently as describe in Figure 3.1 on page 82, however, they have one
common goal that is to provide either voice or instant messaging services. Since each service
deploys different level of security, some are less secure than others. For example, YMSG
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Figure 3.1: Methodology
contents are potentially the least secure because they are sent in plain text. It is interesting to
observe how different security characteristics affect the performance of these services. Since
they are proprietary services, users have no control over the security features that come with
them. Nevertheless, users expect the performance of each VoIP service to be of good quality
and secure all the time. Therefore, they might take extra precaution by securing their network
further using the method suggested by Butcher et al. [18]. Each VoIP performance should
not degrade further once the extra security features are in place. Frameworks that support
the monitoring of a VoIP performance are scarce. The nearest similarity is an experimentally
study on the relationship between resource utilisation on a wireless LAN and the quality of
VoIP calls transmitted over the wireless medium [117]. Another proposal on the deployment
of a monitoring architecture based on their proposed Management Information Base (MIB)
that collects, stores and displays speech quality information about concluded voice calls [38].
Once the experimental environment has been established, VoIP traffic analysis that link
both VoIP security and VoIP performance is performed. However, first, the initial performance
of each service over the insecure Internet is recorded. These measurements are compared to
the performance of the services within several secure environments. In order to understand
the performance of voice communications, call quality, voice quality1, network quality2 and
1i.e. echo, clipping, distortion, noise and delay
2i.e. signalling, accessibility and availability
3.2 Instrumentation 77
service quality3 must all be defined [68]. They relate the quality of service to the user’s call
quality and it is divided into three areas: voice quality that affects the user’s conversation;
network quality that affects the user’s experience on the network; and service quality that
affects the amount and type of services offered to the user.
In this project, however, the VoIP performance is focussing on the voice quality and secur-
ity features that are being deployed. The voice quality is influenced by the traffic delay due
to one-way delay, jitter and/or packet loss. In addition, network resources like available band-
width, routers’ CPU power and memory size can also influence the voice quality. The other
aspects of VoIP performance like the quality of call setup, interoperability between different
VoIP services and additional features of each service, are beyond the scope of this project.
These can be found in [68, 25]. This project emphasises on the media quality and security of
a VoIP service.
3.2 Instrumentation
A framework for instrumenting VoIP under different security scenarios is devised. Refer to
Figure E.1. The architecture collects together a number of available tools and allows monitor-
ing and control of network and host-system resources. The result is estimated using E-Model
as implemented by other researchers in [117, 126]. The E-Model was initially designed by
ITU-T for defining the QoS of PSTN therefore there is a significant challenge because VoIP
and PSTN having different design criteria [76]. However, Carvalho has reformulated the equa-
tion for VoIP speech quality evaluation and the results are calculated from this formula [24].
We used Carvalho version of E-Model to estimate the readiness of our testbed to support any
VoIP calls. The E-model is used to compare several VoIP services over several network scen-
arios. The Carvalho formula is defined in Subsection 3.3.3 on page 84. The output of an
E-Model calculation is a single scalar, known as R factor, derived from delays and equipment
impairment factors. The R factor ranges from 0 (poor) to 100 (excellent). This metric is de-
scribed in Subsection 2.5.6 on page 70. Another metric is the Mean Opinion Score (MOS),
which also comes from the telephony world. This metric is described in Subsection 2.5.1 on
page 67. The mapping between network characteristics and a quality score makes MOS valu-
able for network assessment and tuning. MOS works well but is expensive to deploy and takes
a long time to process [63]. The good news is that the human behavioural patterns have been
heavily researched and captured. By mapping the R factor to MOS value, the voice quality of
any call can be estimated.
Each service security score is estimated using Common Vulnerability Scoring System
3i.e. externality, services and security
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(CVSS). CVSS is grouped into three main metrics, the Base Metrics, the Temporal Metrics
and the Environmental Metrics. The Base Metrics group is set by vendors and once set does
not change. The Temporal Metrics group is set by vendors but can change with time. The
Environmental Metrics group is optionally set by users and provide final score. The Base
Metrics group consist of the impact bias, access complexity, access vector, authentication im-
pact, integrity impact, confidentiality impact and availability impact. The Temporal Metrics
group deal with exploitability, remediation level and report confidence. The Environmental
Metrics group deal with collateral damage and target distribution [175].
3.2.1 Service Conditions
Many VoIP systems employ the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), However, network topology
can impose a problem to a SIP-based VoIP system. A SIP-based VoIP call cannot be estab-
lished if one of the SIP softphones is situated behind a NAT gateway or behind a restrictive
firewall [185]. This is referred to as the NAT and firewall problem.
Firewalls normally allow incoming traffic from external hosts only if the session was initi-
ated from the internal network. Incoming calls from untrusted external sources are filtered out
by firewalls. When user uses a private IP address and local UDP port to receive voice for SIP
call, voice packets from the remote party connected to public Internet will never reach the user
because private IP addresses are not routable in the public Internet. Since NATs and firewalls
prevent SIP and H.323 signals from reaching any devices several possible solutions have been
proposed. For example, Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE), Session Traversal Util-
ities for NAT (STUN) and Traversal Using Relay NAT (TURN) were proposed to overcome
the NAT and firewall problem within SIP and H.323 protocols [100, 125, 177]. Another prop-
erty of NATs is the port mapping is kept only if there is traffic in both directions. For example
if Alice is in a call with Bob, and for a while only Bob talks, then Alice’s NAT may close the
mapping, which effectively terminates the call.
On the other hand, Skype, a popular peer-to-peer VoIP application, is able to traverse NAT
and bypass firewalls, as well as induce a bandwidth burden due to the supernode mechanism.
Any node with a public IP address, having sufficient CPU, memory and network bandwidth is
a candidate to become a supernode. Each Skype client stores a list of supernode IP addresses
and port pairs and buddies list in the Windows registry of its host [146] . This makes Skype
a considerable threat to both security and availability of enterprise networks. Enterprises IT
managers must be made aware of the situation.
Google Talk is based on eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) technology.
Core XMPP is stable but XMPP community continues to define various XMPP extensions.
For example jingle, is added to overcome the NAT and firewall problem. XMPP extensions
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may not be part of the standardization therefore may change as XMPP community works to
standardize features [57].
Information regarding YMSG protocols are less transparent. Firewalls and proxy servers
cause the majority of YMSG connection problems, but it can be configured to get through
most firewalls and proxies without too much trouble [67]. The ports and servers are easily
configurable to use something else including HTTP port 80 and FTP port 21. YMSG uses
different ports for different applications. For example, TCP 5050 is for chat and messenger,
UDP 5000-5010 for voice chat and 5100 for webcam. Blocking instant messengers ports
are difficult because YMSG like any other instant messengers will try a standard range of
preconfigured ports if they find their standard ports are blocked
It seems that Skype, SIP, YMSG and Google Talk have their own solutions dealing with
NAT and firewall problems. This emphasises the need for enterprises to strengthen their net-
work and deploy strategic IT policies to protect and minimise securities exploitation by their
own employees. The two main factors in the security protocol that affect the call setup delay
especially during network congestion were the security handshake and message authentica-
tion. The security channel is established during security handshake. This creates an additional
delay in the course of generating a key and exchanging messages. SIP messages are encryp-
ted for confidentiality and authentication. In this procedure the delay is due to the increased
packet size and computation necessary for encryption [25].
Ranganathan analysed the effect of employing encryption and authentication algorithms
and the additional effect caused by the dynamic key exchange algorithms, IKE, on the VoIP
network performance [134]. The results of the performance analysis are:
i) Between encryption and authentication, encryption is more expensive operation.
ii) When both encryption and authentication services are employed there is 1.4% increase
in SIP call setup times and there is an increase of 1.6% in media stream delays.
Moreover the research conducted by Ranganathan showed that the 1.4% increment on the call
setup and 1.6% increment on media stream delays, due to encryption and authentication are
insignificant to determine the effect of security implementation to a voice quality.
The research in [25] demonstrated the effect of a security protocol on the performance of
SIP particularly on the call setup delays that occur within the three security protocols (i.e. TLS,
DTLS and IPSec) and the three transport protocols (i.e. TCP, UDP and SCTP). UDP with
any combination of security protocols performs much better than the combination of TCP.
TLS/SCTP may have more effect on the performance on average. DTLS has been proposed
as a replacement for TLS. DTLS is designed to operate on unreliable transport protocols like
UDP and is not strict about the sequence of messages. For connectionless transport layer pro-
tocol, DTLS/UDP suprisingly performed better than UDP/IPSec. DTLS/UDP and UDP/IPSec
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are the best performers among the combinations of popular security protocols in different lay-
ers. However, UDP has a side effect of high failure rate for a call setup because of the lack of
congestion control.
A defined process is essential in order to properly instrument and compare different VoIP
scenarios and security schemes. Before deciding on test case scenarios, the similarities and
the differences of each VoIP service are identified. Table 3.1 on page 82 shows the differences
and similarities of the services, among other thing pertaining to call managements, network
types and security features. These characteristics affect the performance of each service. Un-
fortunately users have less control over these features. However, with the right information,
users can choose services that are more reliable and secure. Several factors affect the quality
of a VoIP call. These factors include the speech codec, packetisation, packet loss, delay, jitter,
and the network architecture to provide QoS [56, 17]. A summary of the factors is presented in
Figure 3.2 on page 81. Test scenarios should be selected to stress these parameters. Subsection
3.3.1 on page 83 discusses about the test scenarios.
3.2.2 Scope
The project focuses on the quality of the media part of VoIP services rather than the call sig-
nalling. We would not verify any security protocol’s features. We assume the correctness of
the features suggest in the reference documents of TLS, SRTP and IPSec [41, 10, 104, 85].
For example, TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The pro-
tocol allows client-server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent
eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. On the other hand, SRTP can provide confid-
entiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control
traffic for RTP. IPSec is a suite of protocols designed to provide end-to-end security at the
network layer using encryption and authentication techniques. IPSec can be composed of one
or both of the following network layer protocols: Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH) . ESP and AH provide two mechanisms for protecting data being
sent over an Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). ESP
can be used for integrity and confidentiality and AH for integrity only. In this project we use
Vyatta routers. The routers support IPSec ESP protocol [173]. Currently they do not support
AH protocol. For this project only three VoIP applications are tested. They are Skype, Google
Talk and SIP-based clients.
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Figure 3.2: Parameters that affect QoS
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3.3 Testing Method
This section defines the testing method. This procedure is important to ensure that the test is
executed in a systematic manner, in order to ensure the integrity of data collected for the exper-
iment. First, test scenarios are identified. Several test scenarios to stress the early observation
are described in Subsection 3.3.1 on page 83. Next, test parameters are defined. Subsection
3.3.2 on page 84 discusses the test parameters. Then, Subsection 3.3.3 on page 84 describes
an outline procedure for the testing, analysis and verification processes. The detail processes
are refined in Section 4.5 on page 99 and Section 4.6 on page 103.
3.3.1 Test Scenarios
This subsection describes the test scenarios that are required to stress the parameters that are
presented in Figure 3.2 on page 81. The voice quality of pre-recorded message4 is compared
to post-recorded message5 using PESQ method. The method is described in Subsection 2.5.5
on page 69.
Although ITU-T P.862 indicated that the correlation coefficient between the objective and
subjective scores were 0.935 for both known and unknown data, the PESQ algorithm cannot
be used to replace subjective testings [73]. The PESQ algorithm does not provide a com-
prehensive evaluation of transmission quality. It only measures the effects of one-way speech
distortion and noise on speech quality. It is possible to have high PESQ scores, yet poor quality
of the connection overall. Even with the setback, PESQ is still the right tool to find the effects
of delay, packet loss rate, jitter and additional delay due to the extra security at network layer,
transport layer and application layer and codec like G.711, iLBC and Speex on voice quality
on each VoIP service for this project. This is because the setback lies at the gateway of PSTN
and Internet connectivity whereas this project concentrates purely on PC-to-PC VoIP services.
According to Hermann et al., one-way delay and jitter implies voice quality distortion. By
introducing delay, jitter and other parameters into the packet interceptor, several degraded sig-
nals could be captured [68]. The analysis on these signals would give good indicator how these
parameters affect voice quality. The test scenarios are described as follows: Compute the two
response variables pesqmos (i.e. PESQ Mean Opinion Score) and crude delay (i.e. the delay
due to the crude alignment between the degraded audio and the original audio) for three VoIP
services:SIP-based client, Google Talk and Skype on a secure and on an unsecure network
varying values of the independent variables delay, jitter and plr (i.e. packet loss rate).
The value of these variables are varied as follows:
4original message
5degraded message
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delay has values between 0ms and 400ms and is increased in steps of 10ms, and
plr has values between 0% and 3% and is increased in steps of 0.1%, and
jitter 2
fjitter0; jitter1; jitter2; jitter3; jitter4; jitter5; jitter6; jitter7; jitter8; jitter9g
where
jitter0= (0.33 of 100ms delay, 0.33 of 200ms delay, 0.33 of 300ms delay)
jitter1= (0.20 of 100ms delay, 0.30 of 200ms delay, 0.50 of 300ms delay)
jitter2= (0.50 of 100ms delay, 0.30 of 200ms delay, 0.20 of 300ms delay)
jitter3= (0.30 of 100ms delay, 0.50 of 200ms delay, 0.20 of 300ms delay)
jitter4= (0.20 of 100ms delay, 0.50 of 200ms delay, 0.30 of 300ms delay)
jitter5= (0.50 of 100ms delay, 0.20 of 200ms delay, 0.30 of 300ms delay)
jitter6= (0.30 of 100ms delay, 0.20 of 200ms delay, 0.50 of 300ms delay)
jitter7= (0.05 of 100ms delay, 0.05 of 200ms delay, 0.90 of 300ms delay)
jitter8= (0.05 of 100ms delay, 0.90 of 200ms delay, 0.05 of 300ms delay)
jitter9= (0.90 of 100ms delay, 0.05 of 200ms delay, 0.05 of 300ms delay)
jitter0::9 are not standard but variation of delays that have been introduced by creating three
pipelines with different probability of delays to see the effect of the independent variable
jitter to each VoIP service.
3.3.2 Test Parameters
This subsection describes the input parameters and the output parameters of this project. Fig-
ure 3.3 on page 85 highlights these parameters. The input parameters are clasified into three
categories such as network performance variables, VoIP applications and Network layer se-
curity protocol. Network perfomance variables like packet loss rate, delay, jitter and network
bandwidth are fed into a packet interceptor program: Dummynet. VoIP application: Skype cli-
ent, SIP-based client and Google Talk client are installed into Client 1 and Client 2 computers,
refer to Figure 4.1 on page 90. IPIP and IPSec tunnels are configured on R1, R2 and TR
routers. Semi-automated test-kit scripts control what parameters are to be tested and how long
would they run. These scripts are discussed in details in the fourth stage of the implementation
stages in Section 4.4 on page 97.
3.3.3 Testing, Analysis and Verification
To start the testing the sender is fed with raw audio that has been stored using a loss-less
coding scheme. This prevents results that would be artefacts of the codec rather than the
network. Then the message is recorded at the receiver end and is compared with the sent
audio.
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Figure 3.3: Experimental test parameters
An appropriate holding time6 is required [135, 106]. A shorter holding time is desirable
as it allows more tests to be run. However, it should be long enough to assure reliability in the
evaluation. In this project the holding time is set to 10 seconds.
The framework should allow the comparison of several VoIP services over several network
scenarios. This will be compared using the E-model [24] to estimate the R-factor of each
service:
R = 93:4  Id(ti   ti 1)  Ie(codec; loss)
Where:
• Id(ti   ti 1) is a function of one-way delay
• Ie(codec; loss) is a function of codec and packet loss rate
and R-factor to MOS conversion according to [24] :
For R < 6:5 : MOS = 1
For 6:5  R  100 :MOS = 1 + 0:035R + 7:10 6R(R  60)(100 R)
For R > 100 : MOS = 4:5
6test signal length
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The overall performance trends of the network can be analysed looking at the graph of
TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols. The CPU and memory load for the call can also be captured.
Results can be compared with other studies by Ranganathan and Kilmartin on secure SIP
based VoIP networks [134].
3.4 Summary
This project is to measure selected VoIP services for the benefit of Internet users and any
company IT managers. These services are popular among their users, however, there is still
a lack of studies on the security impact on the quality of their services. The approach is to
have a hybrid architecture whereby a live testbed is complemented with a packet interceptor
simulator to create a suitable environment for comparing the performance of different VoIP
services. This approach allows full control of the parameters set in the experiment. The
method can be carried out for other IP-based and VoIP services.
The process starts with the identification of test scenarios to verify results. In order to
identify the VoIP performance the following parameters are measured: End-to-end delay, Jit-
ter, Packet Loss Rate, Network Resources and Network Trend based on protocol statistics.
The overall performance is estimated based on R-factor score of the VoIP QoS and CVSS
Based Metrics score for the security. The project scope defines which items to be included or
to be excluded from the project, with respect to VoIP services, security features and test cases.
PESQ and E-model are the two tools used to measure the MOS values of the degraded audios
and to predict the network quality, respectively. CVSS is used to calculate the vulnerability
scores on OpenVPN TLS and IPSec. Next, Chapter 4 describes the project implementation.
Chapter 4
Project Implementation
”I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.”
Confucius
This chapter explains the project implementation stages. The implementation of this project
is divided into six stages. The first stage is to setup a network in the laboratory. The network
is connected to Internet via JANET, the UK’s education and research network. The network
is secured either by a site-to-site TLS openVPN or a site-to-site IPSec in tunnel mode. The
second stage is to setup monitoring tools and packet interceptor. The monitoring tools are con-
figured in two different computers, CACTI and TCPdump. Dummynet, the packet interceptor
is installed into the third computer. The third stage is to install VoIP clients. SIP softphone,
Google Talk and Skype are installed into sender and receiver machines. The fourth stage is to
write scripts to automate the testing. The scripts are used to control the test parameters.
The fifth stage is to collect and process data. The audio streams are collected and saved as
.wav files. In addition to that, data packets transmitted from sender to receiver are captured and
saved as .pcap files. The PESQ software compares the original audio and the collected audio
streams and produces a .txt report. The .txt is transformed into the formats that are recognized
by R. R is used to plot graph of mean and box and whisker plot of the MOS. Ipsumdump and
Ipaggcreate scripts transform .pcap files into .txt files. Ipsumdump collates and filters all IP
packets travel from sender to receiver. Ipaggcreate aggregates IP packets travel from sender
to receiver. This information is later used in calculating the network throughput for VoIP
connectivity. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) ping is used to find the statistic of
the round trip time between each connectivity which is required in estimating the R-factor. The
last stage is the validation and verification, where the PESQ, E-Model and CVSS calculators
are validated, and the data collected and the sample result produced are verified.
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4.1 First Stage: Network
The testbed is set as shown in Figure 4.1 on page 90. In addition, Figure 4.2 on page 91
shows the laboratory setup overall view. R1, R2, and R3 are the routers that are placed in
the laboratory. R1 and R2 are connected to R3. A transit router, TR*, theoretically can be
placed anywhere in the globe. For this implementation TR* is situated in the laboratory as
well. HP, IT and Router-to-JANET are routers that are administered by the Loughborough IT
services. They are located within Loughborough University but at different locations to R1,
R2, R3 and TR*. A bidirectional IPIP tunnel is created between R1 and TR*. There is also a
bidirectional IPIP tunnel from R2 to TR*, refer to Table 4.3 on page 94 for the setup. IPSec
tunnels are configured to secure the IPIP tunnels. Another implementation is to have a site-
to-site OpenVPN tunnel between R1 and R2 with TLS as an authentication and key exchange
mechanism.
IPSec could be carried out either in a transport mode or a tunnel mode. Transport mode
is allowed between two end hosts only, whereas tunnel mode is required when at least one
endpoint is a security gateway. A security gateway is an intermediate system that implements
IPSec functionality (i.e. a router). In this project, IPSec is configured in a tunnel mode between
R1 and R2 routers. In the 90s, most VPN is carried out using IPSec with Internet Key Ex-
change (IKE) protocol to be used with Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP) protocol. ISAKMP provides a framework to establish security associ-
ations. A security association (SA) is a bundle of security features that are shared between
two peers to support a secure communication. The SA may include properties such as cryp-
tographic algorithm and mode, traffic encryption key and parameters for data network to be
passed over the secure connection. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent. IKE
is a profile of ISAKMP. IKE provides authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP. It
consists of two phases. In the first phase, IKE establish a secure authenticated communication
channel by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm to generate a shared secret key
to encrypt further IKE communications. This negotiation results in one single bi-directional
security association. The authentication can be performed using either a pre-shared secret
key or other mode like a public key encryption. During the second phase, the IKE peers use
the secure channel established in the first phase to negotiate SA on behalf of other services
like IPSec. IKE SA is bi-directional but AH or ESP SA is unidirectional. Therefore, in a
bi-directional traffic, the channels are secured by a pair of security associations. For this ex-
periment, we used a pre-shared secret key mode, refer to Table 4.4 on page 94 for the setup.
We are aware with the setback of the site-to-site IPSec with a pre-shared secret key, whereby
each endpoint that involves in the communication must keep the other endpoint pre-shared
key. As a result, if there are n IPSec tunnels, network administrator must remember to main-
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tain n pre-shared secret keys from time to time to reduce the possibility of compromised keys.
A network administrator must relies and trusts another network administrator to execute the
task of exhanging a pre-shared secret key at a remote site. The pre-shared secret keys are
exchanged through email or phone. Due to this condition, a site-to-site IPSec with preshared
key is not scalable for a large number of tunnels. In our case, the secure channels are between
two endpoints only.
OpenVPN uses TLS with X.509 certificates, and requires a public key infrastructure (PKI)
to generate the certificates. Vyatta has several ways to authenticate a pair of virtual tunnel.
For example, using a pre-shared secret key or TLS certificate. TLS is a cryptographic protocol
that uses a public key cryptography and does not require the two endpoints to have a pre-
shared secret. Using PKI, the administrator generates a certificate and the associated files for
each endpoint. All certificates are signed by the certificate authority (CA) of the PKI. The
certificate for an endpoint contains many pieces of information, one of which is the endpoint’s
name, which is stored in the Common Name field of the certificate. The administrator transfers
each certificate and the associated files to the corresponding endpoint using a pre-established,
secure channel. When two endpoints want to establish the VPN tunnel, one takes a passive role
whiles the other endpoint must take an active role and initiate the TLS session with the passive
endpoint. Once the active endpoint initiates the TLS session, the two sides authenticate each
other using their public/private key pairs and the CA’s public key, which is known to both
endpoints. After the two endpoints have authenticated each other, they establish a shared
secret using a public key cryptography. Each endpoint then derives a set of keys for the
session. These keys are then used for encryption and Message Authentication Code (MAC)
on the tunnel data to provide data confidentiality and integrity. These keys are only used for the
one session, and therefore they are called session keys. In this project a site-to-site OpenVPN
tunnel with TLS is configured between R1 and R2 routers, refer to Table 4.5 on page 95 for
the setup, whereby R1 takes the passive role whereas R2 takes the active role. A site-to-site
TLS OpenVPN is more scalable than a site-to-site IPSec tunnel with pre-shared secret key
mode. This is because for each router under his responsibility, a network administrator needs
to know the routers public/private key pairs and the CA public key only.
We have configured three virtual LANs, namely VLAN2, VLAN3 and VLAN4 in a DELL
switch. The DELL switch is managed through VLAN1, if and when required. Alternatively,
the DELL switch could also be managed through a web-link using the url to the switch man-
agement IP address. There are twenty four ports on the DELL switch. The ports are labelled
as g1, g2, g3 upto g24. All ports are in VLAN1 unless they are assigned to other VLAN.
All devices that assist in system monitoring (i.e. CACTI, TCPdump and Dummynet) are in
VLAN4 with subnet6. The DELL switch is connected to R1 via port g7. CACTI, is connected
to the DELL switch of port g8. CACTI is used for performance monitoring. It is a complete
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Figure 4.1: Experimental Network
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Figure 4.2: Laboratory Setup:Overall view
Figure 4.3: Specific devices:Front view
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frontend to RRDTool, it stores all the necessary information to create graphs and populate
them with data in a MySQL database [22]. The packet sniffer (i.e. TCPdump) computer is
connected to port g10 and the packet interceptor a.k.a Dummynet is connected to port g9.
Client 1 and Client 2 are in two differents subnets and VLANs. Client 1 is in VLAN2 with
subnet2 and Client 2 is in VLAN3 with subnet4. Client 1 is connected to the switch port g13.
Router R1 is connected to the switch port g16. Client 2 is connected to the ethernet port eth0 of
the packet interceptor. The packet interceptor is then connected to the switch port g20 with a
crossover cable. Router R2 is connected to the switch port g17. The g16 and g17 ports are the
gateways to VLAN2 and VLAN3 respectively. The g13, g16, g17 and g20 ports on the switch
is mirrored to the g3 port. The g3 port of the switch is connected to the TCPdump ethernet port
eth0. Any packets going through these ports are captured by TCPdump. These packets can
then be analysed by TCPtrace or Ipsumdump passively. The problem of time syncronization
between R1, R2, Client 1 and Client 2 is solved since all traffic is mirrored to the g3 port. In
addition an audio cable is connected between Client 1 microphone and Client 2 speaker. Any
degraded audio is recorded back into Client 1 machine. Client 1 and Client 2 are installed
with Express Talk Business Edition version 4.2.6, Google Talk version 1.0.0.104 and Skype
version 4.2.0.158 clients. Virtual Audio Cable (VAC) version 4.9, Sound eXchange (SoX)
version 14.3.1 and Audacity version 1.2 software are installed in Client 1 and Client 2 as well.
A raw audio using a loss-less coding scheme is recorded using Audacity. This prevents results
that would be artefacts of the codec rather than the network. VAC and SoX are explained in
Section 4.4 on page 97. Both Client 1 and Client 2 have the following specification: Microsoft
Windows XP Professional, version 2002 with service pack 3, 3.20GHz Pentium (R) 4 CPU,
3.19GHz, 1.00GB of RAM and 250GB Hard disk.
Before any configuration can be made, a /27 IPv4 network addresses is subdivided into
a smaller network. Table 4.2 on page 94 shows the details of these subnets. Table 4.3 and
Table 4.4 on page 94 show the IPIP tunnel setting and the site-to-site IPSec tunnel setting
respectively. Table 4.5 on page 95 shows the site-to-site OpenVPN with TLS setting. The
routers and switch configurations’ scripts that are mentioned in this subsection are available
in the Appendix A.1 on page i and xxi respectively.
4.2 Second Stage: Monitoring Tools and Packet Interceptor
There are three computers that are installed with the monitoring tools and packet interceptor.
The first computer is labelled as CACTI. The second computer is labelled as TCPdump. The
computer with packet interceptor is labelled as Dummynet. Figure 4.1 on page 90 shows the
experimental network with the locations of these computers with respect to other equipments.
Figure 4.2 on page 91 shows the position of these computers in the laboratory. These com-
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Table 4.1: Device Specification
Item Description Operating System System Specification
1 Client 1 Microsoft Windows XP Professional,
version 2002 with service pack 3
3.20GHz Pentium (R) 4 CPU, 3.19GHz,
1.00GB of RAM and 250GB Hard disk
2 Client 2 Microsoft Windows XP Professional,
version 2002 with service pack 3
3.20GHz Pentium (R) 4 CPU, 3.19GHz,
1.00GB of RAM and 250GB Hard disk
3 TCPdump Linux 2.6.24-29-generic i686 Model Family: Western Digital Caviar fam-
ily
Distributor ID: Ubuntu Device Model: WDC WD400BB-00DEA0
Description: Ubuntu 8.04.4 LTS Serial Number: WD-WMAD14441462
Release: 8.04 Firmware Version: 05.03E05
Codename: hardy User Capacity: 40,020,664,320 bytes
4 Dummynet Linux 2.6.32-14-generic-pae i686 Model Family: Western Digital Caviar fam-
ily
Distributor ID: Ubuntu Device Model: WDC WD400BB-00DEA0
Description: Ubuntu 10.04 LTS Serial Number: WD-WMAD11688819
Release: 10.04 Firmware Version: 05.03E05
Codename: lucid User Capacity: 40,020,664,320 bytes
5 CACTI Linux 2.6.35-28-generic x86 64 Model Family: Western Digital Caviar SE
Serial ATA family
Distributor ID: Ubuntu Device Model: WDC WD1600JD-75HBC0
Description: Ubuntu 10.10 Serial Number: WD-WMAL93844163
Release: 10.10 Firmware Version: 08.02D08
Codename: maverick User Capacity: 160,000,000,000 bytes
6 Router 3 Linux 2.6.35-1-586-vyatta i686 Version: VC6.2-2011.02.09
Description: Vyatta Core 6.2 2011.02.09
Copyright: 2006-2011 Vyatta, Inc.
Built by: autobuild@vyatta.com
7 Router 2 Linux 2.6.35-1-586-vyatta i686 Version: VC6.2-2011.02.09
Description: Vyatta Core 6.2 2011.02.09
Copyright: 2006-2011 Vyatta, Inc.
Built by: autobuild@vyatta.com
8 Router 1 Linux 2.6.35-1-586-vyatta i686 Version: VC6.2-2011.02.09
Description: Vyatta Core 6.2 2011.02.09
Copyright: 2006-2011 Vyatta, Inc.
Built by: autobuild@vyatta.com
9 Router TR* Linux 2.6.35-1-586-vyatta i686 Version: VC6.2-2011.02.09
Description: Vyatta Core 6.2 2011.02.09
Copyright: 2006-2011 Vyatta, Inc.
Built by: autobuild@vyatta.com
10 Dell Switch Dell PowerConnect 5324
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Table 4.2: Project IP Addresses
Subnet From Destination Port Inter-
face
Description
Management of
VLANs
192.168.1.1/24 192.168.1.2/24 eth2-g1 R2 to VLAN1
Link to Internet 172.x.1.2/30 172.x.1.1/30 eth5- R3 to HP
Maintain by IT
services
HP to IT
IT to Router-to-JANET
Subnet1 158.125.253.2/30 158.125.253.1/30 eth1-eth1 R1 to R3
Subnet2 158.125.253.5/30 eth0-g16 R1 to VLAN2
158.125.253.6/30 eth0-g13 Client 1 to VLAN2
Subnet3 158.125.253.10/30 158.125.253.9/30 eth1-eth4 R2 to R3
Subnet4 158.125.253.13/30 eth0-g17 R2 to VLAN3
eth1-g20 Dummynet to VLAN3
158.125.253.14/30 eth0-eth0 Client 2 to Dummynet
Subnet5 158.125.253.18/30 158.125.253.17/30 eth0-eth0 TR* to R3
Subnet6 158.125.253.25/29 eth2-g7 R1 to VLAN4
158.125.253.26/29 eth0-g8 CACTI to VLAN4
158.125.253.27/29 eth2-g9 Dummynet to VLAN4
158.125.253.28/29 eth1-g10 TCPdump to VLAN4
Table 4.3: IPIP tunnel
Interface local-ip remote-ip IP address Description
lo 10.0.5.10/24 Loopback on R2
lo 10.0.6.2/24 Loopback on R1
lo 10.0.1.18/24 Loopback on TR*
10.0.2.18/24
tun0 10.0.5.10 10.0.1.18 10.0.3.10/24 IPIP tunnel R2 to TR*
tun0 10.0.6.2 10.0.2.18 10.0.4.10/24 IPIP tunnel R1 to TR*
tun0 10.0.1.18 10.0.5.10 10.0.3.18/24 IPIP tunnel TR* to R2
tun1 10.0.2.18 10.0.6.2 10.0.4.18/24 IPIP tunnel TR* to R1
Table 4.4: Site-to-site IPSec tunnel
Interface peer local-ip tunnel Description
eth1 on R2 158.125.253.2 158.125.253.10 tunnel1 esp-group ESP-IPIP
ike-group IKE-IPIP
local-subnet 10.0.5.10/32
remote-subnet 10.0.6.2/32
pre-shared-secret Allahuakh-
bar
eth1 on R1 158.125.253.10 158.125.253.2 tunnel1 esp-group ESP-IPIP
ike-group IKE-IPIP
local-subnet 10.0.6.2/32
remote-subnet 10.0.5.10/32
pre-shared-secret Allahuakh-
bar
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Table 4.5: Site-to-site OpenVPN TLS
Interface local-address remote-address remote-host Description/Other Require-
ment
vtun0 10.18.1.1 10.18.1.2 158.125.253.10 R1 to R2
Common Name is RHzgrave
ca-cert-file /path-to-key/ca.crt
cert-file /path-to-key/RHzgrave.crt
dh-file /path-to-key/dh1024.pem
key-file /path-to-key/RHzgrave.key
role passive
static interface-route to
158.125.253.4/30 next-hop-interface
vtun0
vtun0 10.18.1.2 10.18.1.1 158.125.253.2 R2 to R1
Common Name is RRHzgrave
ca-cert-file /path-to-key/ca.crt
cert-file /path-to-key/RRHzgrave.crt
key-file /path-to-key/RRHzgrave.key
role active
static interface-route to
158.125.253.12/30 next-hop-interface
vtun0
puters are installed with LINUX UBUNTU operating systems. Table 4.1 on page 93 list out
the devices specification.
CACTI is a complete frontend to RRDTool. CACTI stores all of the necessary informa-
tion to create graphs and populate them with data in a MySQL database [21]. In this project
SNMP traffics are polled and are used for creating traffic graphs. The prerequisites for CACTI
are RRDTool, PHP, MySQL and Apache Web server [20]. The RRDTool is available from
RRDTool homepage [121]. RRDtool is the OpenSource industry standard, high performance
data logging and graphing system for time series data. It supports custom monitoring shell
scripts or create whole applications using its Perl, Python, Ruby, TCL or PHP bindings. In-
stalling RRDTool is trivial. That is to extract the downloaded RRDTool source code into the
CACTI directory. PHP, MySQL and Apache server could be installed separately. Instead in
this project LAMP (LINUX, Apache, MySQL and Phyton) is installed. LAMP consists of
PHP, MySQL and Apache server for LINUX. The process of installing CACTI is available
from Cacti manual 0.8.7 [20].
The tcpdump packet sniffer has been used for a long time and is the basis for most other
open source packet sniffers. As its name implies, tcpdump collects and dumps data on TCP/IP
networks. Most LINUX distributions come with tcpdump installed by default or it can be
obtained from its official web site [111]. The tcpdump utility is a command-line tool. In
this project tcpdump is installed into TCPdump computer. Dummynet is a tool originally
designed for testing networking protocols, and since then used for a variety of applications
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including bandwidth management. It could be used to enforce queue and bandwidth limita-
tions, delays, packet losses, and multipath effects. It also implements a variant of Weighted
Fair Queueing called WF2Q. It can be used on user’s workstations, or on machines acting
as routers or bridges. Dummynet is available from this official site [142]. In this project,
Dummynet is compiled for LINUX 10.04. The kernel object ipfw mod.ko is installed into
/path-to-kernel /../ netfilter. The bridge-utilities package is also installed. The package is
available at Ubuntu.Package:bridge-utils website [163]. We use Dummynet to simulate delay,
packet loss and jitter between Client 2 and router R2. The scripts for Dummynet is available
in the Appendix A on page xxii.
4.3 Third Stage: VoIP clients
Installing and registering clients are trivial but nonetheless is essential for this project. As such
it is highlighted here. Skype, Google Talk and SIP-based clients are installed into Client 1 and
Client 2. The installers for Skype and Google Talk are available at their official homepages
[153, 57]. For SIP-based clients, two types of SIP user agents are installed, Express Talk and
Ekiga. Express Talk is a SIP softphone that works on personal computer [155]. Although Ex-
press Talk provides functionality for account creation and registration, however, it is not a SIP
service provider. One needs to provide its own SIP servers (i.e. Registration, Authentication,
Redirect and Proxies servers) for Express Talk to function as a SIP service provider. For ex-
ample, Express Talk could be combined with a virtual Private Branch Exchange (PBX) system
like Asteriks system in a company telephony suite to create a customize company telephony
system. However, we use SIP account from a third party SIP service provider like Ekiga in
Express Talk. This is to show that in general, a SIP URI is recognizable by another SIP User
Agent. Ekiga is a GUI application and it provides SIP service. Ekiga executable version or
source code can be downloded from Ekiga homepage [46].
In order for the clients to function properly, they are registered with the appropriate service
providers. At least, two accounts of each client are required, one account is for Client 1 and
another account is for Client 2. For Skype accounts the registrations are with Skype server. For
Google Talk accounts the registrations are with Google Talk server and for SIP-based accounts
the registrations are with Ekiga server. The next step is to create buddies (i.e. contacts) with
each client. At the moment Skype users can only have Skype buddies. Although Skype
SIP communications are also possible, it incurs extra charges. Google Talk users would have
Google Talk buddies. SIP-based users can talk to any SIP-based buddies. With buddies system
in placed, users can filtered out any unwanted users from their groups. Hence, this feature
allows users to determine their own social group and a way of eliminating unwanted calls. For
example, during the experiment, from time to time, several unfamiliar contacts will request to
4.4 Fourth Stage: Script To Automate Experiment 97
join in our Skype contact group.
4.4 Fourth Stage: Script To Automate Experiment
There are three different parameters to be set on Dummynet. They are delay, packet loss rate
(plr) and jitter profiles. Delay has a value which is between 0 ms to 400 ms. Plr is between
0% to 3% and there are ten jitter profiles. From these parameters set, there are more than 80
different test values to be tested on each VoIP service. Hence it takes plenty of time to run these
tests manually. The idea here, is to run these tests repeatedly with less human intervention.
Scripts are written for this purpose. The scripts run on a specific hardware. Figure 4.4 on page
99 shows the boundary of these scripts. Prior to running the scripts, Client 2 is set to have
auto-accept incoming call and an audio cable is connected from the audio out port of Client
2 to the microphone port of Client 1, refer to Figure 4.4 on page 99. The script perform the
following tasks in sequence:
1. Load IPSec or OpenVPN TLS configuration into R1 and R2 routers.
2. Set a testing parameter in Dummynet.
2.1 Start tcpdump to dump packet transmits from Client 1 to Client 2 into TCPdump
computer through ethernet port eth0.
2.2 Activate VoIP client as a caller in Client 1.
2.3 Make a call from Client 1 to Client 2.
2.4 Once the call is successful, SoX plays audio message from Client 1 for 10 seconds.
2.5 Using SoX to record the audio message back in Client 1 and save the recorded
audio.
2.6 Abort the tcpdump program.
3. Repeat step 2 for ten times.
4. Reset parameter to original setting in Dummynet (i.e. no packet filtering)
5. Set R1 and R2 routers to default state (i.e. enable the IPIP tunnel only)
6. Repeat step 1 to 5 for all test parameters.
Some setting are done on the SoX audio parameters to cater for the appropriate VAC
cable ports before running the scripts. VAC is a software that transfer wave streams between
applications and devices [116]. It creates a set of virtual audio devices named ”Virtual Cables”.
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Each virtual audio device consists of a pair of the waveform input and output devices. Any
application can send audio stream to an output side of a cable, and any other application can
receive this stream from an input side. All transfers are made digitally. VAC is useful to
record application’s audio output in real time or transfer a sound stream for other application
to process it. For example, VAC can be used to record calls and conversations of a VoIP
application.
On Client 1, the AudioOUT parameter of SoX is set to one of the VAC cable ports. The
microphone of Skype, Google Talk and Express Talk must also be set with the same VAC cable
port. There are ten cable ports available at any one time. If the settings are done incorrectly, the
audio is still played by the SoX player but through a wrong channel, resulting in no audio being
passed to the clients’ microphone. Similarly, on Client 2, the speaker of Skype, Google Talk
and Express Talk are set to one of the VAC cable ports. In addition the AudioIN parameter
of SoX is set to the same VAC cable port. If the settings are done incorrectly, the audio is
still passed to the clients’ speaker but through a wrong channel, resulting in no audio being
recorded by the SoX recorder. Microphone and speaker are considered as audio devices. Most
VoIP clients allow users to set these devices to suit their own requirements.
Figure 4.5 on page 100 shows the call time line. It takes about 15 seconds for one cycle
of the tasks described on page 97 to be completed. In the diagram it shows that Client A is
making a call to Client B. Client A is making the call from Client 1 and Client B is receiving
the call at Client 2. All scripts are generated from Client 1. In order to perform these tasks,
ssh servers are installed on the Dummynet and TCPdump computers. In addition ssh client
is installed on a remote control computer. For this implementation the scripts are remotely
controlled from Client 1. Hence ssh client is installed into this computer. Other important
thing that should be highlighted here is the Skype client is activated through Skype library
scripts from CPAN. When the Skype perl script is executed, it would attach to the Skype
client that was installed earlier. The Skype perl script assists in the automation of the task of
initiating call from Client 1 computer. However, if there is no CLI interface existed and only
the GUI version of any clients existed then some improvision are applied. In this case, AutoIt
is used to automate the action of making call from Client 1 and a script to receive call at Client
2. AutoIt codes are used to initiate calls for Google Talk and Express Talk clients.
Google Talk is based on XMPP/libjingle project. Google Talk source codes are in C++.
The codes are available for downloaded from Google Talk for Developers site [57]. Sev-
eral attempts have been made to compile the source codes on Microsoft Windows computer
but failed because the prerequisite software GIPS VoiceEngine Lite is no longer available
for public consumption. Therefore the software is downloaded from its official website,
(i.e. http://www.google.com/talk/index.html) and is installed into Client 1 and Client 2 com-
puters. To ensure that Google Talk executes smoothly, AutoIt is used to automate the task of
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Figure 4.4: Scope for a semi-automated VoIP Test-kit
initiating call from Client 1 computer. AutoIt can be downloaded from Autoit v3 website [79].
Since Google Talk does not support auto-accept incoming call, an AutoIt script is written for
this purpose. Similar codes are written for Express Talk. The scripts for the tasks mentioned
in this subsection are available in the Appendix B on page xxvi.
4.5 Fifth Stage: Data Collection and Data Processing
This is one of the core stage of the implementation stages. The data collection and data pro-
cessing processes are done in an orderly manner. This is essential because the collected data
is used to evaluate the performance of each VoIP service. At the end of each data collection
process some files with .wav and .pcap extentions are generated. A special script for PESQ run
is prepared. Example of this script is available in Appendix C.1 on page xxxiii. Ipsumdump
and Ipaggcreate scripts are prepared to generate .txt report from .pcap files. The report con-
tains the time series information pertaining to IP packets and payload length of UDP segments
travel from Client 1 and Client 2 computers, as shown in the sample below.
Epoch_time payload_size_in_byte
1307039254.818301 32
1307039254.818411 32
1307039254.832169 92
.....
.....
1307039953.693428 172
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Figure 4.5: Call thread time line
1307039953.693582 172
Once the .wav data is collected then PESQ program is used to get the PESQMOS reading
of the degraded audio. This audio is compared against the original audio message. In addition
other details like crude delay and sample frequency are also presented in the report. The
device that is used for playing and recording the data must not distort the audio other than
due to the parameters that are introduced in the scripts in the previous Section 4.4. The report
produced by the PESQ script is in .txt format, as shown in the sample below.
REFERENCE DEGRADED PESQMOS PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE_FREQ CRUDE_DELAY
......................
sample1234.wav Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-44-49.wav SQValue=2.845 2.845 0 0 16000 1.464
sample1234.wav Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-03.wav SQValue=2.811 2.811 0 0 16000 1.38
sample1234.wav Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-17.wav SQValue=2.815 2.815 0 0 16000 1.468
sample1234.wav Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-32.wav SQValue=2.766 2.766 0 0 16000 1.344
sample1234.wav Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-46.wav SQValue=2.841 2.841 0 0 16000 1.44
.....................
This report is transformed into .xls format that is recognised by R . It is used to produced box
and whisker graphs and graphs of plot of mean.
The information from .pcap file is required to find the network throughput. In addition
to the tcpdump report, RTT is extracted from ICMP log report. To generate the ICMP log,
ping command is issued from Client 1 to Client 2 with different test parameters being setup
in Dummynet. The RTT is one of the parameter required to estimate the R-factor score of
E-model. The R-factor score objectively estimates the quality of any audio signal passing
through the testbed. The R-factor score and the PESQMOS is cross validate between each
other. The cross validation process is discussed further in Section 4.6 on page 103.
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4.5.1 Data Collection
Data collection is a process of sending data to a central point from one or more locations. In
this project there are two types of data that are being captured. The first one is the degraded
audio signal in the form of .wav. The second one is the data packets that are propagated
between Client 1 and Client 2 computers in the form of .pcap data. There are a few important
points that should be highlighted here:
i. There should not be further loss of precision on the degraded audio signal except due to
the testing parameters that are described in the Subsection 3.3.2 on page 84. Therefore
the SoX player and SoX recorder frequencies are set to 96000 Hertz. This is higher than
the frequency of the codecs used in the experiment.
ii. The holding time for the audio signal is set to 10 seconds. It was suggested that the
recommended test signal length is between 8 seconds to 10 seconds for testing networks
[135]. However, the long distance call mean of short call durations is 3.5 minutes and the
long distance call mean for long call durations is 10 minutes on exponentially distributed
call durations [105]. In this project the holding time is set to 10 seconds as shorter
holding time allows more tests to be run.
iii. Data packets captured includes all activities happened between Client 1 and Client 2
computers. So the size of the data packets captured is bigger than expected. Further
filtering would be required to determine the actual size of the audio data. For example,
using Ipsumdump to extract interested packets, refer to Appendix C.1.2 on page xxxiii.
4.5.2 Data Processing
To explain data processing process, Extraction-Transformation-Loading (ETL) concept is bor-
rowed. Data processing is part of ETL process. ETL tools are pieces of software responsible
for the extraction of data from several sources, their cleansing, customization and insertion
into data warehouse [165]. However, the transformation part of the ETL process is more re-
levent to this project. There are two data sources that require processing before reports can
be produced, the .wav and .pcap files. The degraded audios signal are fed into PESQ pro-
gram to generate a report which consists of the original audio source, the degraded audio, the
PESQMOS value, the crude delay and the sample frequency of each comparison. A sample
run script is available in Appendix C.1 on Subsection C.1.1 on page xxxiii. The .txt report is
then transformed into .xls. Several additional fields are added to the existing records1 before
the file is imported into the R software. R is used to plot the required graphs. For this project,
1Refer to Appendix D.1.1 on page xli
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Figure 4.6: Data processing process
two types of graphs are plotted. They are the plot of means and the box and whisker graph.
Figure 4.6 on page 102 depicted this process. Ipsumdump extracts raw data from a .pcap
file and produces a .txt report containing epoch time and IP packet size in bytes. The data is
updated into rrd database. Rrdtool is used to generate time versus throughput graph, refer to
the graphs on page 135. Optionally, the total IP packet can be calculated from the .txt report
produced by Ipsumdump. Alternatively, Ipaggcreate aggregates the total IP packet. Refer to
Appendix C.1.2 on page xxxiii. Throughput is an average rate of successful message delivery
over a communication channel. It is measured in data packets per second or bits per second.
Throughput is defined as in equation (1):
Throughput = Size
T
data packets per second
(1)
where T is data transfer time in seconds and Size is data payload size in bytes. The
payload size includes Layer 2 and Layer 3 headers and it depends on the type of the codec in
used. Table 2.2 on page 63 shows several payload size for different codec types.
In this experiment T is fixed to 10 seconds. To change Throughput to bps, multiply the value
by 8.
Last but not least is to extract RTT values from ICMP log report. RTT is the time taken for
a signal to be sent plus the length of time it takes for an acknowledgment of that signal to be
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received. It is also known as ping time. By default, ping waits 4 seconds for each response to
be returned before displaying the ’Request Timed Out’ message. The ICMP log report consists
of a ping statistic that consists of RTT average, minimum and maximum times. In addition
to that, it consists of the number of packet transmitted and received and the percentange of
packet loss. Here, Client 1 sent ICMP ping to Client 2 for 10 counts of 100 bytes ping packet
for every test parameters set on the Dummynet and the ICMP log shows RTT value between
0ms and 1600ms. The ICMP log is available in Appendix D.1.2 on page xliii.
4.6 Sixth Stage:Validation And Verification
The validation and verification process emphasizes on three things: Validation on the tools;
Validation on the data collection process; and Verification on the result.
4.6.1 Tools
There are three different measurement tools used in this project. The PESQ calculator is used
to measure the PESQMOS and crude delay of audio streams. The PESQ measuring tool is
described in Subsection 2.5.5 on page 69. PESQMOS is a value between 0 and 5. In which
case higher value implies better score. Crude delay is the delay due to the crude alignment
between the degraded audio and the original audio. Crude delay of zero implies that the two
audio streams are 100% in synchronization.
In this project the PESQ software is from ITU-T Recommendation P.862 with limited user
permission [73]. The ITU-T code can be used free of charge as long as it is for purely academic
work and the project must not be the result of any contracted work funded by one industry or
a consortium of several industries. The tool is used for understanding PESQ algorithm or to
evaluate the ability of the PESQ algorithm to perform its intended function of predicting the
speech quality of a system. The software is owned by British Telecommunications plc (BT)
and Royal KPN NV (A Dutch landline and mobile telecommunications company). However,
all rights are assigned to Psytechnics Limited and OPTICOM GmbH. To check the accur-
acy and consistency of the software, two untreated audio streams were tested with sample
frequencies of 8000Hz and 16000Hz. The result is as follows:
REFERENCE DEGRADED PESQMOS PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE_FREQ CRUDE_DELAY
sample1234.wav sample1234.wav SQValue=4.500 4.500 0.000 0 16000 0.0000
sample1234.wav sample1234.wav SQValue=4.500 4.500 0.000 0 8000 0.0000
sampleabcd.wav sampleabcd.wav SQValue=4.500 4.500 0.000 0 16000 0.0000
sampleabcd.wav sampleabcd.wav SQValue=4.500 4.500 0.000 0 8000 0.0000
It shows that the PESQMOS are 4.500 and CRUDE DELAY are 0.0000 for both frequen-
cies. So why is the PESQMOS is 4.5 and not 5.0? What happen to the extra 0.5 score? Does
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not PESQ return score that conforms to ITU-T P.862? According to the 2004 Technical report
by Malden Electronic Ltd, the score lies between the scale of -0.5 and 4.5 [102]. This score
correlates with the quality subjective score. However, PESQ score tends to be optimistic on a
low quality speech and pessimistic on a high quality speech. Several mappings are available
to produce more realistic correlation between PESQMOS and quality subjective score. Here
is the mapping for wideband measurement or PESQ-WB [102]:
PESQ-WB= 0:999 + 4:999 0:999
1+exp 1:3669PESQMOS+3:8224
The second tool, E-Model calculator predicts the readiness of a network to handle VoIP
services. The E-model takes into account a wide range of telephony-band impairments, in
particular the impairment due to low bit-rate coding devices and one-way delay, as well as
the ’classical’ telephony impairments of loss, noise and echo. It can be applied to assess
the voice quality of wireline and wireless scenarios, based on circuit-switched and packet-
switched technologies. The sample report in Appendix D.1.3 on page lviii shows the results
of running emodel.java program. The emodel.java program executes several test cases in
batch mode. The NIST E-model calculator processes each test case one at a time [78]. The
emodel.java code is available in Appendix C.1.4 on page xxxv. For validation, several one-
way delays in ms and packet loss probabilities are feeded into the emodel.java program for
G.711 codec type. The results are verified against NIST E-model calculator. The results are
impartial for both tools.
The third tool is the CVSS calculator. To find the CVSS score, each service security con-
dition is mapped into CVSS Base Metrics. CVSS is a vulnerability scoring system that was
designed to provide an open and standardized method for rating IT vulnerabilities. It helps IT
managers, vulnerability bulletin providers, security vendors, application vendors and research-
ers prioritize and coordinate a joint response to security vulnerabilities by communicating the
properties of a vulnerability. In this project we use CVSS version 2 [49]. Table 4.6 explains
the meaning of each parameter used in the assessment. The score ranging from 0 to 10. The
higher the vulnerability, the higher the score. We customised an openCVSS.py class so that
we can execute the test cases in batch mode. The openCVSS.py class was written by Dixon
[42]. The NIST CVSS calculator executes a test case at any one time. There are about 64
samples output produced by openCVSS.py. They are presented in Figure 4.7 on page 106.
Eight of them are recalculated using NIST CVSS calculator and presented in Table 4.7 on
page 107. There are two inconsistencies found. One is related to the impact score and another
one is regarded the base score. The different is about 0.1 for each. These differences might be
due to the rounding to one decimal place.
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Table 4.6: Base Metrics
Base Metrics [49]
Access Vector (AV)
• Local (L)
• Adjacent (A)
• Network (N)
This metric reflects how the vulnerability is exploited. The more remote an attacker can
be to attack a host, the greater the vulnerability score.
Access Complexity (AC)
• High (H)
• Medium (M)
• Low (L)
This metric measures the complexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerability
once an attacker has gained access to the target system. The lower the required complex-
ity, the higher the vulnerability score.
Authentication (Au)
• Multiple (M)
• Single (S)
• None (N)
This metric measures the number of times an attacker must authenticate to a target in
order to exploit a vulnerability. This metric does not gauge the strength or complexity of
the authentication process, only that an attacker is required to provide credentials before
an exploit may occur. The fewer authentication instances that are required, the higher the
vulnerability score.
Confidentiality Impact (C)
• None (N)
• Partial (P)
• Complete (C)
This metric measures the impact on confidentiality of a successfully exploited vulnerabil-
ity. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized
users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones. Increased
confidentiality impact increases the vulnerability score.
Integrity Impact (I)
• None (N)
• Partial (P)
• Complete (C)
This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability.
Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and guaranteed veracity of information. Increased
integrity impact increases the vulnerability score.
Availability Impact (A)
• None (N)
• Partial (P)
• Complete (C)
This metric measures the impact to availability of a successfully exploited vulnerability.
Availability refers to the accessibility of information resources. Attacks that consume
network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Increased availability impact increases the vulnerability score.
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Figure 4.7: CVSS Base Score report
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Figure 4.8: NIST CVSS calculator version 2
Table 4.7: Several output from NIST CVSS calculator version 2
Sample Exploitability Impact CVSS
Subscore Subscore Base Score
(AV:A/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:C/A:N) 4.4 7.8 5.8
(AV:A/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:P) 3.2 8.5 5.8
(AV:L/AC:L/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:N) 2.5 9.2 5.9
(AV:L/AC:H/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C) 1.2 10 5.9
(AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P) 6.8 6.4 6
(AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:C/A:N) 6.5 6.9 6.1
(AV:L/AC:L/Au:M/C:P/I:C/A:C) 2.5 9.5 6.2
(AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C) 3.9 8.5 6.1
4.6 Sixth Stage:Validation And Verification 108
4.6.2 Data Collection
As mentioned earlier, data collection is one of the most important step in this project because
the data collected is analysed to evaluate the perceived voice quality of Skype, Google Talk
and Express Talk applications. For validation, the scripts as in Appendix B.1 on page xxvi
are executed repeatedly for several times. As much as possible the scripts are run with less
human intervention. For every parameters set on Dummynet, ten readings are taken, (refer
to Section 4.4 on page 97). The consistency of the results are checked. Sample reports are
available in Appendix D.1 on page xli. We also plot box and whisker graphs to check for
consistency of the data collected. For example, Figure 4.9 on page 108 shows the data taken
for Google Talk over IPIP tunnel on delay between 0 ms to 400 ms range. In this example,
the scores are quite consistent. There are more related graphs in Appendix D.1.6 on page lxx.
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4.7 Summary
This chapter explains the project implementation stages. There are six stages. Each stage is
important as they aim to increase consistency and reduce error of the collected data. These
data are used for analysing the selected VoIP performance. Next, Chapter 5 describes the
result and analysis of the experiment.
Chapter 5
Results and Analysis
”Indeed the cure for ignorance is to ask.”
Al-Hadith Abu Dawud
This chapter discusses the results of the experiments conducted as described in Chapter 4, to
evaluate the performance of Skype, Google Talk1 and Express Talk. There are three significant
scores. First is the PESQ-WB score, for each VoIP service. Second is the CVSS base score
and third, is the throughput for each test condition. The test conditions were described in Sub-
section 3.3.1 on page 83. PESQ-WB score is the wideband measurement based on PESQMOS
score. They are described in Subsection 4.6.1 on page 103. We plotted the graphs of delay
versus PESQ-WB, packet loss rate versus PESQ-WB and box and whisker graph on jitter. We
analysed the effects of delay, packet loss rate and jitter on the voice qualities. In addition,
CVSS scores predict the security vulnerability of the VoIP services in the testbed. We also
analysed the throughput gained by each experiment. According to Chiang et al., throughput
can reflect the bandwidth requirement and the achieved voice quality of a VoIP application
whereby higher throughput often results in better voice quality [28]. The process of extracting
throughput values and producing time series graph using a rrdgraph function is in Subsection
4.5.2 on page 101. The rrdgraph is a graph function of rrdtool that is used to present the rrd
data into a nice graphical representation or numerical report [122].
It is important to check the readiness of our testbed to support VoIP services. This is be-
cause we would like to ensure that any results obtained are not influenced by other factors other
than the parameters set on each test scenario. This is our way of controlling the experiment.
Hence, R factor is used to gauge the readiness of the testbed to run the VoIP services. E-model
calculator maps R factor values to MOS scores. R-factor values of below 50 are generally
unacceptable and typical telephone connections do not get above 94, giving a typical range
1In this project sometimes it is referred to as Gtalk
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of acceptable scores of 50 to 94 [80]. We have discussed about E-model in Subsection 2.5.6
on page 70. The E-model calculator program is available in Appendix C.1.4 on page xxxv.
Figure 5.1 on page 112 shows the MOS scores based on E-model prediction for the testbed
network with the one-way delay between 0ms to 800ms and Figure 5.2 on page 112 shows
the MOS scores for the packet loss probability between 0% to 3%. These scores influence the
range of the delay and plr parameters that were set for this project. In addition, it is recom-
mended that an upper limit of 400ms for a one-way delay of general network planning. This
is because practically many voice calls and interactive data applications might be affected by
much lower delays [74]. Figure 5.1 on page 112 shows that the MOS value is approximately
3.25 at 400ms delay and approximately 4.3 at 150ms delay. Figure 5.3 on page 112 shows that
the quality of the audio becomes poor beginning at 600ms mark (i.e. where R value is 50 and
MOS is approximately 2.5). In addition, Figure 5.2 on page 112 shows that the MOS values
decrease exponentially to packet loss probability. Figure 5.4 on page 112 indicates that the
voice quality is poor for plr beyond 0.8%. Theoretically the testbed is suitable to carry voice
data for any delays less than 150ms and any packet loss probability that is less than 0.1%. So,
it is important to inspect the PESQ-WB scores of the VoIP clients beyond these limits.
5.1 Voice Quality:PESQ-WB Scores
5.1.1 Delay
Normal speech consists of talkspurts that last for a few hundred milliseconds and silence peri-
ods, which occur within spoken words and between words. In a packet-based network, voice
packets are generated periodically at the sender and transmitted across the network [110]. In
most cases, users would not notice any delays in a conversation if they are less that 150ms
[74, 43]. The experiment shows that voice quality drops due to a delay for Skype and Google
Talk. This is based on the graphs that are depicted on page 114 and page 115. However,
the quality of Express Talk is better than Skype or Google Talk, refer to Figure 5.8 on page
116. There are no significant differences in Express Talk performances in the secure tunnels
(i.e. either IPSec or TLS) to those executed in the IPIP tunnel. From our observation, Skype
and Express Talk did not show very much variation with delay but Google Talk degrades with
higher delay as shown in Figure 5.8. We have no clear answer to this. It is probably due to
an unknown factor at work in the codecs. We have no way to determine the reason due to the
closed nature of the Google Talk and the Skype systems.
Next, we analysed Skype performances. The experiment shows that overall, Skype has
much better voice quality than Google Talk, refer to Figure 5.8 on page 116, Figure 5.9 on
page 116 and Figure 5.10 on page 117. However, Skype performances are quite random for
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Figure 5.5: SIP protocol: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.7: Google Talk protocol:The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
all three network conditions. Interestingly, the scores for Skype are more stable in the IPSec
tunnel than to the TLS tunnel. The graph in Figure 5.6 on page 114 shows that, despite
the random behaviour, there are substantial decrease in Skype performances due to delay.
The majority of the scores are below 2.5 which indicate poorer quality than the acceptable
telephony quality. The experiment also shows that the performance of Google Talk is slightly
better in the IPSec tunnel than to the TLS, refer to Figure 5.7 on page 115. Google Talk
performances drop in both secure tunnels (i.e. IPSec and TLS). Google Talk performances
drop linearly with delay when the delays are below 300ms mark. The voice quality scores
have worsen after the 300ms delay.
In summary, the observation so far indicates that the voice qualities for Skype shows slight
improvement in an IPSec tunnel. It also shows that Google Talk performance decreases due
to additional processing to authenticate security tunnels at Network layer (i.e. IPSec) and
Transport layer (i.e. TLS). On the other hand, Express Talk performance are almost similar in
any of the tunnels. It also shows that, in general, network delays can cause substantial defect
on the voice qualities for some of the VoIP protocols. Eventhough the graph in Figure 5.1
on page 112 has suggested that the starting point for the MOS for all VoIP clients should be
around 4.3, however, each client has lower PESQ-WB than expected. At this point, we could
not conclude what causes this defect. We suspect that the actual delay in the testbed is more
than the theoretical delay value. In order to prove this, we execute ICMP ping command from
Client A to Client B. The result is shown in Appendix D.1.2 on page xliii. However, there
were no unusual activities reported in the log. Another potential cause is due to a different
bandwidth requirement imposed by each VoIP client to carry the voice data. In which case,
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Figure 5.8: IPIP tunnel: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.9: IPSec tunnel: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.10: TLS tunnel: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
we analyse the actual throughput of each client for every test cases. Section 5.3 on page 131
discusses these throughputs and their effects on voice qualities.
5.1.2 Packet Loss Rate
In a TCP/IP network, packet loss can be caused by numerous factors such as insufficient
bandwidth, network connection problems, faulty networking hardware, faulty network drivers
or normal routing routines. However, what matter most is how many packets are lost at the
final destination. If the final destination is not affected, then all other delay and packet loss are
just an artifact of router configuration or something similar. Hence, it should not cause any
problem because it does not impact network availability to the end users in general. However,
the data packets might be transmitted over a longer duration.
This is not the case for time sensitive applications. For time sensitive applications such as
VoIP, packet loss during transmission might cause conversational difficulty because in most
cases the network transport protocol is UDP. UDP provides no recovery for lost packets. Ap-
plications that use UDP are expected to define their own mechanisms for handling packet loss.
In general, small percentage loss would not effect the overall service quality. The only effect
seen due to the occasional dropped packet is jitter. However, if the percentage of loss of the
total packet stream is high then it affects the quality significantly. The experiment involving
packet loss rate in this project would determine the plr limit of each VoIP service that would
have significant impact on the voice quality. In addition, it would show whether IPSec and
TLS have significant influences on these performances.
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Figure 5.11: SIP Protocol: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.12: Skype Protocol: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.13: Google Talk Protocol: The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
Analysis on the graphs depict on page 118 and page 119 show that packet loss rate have
significant effect on the PESQ-WB scores regardless of the percentage of loss. In all cases the
scores are quite random although Google Talk in the TLS and Google Talk in the IPSec show
more stable scores for plr between 0% to 1.5%. Eventhough the graph in Figure 5.2 on page
112 has suggested that the starting point for the MOS for all VoIP clients should be around
4.3 at 0% plr and drops exponentially due to packet loss probability, however, each client has
much lower PESQ-WB scores than expected. From the experiment, refer to Figure 5.11 on
page 118, it can be deduced that Express Talk has better scores than Skype or Google Talk
regardless of the network conditions. There is no significant difference in term of Express Talk
performance in an IPSec or a TLS or just an IPIP tunnel without security. Figure 5.12 on page
118 also shows that Skype performance is very sensitive to packet loss. The score can be very
low even in a unsecured network. This is demonstrated by the low score in the IPIP tunnel
when the plr is between 0% and 1%. Generally, Skype performances have no clear pattern.
However, the scores are much better in an IPSec tunnel. Figure 5.13 on page 119 demonstrates
that Google Talk is more tolerance to packet loss. Google Talk performance drops slightly due
to the Network layer and Transport layer securities. However, the performance are better than
Skype. Most of the PESQ-WB scores are above 2.5. Nevertheless, the PESQ-WB scores for
both IPSec and TLS are quite stable.
In summary, the experiment shows that even a small percentage of a packet loss rate can
significantly reduces a VoIP performance. Skype performances are sensitive to packet loss
(i.e. plr between 0% to 3.0%). Google Talk and Express Talk on the other hand, can handle
packet loss better than Skype.
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Figure 5.14: IPIP protocol:The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.15: IPSec protocol:The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
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Figure 5.16: TLS protocol:The result of taking the mean of 10 runs
5.1.3 Jitter
Jitter is the variation of delay between packets arriving. Jitter is caused by network congestion,
timing drift, route changes, queuing at the egress gateway or buffering delay. The amount
of allowable jitter depends greatly on the application. In VoIP, jitter introduces distortions
in audio signals which lead to low audio quality. Jitter can also lead to loss of transmitted
data between network devices. In this project, jitters have been introduced by creating three
pipelines with different probability of delays to see the effect of the independent variable jitter
to each VoIP service. The three delays are below 400ms as recommended by the ITU-T G.114
Recommendation. However, the probability of each pipeline to transfer data varies, refer to
Table 5.1 on page 123. Each profile creates different RTT values. There is no particular
reason for choosing 100ms delay, 200ms delay and 300ms delay of pipelines. However, for
many intra-regional routes in the range of 5000km or less, VoIP users are likely to experience
mouth-to-ear delays that is less than 150ms [74]. In a worst case scenario a VoIP mouth-to-
ear path is likely to see a delay of just 300ms. So these delays seem to mimic the typical
long distance calls. The difference between a maximum RTT and a minimum RTT seems
to influence the delay variation reading. The RTT magnitude and rate of occurance of each
pipeline determine the damage done on the voice quality. This observation is demonstrated in
the box and whisker graphs of Figure 5.17, Figure 5.18, Figure 5.19, Figure 5.20, Figure 5.21,
Figure 5.22, Figure 5.23, Figure 5.24 and Figure 5.25. The performances of Skype, Google
Talk and Express Talk were affected by these jitters as shown by the different scores for each
condition on every different test runs.
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Figure 5.17: SIP IPIP Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.18: SIP IPSec Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Table 5.1: Jitter Profiles
Profile/Pipeline 100ms delay 200ms delay 300ms delay Round Trip Time
(Probability) (Probability) (Probability)
jitter0 0.33 0.33 0.33 Minimum = 400ms, Maximum =
897ms, Average = 649ms
jitter1 0.2 0.3 0.5 Minimum = 199ms, Maximum =
899ms, Average = 618ms
jitter2 0.5 0.3 0.2 Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 496ms,
Average = 335ms
jitter3 0.3 0.5 0.2 Minimum = 98ms, Maximum = 700ms,
Average = 398ms
jitter4 0.2 0.5 0.3 Minimum = 396ms, Maximum =
897ms, Average = 587ms
jitter5 0.5 0.2 0.3 Minimum = 97ms, Maximum = 799ms,
Average = 434ms
jitter6 0.3 0.2 0.5 Minimum = 396ms, Maximum =
1098ms, Average = 737ms
jitter7 0.05 0.05 0.9 Minimum = 898ms, Maximum =
1200ms, Average = 1038ms
jitter8 0.05 0.9 0.05 Minimum = 597ms, Maximum =
800ms, Average = 768ms
jitter9 0.9 0.05 0.05 Minimum = 297ms, Maximum =
398ms, Average = 357ms
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Figure 5.19: SIP TLS Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.20: Skype IPIP Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.21: Skype IPSec Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.22: Skype TLS Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
Our analysis on the Express Talk shows that jitters affect its performances. The mean
scores of Express Talk are above 2.0 in all jitter profiles except for Jitter3, Jitter4 and Jitter5
as depicted in Figure 5.17 and Jitter3 and Jitter7 in Figure 5.18 on page 122 and Jitter0,
Jitter1, Jitter3 and Jitter5 in Figure 5.19 on page 123 respectively. Generally, this indicates
that more than fifty percent of the scores are above 2.0. In addition, the PESQ-WB scores are
widely spread within the range of 1.0 to 4.0 approximately with a few outliers. However, to
understand the effect of each individual jitter, we analyse each plot separately. For example,
referring to Figure 5.17, for Jitter0, the score ranges from 1.3 to 4.1, approximately a 2.8 score
spread, which in PESQ-WB scores is quite a bit of difference. The first quartile reading is
1.5 which means that seventy five percent of the scores in this test case are 1.5 or more. The
third quartile tells us that twenty five percent of these calls have scored 4.0 or higher which
are really good scores. The median cuts the data in half at 3.4. This indicates that fifty percent
of the calls received PESQ-WB scores of 3.4 or higher. These scores skew to the right. From
this we can conclude that there is a wide range of scores that reflect the effect of Jitter0 to
the voice quality. The analysis on Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 show similar outcomes except
for the Express Talk in TLS the scores skew to the left and for the Express Talk in IPSec, the
third quartile starts at 3.0 instead of at 4.0. This shows that for Express Talk, jitters in a secure
tunnel may reduce the PESQ-WB scores further.
Generally, the scores of Skype are much lower and uncertain in all jitter profiles, refer to
Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21 on page 124 and Figure 5.22 on page 125 respectively. Regardless
5.1 Voice Quality:PESQ-WB Scores 126
Jitter0 Jitter1 Jitter2 Jitter3 Jitter4 Jitter5 Jitter6 Jitter7 Jitter8 Jitter9
1.
8
2.
0
2.
2
2.
4
2.
6
Google Talk over IPIP tunnel:box and whisker plot over 10 runs
Jitter Profile
PE
SQ
−W
B
Figure 5.23: Gtalk IPIP Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.24: Gtalk IPSec Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
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Figure 5.25: Gtalk TLS Protocol: Box and whisker plot over 10 runs
whether the tunnels are secure or unsecure the medians are below 2.0. This shows that fifty
percent of the scores are less than 2.0. In most cases the maximum scores are around 2.6
with a few exception, for example Jitter9 in IPIP and IPSec tunnels, whereby the maximum
scores are around 3.0. However, the overall scores skew to the left which indicates that jitters
cause Skype to have low performances. In addition, there are more outliers as compare to the
scores for the Express Talk. In these scenarios, TLS and IPSec have less influence on Skype
performances. This shows that Skype is more sensitive to jitters than any other impairments.
Google Talk scores are much higher than Skype but lower than Express Talk. The scores
spread is also smaller than Express Talk. This indicates that Google Talk scores are quite
consistence with fewer outliers as compared to Skype. Most of the medians are about 2.2,
which indicates that fifty percent of the scores are higher than 2.2. Refer to Figure 5.23,
Figure 5.24 on page 126 and Figure 5.25 on page 127 respectively. However, in most cases
the maximum scores are around 2.5. Any scores less than 2.5 indicate that the services have
very low voice quality. Generally, when there were jitters, IPSec and TLS have little influenced
on Google Talk performances, refer to Figure 5.24 and Figure 5.25 on page 126 since their
scores are at par with those in the IPIP tunnel. The results also indicate that Google Talk is
more sensitive to jitters than any other impairments like plr and delay.
In summary jitters affect Skype and Google Talk more than Express Talk. In most cases
secure or unsecure tunnels have less effect on the overall performances. In case of Skype and
Google Talk, jitters cause their scores to be low but the scores distribution has smaller spread
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than Express Talk. On top of that, jitters introduce outliers in their data samples. On the other
hand, for Express Talk, jitters cause the scores to have wide spread of values. Some of the
scores are quite good but some are very low. One way to overcome jitters in any VoIP services
is by having an appropriate size of de-jitter buffer. We have discussed about de-jitter buffer
briefly in the third paragraph of Subsubsection 2.4.1.2 on page 58.
5.2 Security:Vulnerability Score
5.2.1 CVSS base score
We computed the CVSS base scores for SIP, Google Talk and Skype based on the profiles
of the VoIP services as depicted in Table 3.1 on page 82 and Table 4.6 on page 105. Figure
5.26 on page 129 shows these scores. We define the CVSS score in the third paragraph of
Subsection 4.6.1 on page 104. The scores range from 0 to 10. The higher the vulnerability,
the higher the score. Other than that , the Exploitability Score is also obtained from the CVSS
calculator [49]. Overall, SIP has the lowest CVSS base score for each security protocol imple-
mented as compared to Google Talk or Skype. In all conditions the CVSS base scores reduce
with the implementation of IPSec or TLS. Both IPSec and TLS protect the confidentiality
and integrity of any data that is transmitted through their tunnels [172, 178]. The different
between confidentiality and integrity is that, the first refers to limiting information access and
disclosure to only authorized users and preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized
users. On the other hand, the latter measures the trustworthiness and guaranteed veracity of
the information. The confidentiality is maintained if the data is encrypted and only authorized
users are allowed access. On the other hand, the integrity is obtained by applying a hashing
algorithm like Hash-Based Media Authentication Code (HMAC). When TCP is used as the
transport protocol, TLS can be used to protect VoIP messages. TLS, a successor to SSL, is a
protocol that ensures privacy between communication applications and their users on the In-
ternet [25, 152, 113]. For a server and client communication, TLS ensures that no third party
may eavesdrop or tamper with any message travels between the two devices. IPSec may also
be used to protect the layer three communications, regardless of transport protocol types of
either TCP or UDP [25, 113]
SIP has several logical servers with dedicated functions. SIP servers located within the
internet cloud. According to Salsano, SIP supports two forms of encryption: end-to-end and
hop-by-hop. S/MIME performs end-to-end encryption, whereas IPSec and TLS perform hop-
by-hop encryption of the whole SIP messages in order to protect the information that should
be accessed by intermediate entities, such as From, To, and Via headers. The full description
of SIP security mechanisms can be found in [147]. The difference between an end-to-end
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Figure 5.26: CVSS Base Score
security and a hop-by-hop security is that for the end-to-end security the whole message is en-
crypted either using a symmetric or an asymmetric key where the necessary key-variables and
algorithms are shared by both parties. The end-to-end encryption involves an uninterrupted
protection of the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data by encoding it at its starting
point and decoding it at its destination. It involves encrypting data at source with knowledge
of the intended recipient, allowing the encrypted data to travel safely through public networks
to its destination where it can be decrypted. For the hop-by-hop encryption, any data trans-
mitted between the two network devices that involve in the tunnelling is protected, refer to
Figure 5.27. However there is no guarantee that the data will still be protected when it travels
between end points and the network devices.
SIP protocol is defined in Subsection 2.2.1 on page 34. When a call is made, SIP register-
ation server authenticates user. Typically SIP call signalling travels in the internet cloud from
one proxy server to another. SIP has the ability to protect its service from Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. SIP has multiple instance of authentication. SIP provides user to user authen-
tication and user to proxy authentication. SIP access complexity is medium because so far
there is no evidence of man in the middle (MiTM) attack. However, with DoS protection, this
might imply that it is not easy to get into the target in the first place. SIP messages are still in
plain text and not encrypted. Therefore Confidentiality Impact is partial since attackers may
not be able to break confidentiality if they cannot get access to the stream. With IPSec ESP
implementation in place, SIP media is protected but SIP signalling can still be compromised.
Hence, IPSec ESP increases confidentiality and integrity of the media in SIP service but it still
compromises on confidentiality of the signal. SIP service depends on the internet availability,
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Figure 5.27: Media security
hence we concluded that the availability impact is partial for all scenarios.
Google Talk server is in the internet cloud. Google Talk Access complexity is low although
there is a Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) in place. XMPP message is in a
human readable format hence the confidentiality impact is partial. There is an integrity check
therefore the integrity impact might be none. The availability is partial due to the internet
best effort. With IPSec ESP implementation in place, the access complexity is still low on the
signal but the audio streams are protected. IPSec ESP increases confidentiality and integrity of
the media in Google Talk service but it still compromises on the confidentiality of the signal.
Skype has a decentralised user directory. Skype audio is encrypted end-to-end. The prob-
lem is, Skype can bypass firewall and NAT. Skype supernode also increase risk to its user.
Therefore Skype access complexity is low, authentication is for a single instance, the confid-
entiality impact is partial and the integrity impact is none. With IPSec ESP implementation,
Skype access complexity is medium since Skype signal is still vulnerable but the audio is pro-
tected by the IPSec tunnel. Hence, IPSec ESP increases confidentiality and integrity of the
media in Skype service and lower the vulnerability score. However, it still compromises on
confidentiality of the signal. Since Skype service depends on the internet availability, hence
we decided that the availability impact is partial.
In all cases, OpenVPN TLS protects the payload from eavesdropping, tampering and mes-
sage forgery. However, it still compromises on confidentiality of the signals. Therefore, in
terms of media protection, both IPSec ESP and OpenVPN are at par. However, OpenVPN
TLS or IPSec is more scalable and secure in term of key exchange mechanism if it uses public
key cryptography instead of a pre-shared secret, refer to Section 4.1 on page 88 on the method
used in this experiment. Another way to protect the payload is by using the ZRTP protocol
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[189]. For example, Zfone could be used to encrypt phone calls over the Internet [188]. Zfone
uses ZRTP protocol and it supports SIP and Google Talk but not Skype. Skype does not need
this extra protection because its media is already been encrypted. If ZRTP is implemented,
the media parts of SIP and Google Talk can also be protected but the signalling parts for both
services can still be compromised. However, the Application Layer security is beyond the
scope of our project. Hence, it is not included in this experiment.
Figure 5.26 on page 129 shows the base score estimations for the conditions that have been
described above. Generally, services aim for low vulnerability scores. SIP with IPSec ESP
and OpenVPN TLS implementations have the lowest scores. From the result, it shows that
the vulnerability scores improve with the implementation of IPSec ESP and OpenVPN TLS.
IPSec ESP and OpenVPN TLS are a few protocols that can be used to reduce the vulnerability
on the media part of a VoIP service. The protection of the signal part of any public VoIP
service is feasible. However, it is not scalable neither practical except for Internet Service
Provider (ISP) that uses an Internet Telephony Service Provider (ITSP) connection to PSTN
[147]. The service allows internet users to place calls in the PSTN. In this scenario the ISP
already has a security relationship with its customer. For example, a SIP proxy server in the
ISP network will be configured as the default outbound proxy server for the SIP clients in the
ISP network. This proxy server forwards calls to the ITSP proxy server, which will select and
contact the more appropriate SIP gateway. Other than that, a company can opt for a private
VoIP service to have a full protection, just like a banking system is doing on the e-banking.
5.3 Bandwidth Utilisation
Bandwidth describes how much information can be transmitted over a connection per unit of
time. For VoIP services to function properly, an end-to-end connectivity with an adequate
bandwidth must be able to carry enough information to sustain the succession of audio sig-
nals. In a connectionless network where data can be routed through any paths from source to
destination, the actual bandwidth is as good as the last miles bandwidth. This is because an
access network normally has the lowest bandwidth capacity than to core networks that belong
to ISP. Throughput, also known as bandwidth utilisation, is the amount of data successfully
sent per unit of time. Throughput fluctuates even within the same session and it would not
exceed bandwidth limit of a link. The type of link and the codec in used would determine the
bandwidth requirement and throughput value. Subsubsection 2.4.2.1 on page 61 explains the
method used to calculate the bandwidth requirement for a single call. Table 5.2 on page 132
shows the bandwidth and sample packet size in kbps that are calculated using this method.
Google Talk, Express Talk and Skype negotiate the codec type during calls setup. Appar-
ently, Google Talk supports iLBC, Speex, G.722 and G.711 [57]. On the other hand, Express
5.3 Bandwidth Utilisation 132
Talk supports G.711u, G.711a and GSM with echo cancellation and noise reduction [167].
Express Talk might be using a new extension of ITU-T G.711 to cater for a wideband coding
scheme known as the ITU-T wideband extension (G.711.1). The G.711.1 operates at 64, 80,
and 96 kbps, and is designed to achieve very short delay and low complexity [69]. Lapierre et
al. present a noise shaping scheme so that a multi-rate codec is interoperable with the legacy
narrow-band codec [96]. As a result, it increases the intelligibility and naturalness of speech
and offer a better face-to-face experience to the end users. Another Express Talk supported
codec, GSM is less relevant for our research since it is used to support a cellular telephony
service. Skype supports iLBC, G.711, G.729 and Speex [154]. In addition, Skype has sev-
eral proprietary codecs like SILK2, a super wideband speech coding standard, developed by
Skype in the year 2009 and SVOPC3, a lossy speech compression codec designed specifically
towards communication channels suffering from packet loss. SVOPC coder is inherently ro-
bust to packet loss but uses more bandwidth than the best bandwidth-optimised codecs [101].
These codecs are either CBR or VBR , refer to Subsection 2.2.7 on page 40 for explanation.
Table 5.2: VoIP per call bandwidth per CODEC type
Codec
type
Standard VBR/ CBR Sample
period
No. of
frame
per
packet
Packet
per
second
Codec
bit rate
Total
packet
size
(bits)
Bandwidth
per call
G.711
(PCM)
ITU-T CBR (Narrowband) 20ms 1 50 pps 64 kbps 1904
bits
95.2
kbps
G.711.1
(PCM)
ITU-T CBR (Wideband) 20ms 1 50 pps 80 kbps 2224
bits
111.2
kbps
G.711.1
(PCM)
ITU-T CBR (Wideband) 20ms 1 50 pps 96 kbps 2544
bits
127.2
kbps
G.729A
(CS-
CELP)
ITU-T CBR 10ms 2 50 pps 8 kbps 784 bits 39.2
kbps
G.729 ITU-T CBR 10ms 2 50 pps 8 kbps 224 bits 11.2
kbps
G.723.1A
(ACELP)
ITU-T CBR 30ms 1 33.3 pps 5.3 kbps 784 bits 26.1
kbps
iLBC IETF
(RFC
3951)
CBR 20ms 1 50 pps 15.2
kbps
928 bits 46.4
kbps
iLBC IETF
(RFC
3951
CBR 30ms 1 33.3 pps 13.33
kbps
1024
bits
34.1
kbps
Speex Open
Source
VBR 20ms 1 50 pps 4 kbps
to 44.2
kbps
704 bits
to 1512
bits
35.2kbps
to
75.4kbps
In theory, VoIP over ethernet with legacy G.711 codec requires 95.2kbps bandwidth in
2Super Wideband Audio Codec
3Sinusoidal Voice Over Packet Coder
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order to sustain the succession of audio signals in the VoIP service. There is no data compres-
sion for this codec [119]. However, there would be some trade-off in term of voice quality
and bandwidth requirement. Other codec types would have some form of data compression in
them. Hence, less bandwidth is required to sustain the succession of audio signals in the VoIP
service. However, the voice quality would decrease due to the data compression. The payload
size for the G.711 codec with 64kbps bandwidth and 20ms sample period is 160 bytes. On
top of that there is a fixed IP overhead of 40 bytes and fixed Ethernet overhead of 38 bytes.
Hence, the total IP packet size is 238 bytes. Since normal speech consists of talkspurts that
last for a few hundred milliseconds and silence periods that occur within spoken words and
between words, hence, ideally the packet size for each talkspurt would be around 1904 bits.
On the other hand, VoIP over ethernet with iLBC codec requires 46.4kbps bandwidth in
order to sustain the succession of audio signals in the VoIP service. The iLBC codec enables
graceful speech quality degradation in the case of lost frames, which occurs in connection
with lost or delayed IP packets. The payload size for iLBC4 codec with 15.2kbps bandwidth
and 20ms sample period is 38 bytes. On top of that there is a fixed IP overhead of 40 bytes
and fixed Ethernet overhead of 38 bytes. Hence, the total IP packet size is 116 bytes. Hence,
the packet size for each talkspurt would be around 928 bits, an estimated size for any VoIP
services with iLBC. VoIP over ethernet with G.729A codec requires 39.2kbps bandwidth in
order to sustain the succession of audio signals in the VoIP service. The payload size for
G.729A codec with 8kbps bandwidth, 10ms sample period and 2 frame/packet is 20 bytes. On
top of that, there is a fixed IP overhead of 40 bytes and fixed Ethernet overhead of 38 bytes.
Hence, the total IP packet size is 98 bytes. The packet size for each talkspurt would be around
784 bits.
Another type of codec supported by Skype, Google Talk and Express Talk is Speex which
is an Open Source Software patent-free audio compression format designed for speech. The
Speex Project aims to lower the barrier of entry for voice applications by providing a free
alternative to expensive proprietary speech codecs. Moreover, Speex is well-adapted to In-
ternet applications and provides useful features that are not present in most other codecs, for
examples it is robust to corruption at the bit level, as found on wireless networks, embeds nar-
rowband bitstreams in wideband bitstreams and variable bit rate (VBR) [182]. In particular,
Speex codec uses multirate, and supports ultra-wideband (i.e. 32 kHz sampling rate), wide-
band (i.e. 16 kHz sampling rate) and narrowband (i.e. telephone quality, 8 kHz sampling rate).
Multirate capability allows the codec to change bitrate dynamically, at any moment. The pay-
load size for Speex wideband codec with bandwidth between 4kbps to 44.2kbps, 20ms sample
period is between 10 to 111 bytes. There is also a fixed IP overhead of 40 bytes and fixed Eth-
4There is another one with 13.33 kbps with an encoding frame length of 30ms
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ernet overhead of 38 bytes. Therefore, VoIP over ethernet with Speex wideband codec requires
bandwidth between 35.2kbps to 75.4kbps in order to sustain the succession of audio signals in
the VoIP service. The packet size for each talkspurt would be between 704 bits to 1508 bits.
In our experiment, the throughput for each VoIP service is measured every 10 seconds,
(i.e. data transfer time T is set to 10 seconds, refer to page 102). The throughput for each
service is represented in the form of time versus throughput graph. Subsection C.1.2 on page
xxxiii in Appendix C shows the steps on how we draw the graphs of throughput from the .pcap
data that we collect using the method as described in the Subsection 4.6.2 on page 108. For
examples, the graphs on page 135 show the throughput for SIP clients, the graphs on page 141
show the throughput for Skype clients and the graphs on page 144 show the throughput for
Google Talk clients. There are many different flavour of SIP clients. In this experiment we use
Express Talk as our SIP client. We begin our analysis on the Express Talk implementation in
the IPIP tunnel. We want to find out the effect of delay, plr and jitter on throughput value
based on the graphs shown on page 135. The graphs, refer to Figure 5.28, Figure 5.29, Figure
5.30 and Figure 5.31, on delay show that delay influences the amount of throughput passes
through the network from a sender to a receiver. However, the maximum amount of throughput
for each talkspurt remains constant throughout the experiment. We believe Express Talk uses
a CBR type of CODEC like G.711.1 as mentioned in [167]. The graphs also demonstrate
that the throughputs are sensitive to changes and disturbance in the network. For example,
excessive delay might result in packets loss during transmission or drop at the gateway, refer
to the graph of Figure 5.31 for delay between 300ms to 400ms, on page 135. There are
more time gaps between the adjacent packets in this graph as compared to the graph in Figure
5.28 for delay between 0ms to 90ms on page 135. Another condition that creates wider gaps
between adjacent packets are when there are jitters in the network as shown by the graph in
Figure 5.35 on page 135.
Figure 5.32, Figure 5.33 and Figure 5.34 show that plr values also influence the amount
of throughput passes through the network from a sender to a receiver. Based on Figure 5.35
on page 135, it seems that the maximum throughput remains constant throughout the experi-
ment. However, there are more obvious gaps in the graph. Throughputs may also affect the
PESQ-WB scores. We believe that there is a correlation between the throughput and the avail-
able network resources. However, the maximum throughput of any CBR codec is a constant
value and is never beyond a sample packet size travels every seconds. From the graphs, we
notice that the maximum packet travels in one second for each condition is around 1400 bits.
Subsubsection 2.4.2.1 on page 61 explains on how to calculate a bandwidth requirement for
a single call for a different codec type. Referring to Table 5.2 on page 132, the packet size
for VoIP/UDP/IP/Ethernet is about 1904 bits. This value is higher than the experimental value
because in the experiment we extract IP packets, hence our script exclude any Layer 2 frame
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Figure 5.28: Express Talk: Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.29: Express Talk: Delay 100ms to
190ms
Figure 5.30: Express Talk: Delay 200ms to
290ms
Figure 5.31: Express Talk: Delay 300ms to
400ms
Figure 5.32: Express Talk: PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.33: Express Talk: PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.34: Express Talk: PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.35: Express Talk: 9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.36: Express Talk-IPSec: Delay 0ms
to 90ms
Figure 5.37: Express Talk-IPSec: Delay
100ms to 190ms
Figure 5.38: Express Talk-IPSec: Delay
200ms to 290ms
Figure 5.39: Express Talk-IPSec: Delay
300ms to 400ms
Figure 5.40: Express Talk-IPSec: PLR 0.0% to
0.9%
Figure 5.41: Express Talk-IPSec: PLR 1.0% to
1.9%
Figure 5.42: Express Talk-IPSec: PLR 2.0% to
3.0%
Figure 5.43: Express Talk-IPSec: 9 Jitter pro-
files
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Figure 5.44: Express Talk-TLS:Delay 0ms to
90ms
Figure 5.45: Express Talk-TLS:Delay 100ms
to 190ms
Figure 5.46: Express Talk-TLS:Delay 200ms
to 290ms
Figure 5.47: Express Talk-TLS:Delay 300ms
to 400ms
Figure 5.48: Express Talk-TLS:PLR 0.0% to
0.9%
Figure 5.49: Express Talk-TLS:PLR 1.0% to
1.9%
Figure 5.50: Express Talk-TLS:PLR 2.0% to
3.0%
Figure 5.51: Express Talk-TLS:9 Jitter profiles
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header, refer to Subsection C.1.2 on page xxxiii in Appendix .
Once we have analysed the throughputs in the IPIP tunnel we continue our analysis on
throughputs in IPSec tunnel. From our observation, Express Talk in the IPSec reveals similar
results, refer to the graphs on page 136. We believe IPSec has some impact on the amount
of throughput transmitted from a sender to a receiver. However, since the .pcap data was
collected at the gateway, hence we could not see the difference. At the gateway the packets
were decapsulated by the IPSec tunnel. However, the size of the throughput confirms that
VoIP packet’s size is very small. In fact the total throughput is smaller than the calculated
bandwidth required to make a single VoIP call. Express Talk in the TLS, refer to the graphs
on page 137, reveals similar pattern to the IPIP and IPSec tunnels. These experiments show
that Express Talk drops packets or decreases throughput during resources constraint.
Next, we analyse the amount of throughput produce while running Skype. We scrutinize
Skype throughput on the IPIP tunnel. The graphs on delay on page 141 show that Skype
produced less throughput than Express Talk, refer to the graphs on page 135, and Express Talk
PESQ-WB scores are better than Skype, refer to Figure 5.8 on page 116. However, within the
Skype, it seems to suggest that there is a direct correlation between the throughput and the
PESQ-WB. For example Figure 5.52 on page 141 and Figure 5.6 on page 114 seem to show
that there are correlations between high throughput (i.e. at about 15:15 hour and 15:20 hour)
and high PESQ-WB (i.e. between 10ms to 50ms delay) score and low throughput (i.e. after
15:20 hour) and low PESQ-WB score (i.e. after 50ms delay). We consider the PESQ-WB is
high when the score is equal or above 2.5 and low if the score is less than 2.5. The PESQ-WB
scores are low when there are packet losses. This is evidenced by the low PESQ-WB scores
when there are very few throughput between 16:20 hour and 16:30 hour (refer to Figure 5.54
on page 141). The PESQ-WB scores of Skype reduce gracefully as compared to Google Talk,
refer to to Figure 5.8 on page 116. This might suggest that Skype uses a codec that adapts to
a congested network. It employs embedded or layered coding codec which allows the speech
quality graceful degradation in the congested network [101]. This type of codec does not rely
on interframe coding techniques for frame-erasure channel instead on a sinusoidal voice over
packet coder (i.e. SVOPC) to avoid interframe erasure from propagate over several consecutive
frames [101]. The graphs on plr on page 141 seem to show that Skype would adjust on the
types of codecs use, refer to Subsection 2.2.7 on page 40, depending on the amount of available
resources. In most cases the throughput is about 0.6 kbps. The throughput is not constant.
There are sudden burst of throughput from time to time. However, these sudden burst of
packets do not influence the PESQ-WB scores, refer to Figure 5.14 on page 120. Figure 5.18
on page 122 shows the PESQ-WB scores for Skype, Express Talk and Google Talk in the
IPIP network for several jitter profiles, refer to Table 5.1 on page 123. Skype generates less
throughput than Express Talk, refer to Figure 5.20 on page 124, except during start up. The
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high throughput during start up might be due to the extra processing for Skype to adapt to
the available resources and negotiates on the coder type between a sender and a receiver. The
graphs on delay in the IPSec for Skype reveals similar behaviour, refer to the figures 5.60
to 5.63 on page 142. However, Figure 5.61 for delay between 100ms to 190ms seems to
suggest that when there are network resource constraints, Skype waits until there are available
network resources for the next call to succeed. This is evidenced by the long gap in the graph
before the next call being made. In other situation Skype might drop the packets to conserve
resources as shown in Figure 5.62 for delay between 200ms to 290ms for the time between
17:10 hour and 17:20 hour. Due to that Skype PESQ-WB scores drop, refer to Figure 5.9
on page 116. IPSec introduces extra processing in Skype which affects Skype performance.
However, Figure 5.12 on page 118 seems to suggest that Skype PESQ-WB scores are better in
the IPSec as compared to the IPIP. The difference between the minimum throughput and the
maximum throughput are small, refer to Figure 5.64 on page 142. There are also sudden burst
of packets for plr between 1.0% and 1.9%. In which case, the PESQ-WB score is better than
the adjacent plr values. For example when there is a burst at 18:47 hour, the PESQ-WB also
increase, refer to Figure 5.65 on page 142 and Figure 5.12 on page 118. Skype throughput for
jitter in the IPSec is quite similar to those in the IPIP. This suggests that Skype PESQ-WB
scores in the IPSec are random but the throughput remain the same. Similarly, the throughput
values are higher during start up. Skype throughput values in the TLS also reveal almost
similar patterns as in the IPIP and IPSec except there are no packet losses and the throughput
during start up is much higher than the subsequent periods for delay between 200ms to 290ms,
refer to Figure 5.69 on page 143. Another interesting observation is for Skype in the TLS for
plr between 0.0% to 0.9%, refer to Figure 5.72 on page 143. The throughput produced is
quite similar to the throughput produced in the IPIP network, refer to Figure 5.56 on page
141. However, for jitter the throughput resembles to the throughput produced under IPSec,
refer to Figure 5.75 on page 143 and Figure 5.59 on page 141. Last but not least, we analyse
the throughput produced by Google Talk. We start with the throughput produced in the IPIP
tunnel, refer to the graphs on delay on page 144. The throughput fluctuates between 0kbps
and 1.2kbps for delay between 0ms to 90ms, refer to Figure 5.76 on page 144. The amount
of throughput produced is reflected by high PESQ-WB score, refer to Figure 5.7 on page
115. The throughput produced decreases for delay that is between 100ms and 190ms, refer to
Figure 5.77 on page 144. Consequently the PESQ-WB score is also reduced, refer to Figure
5.7 on page 115. The throughput produced seems to suggest that Google Talk uses a variable
bit rate codec such as Speex or iLBC. There is a correlation between the throughput and the
PESQ-WB score. For example the PESQ-WB scores are low for the delay between 300ms
to 400ms, refer to 5.79 on page 144, due to bandwidth constraint and packet losses. For plr,
refer to Figure 5.80 on page 144 and Figure 5.13 on page 119, Google Talk waits until there
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is enough network resources available to initiate another call. This is evidenced by the gap
between the 12:00 hour and 12:10 hour of Figure 5.80 and the PESQ-WB scores are higher
than 2.5 for the plr range. Another example is on Figure 5.82 on page 144, there is a gap
before a successful call being made at about 13:36 hour. We believe that Google Talk will
initiate a call when there is enough network resources otherwise the call is dropped. However,
Google Talk produces less throughput when there are jitters in the network. This is evidenced
by the low throughput and low PESQ-WB score for jitter, refer to Figure 5.83 and Figure 5.21
on page 144 and page 124 respectively. We see similar patterns appear for Google Talk in the
IPSec and TLS implementations. The graphs for Google Talk in the IPSec implementation
is on page 145 and the graphs for Google Talk in the TLS implementation is on page 146
respectively.
In summary, the experiment shows that Express Talk, Skype and Google Talk generate
small amount of throughputs. This is as expected since VoIP payloads are small generally,
i.e. approximately 160 bytes and the sizes are smaller for any VoIP codecs with compression.
IPSec and TLS do not increase the size of the throughput produced. This is because the VoIP
payload is encapsulated within the IPSec or TLS headers when transmitted within the security
tunnel and is decapsulated at the gateway before entering the end user device. We have set the
tcpdump to monitor the packets travelling from a sender to a receiver by mirroring the sender
and receiver PCs and relevent router ports into the DELL switch, refer to the network setup
on Section 4.1 on page 88. In which case tcpdump fails to monitor the packets when they are
in either IPSec or TLS tunnels. As such we set the tcpdump to sniff the voice packets at the
gateway that is closer to the receiver end. In addition, the reason for the long time gaps in the
time versus throughput graphs might be due to the VoIP mechanism to overcome any network
resources constraint whereby during any disturbance, the overall end-to-end delay is prolong
or some packets are dropped. The overall effect of the mechanism would be to reduce the
quality of the VoIP services.
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Figure 5.52: Skype: Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.53: Skype: Delay 100ms to 190ms
Figure 5.54: Skype: Delay 200ms to 290ms Figure 5.55: Skype: Delay 300ms to 400ms
Figure 5.56: Skype: PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.57: Skype: PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.58: Skype: PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.59: Skype: 9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.60: Skype-IPSec: Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.61: Skype-IPSec: Delay 100ms to
190ms
Figure 5.62: Skype-IPSec: Delay 200ms to
290ms
Figure 5.63: Skype-IPSec: Delay 300ms to
400ms
Figure 5.64: Skype-IPSec: PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.65: Skype-IPSec: PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.66: Skype-IPSec: PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.67: Skype-IPSec: 9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.68: Skype-TLS: Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.69: Skype-TLS: Delay 100ms to
190ms
Figure 5.70: Skype-TLS: Delay 200ms to
290ms
Figure 5.71: Skype-TLS: Delay 300ms to
400ms
Figure 5.72: Skype-TLS: PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.73: Skype-TLS: PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.74: Skype-TLS: PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.75: Skype-TLS: 9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.76: GTalk: Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.77: GTalk: Delay 100ms to 190ms
Figure 5.78: GTalk: Delay 200ms to 290ms Figure 5.79: GTalk: Delay 300ms to 400ms
Figure 5.80: GTalk: PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.81: GTalk: PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.82: GTalk: PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.83: GTalk: 9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.84: Gtalk-IPSec:Delay 0ms to 90ms
Figure 5.85: Gtalk-IPSec:Delay 100ms to
190ms
Figure 5.86: Gtalk-IPSec:Delay 200ms to
290ms
Figure 5.87: Gtalk-IPSec:Delay 300ms to
400ms
Figure 5.88: Gtalk-IPSec:PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.89: Gtalk-IPSec:PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.90: Gtalk-IPSec:PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.91: Gtalk-IPSec:9 Jitter profiles
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Figure 5.92: Gtalk-TLS:Delay 0ms to 90ms Figure 5.93: Gtalk-TLS:Delay 100ms to 190ms
Figure 5.94: Gtalk-TLS:Delay 200ms to
290ms
Figure 5.95: Gtalk-TLS:Delay 300ms to
400ms
Figure 5.96: Gtalk-TLS:PLR 0.0% to 0.9% Figure 5.97: Gtalk-TLS:PLR 1.0% to 1.9%
Figure 5.98: Gtalk-TLS:PLR 2.0% to 3.0% Figure 5.99: Gtalk-TLS:9 Jitter profiles
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5.4 Overall Scores
Table 5.3 on page 148 shows the overall performance scores for Express Talk, Skype and
Google Talk. There are several conclusions that can be derived from this research:
1. The three VoIP services under test are more sensitive to the impairments due to plr and
jitter rather than to the impairment due to delay.
2. Bandwidth and other resources like a de-jitter buffer and a gateway’s CPU and memory
are important in order to produce a good quality VoIP service. The lack of these re-
sources would result in several packets lost before they reach the destination or the
packets arrive too late to join the other packets in the de-jitter buffer at the destination
gateway. The gateway would drop these packets if the de-jitter buffer is full or not
enough memory or CPU powers to process the packets.
3. The gateway closer to the receiver end decapsulates IPSec or TLS packets. The gateway
also decodes the voice packets before the packets entering the receiver machine.
4. High throughputs do not imply high PESQ-WB scores. The throughput size is determ-
ined by the codec type and the security features that are implemented on the infrastruc-
ture.
5. Google Talk PESQ-WB scores are better than Skype for any delay less than 150ms and
plr that is less than 1%, those factors are within the recommended ITU-T Recommend-
ation values.
6. Most of the Skype PESQ-WB scores due to plr impairments are below 2.5 which indic-
ate poor voice quality than acceptable telephony quality.
7. In most cases, Express Talk PESQ-WB scores are quite high which indicates good voice
quality, generally.
8. Application Layer security, Internetworking Layer security and Transport Layer security
reduce the vulnerabilities score for the system. For example the CVSS for SIP in the
IPIP is 5.4 and it is reduced to 1.8 in the IPSec and TLS implementations, refer to the
CVSS scores on Table 5.3.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter discusses the experimental results and analysis on the results. The chapter is
divided into three different sections. The first section discuss the results and analysis on voice
quality based on PESQ-WB scores for Express Talk, Skype and Google Talk. The second
section looks into the security aspect of the performance and the third section evaluate the
throughput for all test cases that were discussed earlier. Next, Chapter 6 explains on how the
results gained from this project could be used by the end users.
Chapter 6
Knowledge Presentation And Distribution
’So indeed with hardship is ease. Indeed with hardship is ease..”
Al-Quran:Chapter 94 verses 5-6
This chapter discusses on how the information gained from this project could help end users to
choose VoIP services that suit their needs. The information obtained should be disseminated
to users in a form that is easily understood by them. In most cases these two scoring systems
are being presented as two separate entities. However, it would be more meaningful to present
the two scores together. In which case, users can easily comprehend the meaning of the scores.
6.1 Information Convergence
We present our data in a graphical form of CVSS versus PESQ-WB scores. We set some
limits to the CVSS and PESQ-WB scores before drawing this graph . Basically a low CVSS
value (i.e. value nearer to 0) indicates less vulnerability in the network as compared to the
high value (i.e. value nearer to 10) of CVSS. A high PESQ-WB score (i.e. value nearer to 5)
indicates better voice quality . We present an algorithm to combine the two sets of scores as
in the Subsection 6.1.1. The overall performance of any VoIP services could be determined
by these two scoring schemes.
6.1.1 Algorithm
The main purpose of our algorithm is to combine the two metrics that measure VoIP clients’
QoS and security so that a user on the work could determine the suitability of a VoIP platform
for a particular VoIP client. In order to achieve this objective, we design our solution using Set
theory. We start with the descriptions of our independent and dependent variables. There are
three important independent variables. They are the security metric, the QoS metric and the
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client type. In addition, there is one dependent variable, i.e. the overall performance. From the
three independent variables we could determine the status of the dependent variable, whether
it is in good or not satisfactory or bad condition. In which case our algorithm is as follows:
Suppose that x 2 C and y 2M ,
where C = [0::10] ,M = [0::5] and performance  =f Good, Not Satisfactory, Bad g
then 8z whereby z 2 V = fSkype;GoogleTalk; ExpressTalkg
then the performance  of z is good if x  5 and y  2:5 (i.e. GREEN ZONE)
else if x  5 and y  2:5 then the performance  of z is Not Satisfactory (i.e. BLUE ZONE)
else if x  5 and y  2:5 the performance  of z is Not Satisfactory (i.e. YELLOW ZONE)
else if x  5 and y  2:5 the performance  of z is Bad (i.e. RED ZONE)
In this case, C represents the CVSS scores andM represents the PESQ-WB scores. Based
on this algorithm we map each z performance, , into CVSS versus PESQ-WB scores chart.
The charts are depicted in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. With
regards to the voice QoS, a score 2:5 < M < 3:5 could only be considered satisfactory, but
in our case we consider anything where M > 2:5 as ”good”. In practice an operator may
set the threshold for M as nearer 3:5. Our results show lower MOS scores than we might
expect, possibly due to a PESQ mapping that has not been calibrated. However, this improved
mapping would only be possible with a large subjective test data corpus that is not openly
available.
6.1.1.1 Four Coloured Zones
We have divided the overall client statuses into four different zones. The Green zone means
that z has good CVSS score and good voice quality. The Red zone means that z is in a danger
area whereby both CVSS and PESQ-WB scores are bad and not acceptable. These are the
two extreme zones. VoIP users should choose z that is in the Green zone and not otherwise.
The Blue zone means that z has good voice quality but it is vulnerable to security threats
and attacks. The Yellow zone means that the voice quality of z is not acceptable and might
contribute to the conversational difficulty though the security vulnerability is less.
6.1.1.2 Network Impairments
The PESQ-WB scores depend on the impairments induced on the test-bed. The factors that
influence the network condition are one-way delay, packet loss rate and network security fea-
tures like IPSec and TLS tunnelling. Jitters exist due to the inconsistent time taken for voice
packets to travel to their destination device from their source device. Part of the problem
lies on the TCP/IP protocol itself, refer to Subsubsection 2.4.1.1. By default, the IP protocol
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offers a best effort connectivity and the TCP transport protocol of the TCP/IP stack offers
reliability. However in the effort of providing the reliability, the overall one-way delay might
increase which can be detrimental to any time-sensitive applications. From our observation, a
voice quality y, is greater or equal to 2.5 when the one-way delay is between 0ms to 150ms
8z; z 2 fSkype;GoogleTalk; ExpressTalkg. IPSec and TLS reduce y value a little but
the performance  improves in x value because the value reduces with the implementation on
IPSec or TLS. Our results show some similarity with the research done by Ranganathan [134].
We have summarised his result on page 79. In which case, there is no significant different on
the voice quality for a VoIP service in a secure or an unsecure network. Figure 6.1 displays
the position of each VoIP client in the CVSS versus PESQ-WB chart for delay between 0ms
and 150ms. The delay is within the acceptable delays for voice application as recommended
by ITU-T, G.114 standard.
The other observation is for the packet loss rate between 0% and 1%. We believe that
Skype, Google Talk and Express Talk have good voice qualities eventhough Skype might po-
tentially fall into the Yellow and Red zones. Section 5.4 describes the overall effects of CVSS
and PESQ-WB scores due to the impairments that have been mentioned before. However, the
effects of the two scoring methods are presented separately in the section. Among the three
VoIP services, Skype is most likely susceptible to a high packet loss rate. This is evidenced
by the score of y below 2.5 for plr between 0% to 1%, refer to Figure 6.3.
6.1 Information Convergence 153
CVSS     Score
Legend:
ET- Express Talk in IPIP Sk- Skype in IPIP GTalk- Google Talk in IPIP
ET-Express Talk in IPSec Sk -Skype in IPSec GTalk-Google Talk in IPSec
ET- Express Talk in TLS Sk- Skype in TLS GTalk- Google Talk in TLS
PESQ-WB=2.5
Case Study: 0ms<Delay <150ms
CVSS=5.0
ET ET ET 
GTalk GTalk GTalk 
Sk Sk  
0 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Vulnerability 
Decreases 
Vulnerability 
Increases 
P
E
S
Q
-W
B
  
S
co
re
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 6.1: CVSS to PESQ-WD chart for Delay between 0ms and 150ms
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Figure 6.5: CVSS to PESQ-WD chart for PLR betweeen 2% and 3%
6.1.2 CPU Power and Operating System Type
Researches performed by other researchers showed that different types of CPUs speed, RAMs
sizes and operating systems can influenced the end and intermediate devices performance. We
highlight a few important points as follows:
i. We use quite low capacity of CPUs and RAMs with Windows XP operating systems
on our end devices and Linux operating systems on our routers, refer to Table 4.1 on
page 93. The preliminary studies conducted by Ahmed and Mansor showed that the
number of concurrent calls was mostly dependent on the CPU powers of the end and
intermediate devices [2]. However, we only execute a single call at any one time.
ii. An experiment conducted by Gaspary et al. suggested that a CPU was busy at 80% to
97% for messages up to 1024 bytes long due to the fact that, for smaller messages, a
larger time fraction was consumed in preparing and dispatching data through the TCP/IP
stack, hence, the sending rates in messages tended to be higher. For messages larger than
2048 bytes, the average CPU consumption was lower. The CPU load decreased further
when messages larger than 4096 bytes were used [51]. Based on this theory, we can
deduced that VoIP clients consume 80% to 97% CPU because their packet sizes are
less than 1024 bytes. Table 2.2 shows the VoIP per call bandwidth per codec type. For
example, we can see in the table that the total packet size in bytes for G.711 codec is
less that 1024 bytes. The total packet size for other codec types is lower.
iii. Another study that was performed by Salah and Hamawi on the impact of running CPU-
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bound applications on the performance of IP packet forwarding in Linux and Windows
XP showed that Linux IP forwarding was not affected by the CPU-bounded applica-
tions, whereas Windows XP network performance was degraded in terms of through-
put, packet loss and delay [145]. Balen et al. in their studies showed that a network
traffic with smaller packet sizes would benefit from Windows Vista and Windows 7 en-
hancement to overcome any shortcoming of Windows XP. However, any network traffic
with bigger packet sizes still has the best performance in Windows XP [7]. Balen et al.
device specifications are quite similar to our end devices except that their RAMs sizes
are bigger.
iv. Since the overall one-way delay, refer to Subsection 6.1.3, depends on the end device
processor speed and the intermediate network equipments’ capabilities hence  might
be improved in term of y, the voice quality score, if users can afford higher capability
computers’ CPUs and RAMs or using an upgraded version of Windows Operating Sys-
tems. In general, heavy loaded CPUs and RAMs of end devices and network equipments
are not good for any VoIP services.
6.1.3 Source of Delays
Users should understand the source of delays and the detrimental effect of the one-way delay,
packet loss rate and jitters to a VoIP voice quality if not properly control. Once they under-
stood the source of these delays, they would consider the right technologies, architectures and
topologies to be deployed into their VoIP networks. We highlight a few important points about
delays:
i. There are two distint types of delay that contribute to the overall one-way delay. They
are the fixed delay and the variable delay. In theory the fixed delay is due to the Coder
delay, Packetization and Depacketization delays and Serialization delay [62, 93]. By
definition, the Coder delay is the time taken by the digital signal processor (DSP) to
compress a block of PCM samples and the value varies with the voice coder used and the
device processor speed. The Packetization delay is the time taken to fill a packet payload
with encoded or compressed speech and the Depacketization delay is the reversed of it.
Both Packetization and Depacketization delays depend on the CPU processing power
and the RAM size [51]. The Serialization delay is the fixed delay required to clock a
voice or data frame onto a network interface. It is directly related to the clock rate on a
trunk. On relatively slow links, such as WAN connections, large data packets can take a
long time to send onto the wire. When these large packets are mixed with smaller voice
packets, the excessive transmission time can lead to both one-way delay and jitters. One
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solution to overcome the problem is to separate the voice and data networks or in a
unified network to give higher priority to voice packets.
ii. The other variable delay is due to the queueing delays of the intermediate and end
devices. Variable delays or jitters are not good to VoIP services because they cause
voice packets to reach the destination device at unpredictable time. The side effect of
jitters is packets being drop and loss during transmission. A de-jitter buffer is used
to overcome the problem due to the variable delay at the receiving router or gateway.
However, the de-jitter buffer increases the overall one-way delay and might affect the
voice quality of a call. Subsubsection 2.4.1.2 discusses the idle size for a de-jitter buffer
as to reduce the number of packets loss or being drop while maintaining the one-way
delay within the acceptable ITU-T standard limit. Another source of delay is the Net-
work switching delay that contribute to the largest delays for any voice connections.
The Network switching delay is the most difficult to quantify. It depends of the type of
equipments and technology in used by the carrier networks.
6.1.4 Packet Loss Rate
Express Talk uses Constant Bitrate (CBR) type of codec. It uses an extended version of G.711
codec, refer to Section 5.3. In theory G.711u and G.711a do not compress the voice payload.
We believe that the y value might be influenced by the codec type. The y values for Express
Talk are good in all network conditions.
Google Talk and Skype use Variable Bitrate (VBR) type of codecs. For VBR type of
codecs, each packet size depends on the amount of available bandwidth and CPU and memory
processing powers of the intermediate and end devices. Google Talk and Skype drop any
packets that arrive too late to be placed into a de-jitter buffer. In the experiment we can see
that Skype voice quality is slightly below the standard set by ITU-T, G.114 . The acceptable
plr for a VoIP service is below 1%. By right a VoIP client should adjust its de-jitter buffer
based on the current network condition [179]. The packet loss rate and latency could be
reduced by setting the right size of de-jitter buffer depending whether it is a static buffer size
or an adaptive buffer size. The de-jitter buffer size is important because a small buffer size
would lead to packets overflow and more packets may be discarded and a large buffer size may
reduced conversation intelligent because it increases the one-way delay. The de-jitter buffer
is discussed in Subsubsection 2.4.1.2. When choosing VoIP services, users should also check
on the type of codecs in used and the de-jitter buffer size. In addition they should also find out
whether the size is adaptive to the network conditions.
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6.1.5 Codec and Bandwidth Utilisation
We have discussed about each VoIP bandwidth utilisation in Section 5.3. The belief that
high throughput implies good service quality is not hundred percent correct. Our observation
shows that the payload size, hence, the throughput produced by each VoIP service is small
as compare to other data applications. High throughputs do not imply high y scores, refer
to Subsection 6.1.1. The throughput size is determined by the codec type, the topology and
architecture of the infrastructure. The overall frame size is determined by the Packetization
and the compression technique applied on the voice payload or encapsulation by other pro-
tocols. Our observation on Skype and Google Talk shows that high throughput can happen
during call initiation and the services might wait for available resources before initiate another
call, refer to Section 5.3. Our experiment shows that the throughput graphs produced by each
VoIP client reflect the type of codec used by the client. For example the throughput graphs
produced by Express Talk have constant maximum value but the graphs produced by Skype
and Google Talk fluntuate with different maximum and minimum throughput values. If this
is true then the shape of the throughput graphs give the first indication on the type of codec
used by a VoIP client. Most VoIP clients automatically negotiate the best suitable codecs with
their peers. However, some VoIP clients allow their users to choose the codecs for their VoIP
clients. The information that we provide would allow the users to choose the suitable codecs
based on their available resources. For example, users might opt for G.711 codec or the new
extended version of it if they have high capacity bandwidth in their network. Our observation
on Express Talk indicates that VoIP clients that use G.711 codec would produce better voice
quality.
6.2 Summary
This chapter discusses the knowledge that can be deduced from the project that benefit users,
system administrators and companies. Next, Chapter 7 is the conclusion of this project and
the thesis.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
”He hath loosed the two seas. They meet.
There is a barrier between them. They encroach not (one upon the other).
Which is it, of the favours of your Lord, that ye deny?”
Al-Quran:Chapter 55 verses 19-21
7.1 Process Flow
In this project, research had been conducted on three selected VoIP clients. They were Express
Talk, Skype and Google Talk. Our experiment was conducted in the laboratory. The exper-
iment was executed on a hybrid testbed because the approach was closer to the real world
problem. The experiment gathered the information regarding secure VoIP services. Several
researchers conducted experiments on SIP-based systems or Skype [27, 8, 14, 23]. However,
none of them tried to figure out the differences and similarities among SIP-based application,
Skype and Google Talk, particularly on their performances with the effect of the Network
Layer security or Transport Layer security implementations even though these services were
heavily used by VoIP users. A sytematic approach was followed in order to gain understand-
ing on the subject. The steps that a network administrator and an end user had to undergo
to setup secure VoIP services were emulated. The research started with a feasibility study on
the subject matter in order to find the possible gap in the area. There were researchers who
tried to correlate the VoIP security with VoIP performance, but their research was more con-
fined to theoretical approaches and deduced result from tests conducted in laboratory using
simulations. In this research, the hybrid testbed was designed. From this design the method
was expanded onto the experimental network. An E-Model calculator was used as the tool
to calculate the R-factor in order to gauge the readiness of the testbed. The R-factors were
mapped to MOS values and the graphs delay versus MOS and packet loss probability versus
159
7.2 Potential Research Works 160
MOS were drawn, example graphs are on page 112. These graphs gave a rough idea on how
the experimental results would turn out.
Next, the test rig was built and calibrated. The calibration of the test rig took longer time
than we anticipated to cater for three different networks setup, i.e. IPIP, IPSec and OpenVPN
TLS. Other time consuming tasks were data collection and analysis. Therefore, data collection
was performed with less human intervention. Scripts were written in order to generate and
collect the degraded voice calls and sniff traffics that travel from sender to receiver computers
in batches. In addition, CACTI was configured to monitor the health of the test equipments
and whether they were connected or disconnected. PESQ software was used to evaluate the
voice qualities of the selected VoIP services. Several graphs were generated and analysed in
order to compare the performance of each VoIP service. The comparison was not confined to
voice quality but on the vulnerability score and the amount of throughput generated for each
test case. The findings were documented in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
7.2 Potential Research Works
This research had some limitations, hence, the results obtained were subjected to the test cases
of this project alone. First, the result for SIP-based service might be different if different types
of SIP clients were used in the experiment. Second, the result was valid for the specific Skype
and Google Talk versions. Third, the transit router TR* was in the same physical location but
different subnet to Router1 and Router21. The research was unable to conclude whether the
result would be different if the TR* router was placed at several different locations. Fourth,
the research could not determine how much noise was in the data since the experiment was
conducted on live testbed and internet offers only best effort connectivity. Location and time
might influence the results of this research. Therefore, the scores might be influenced by the
time of the day the data was collected especially during peak hours. Fifth, the experiment
could only determine which codec was used for each VoIP service based on the time versus
throughput graphs, refer to Section 5.3 in Chapter 5 for detail but we think that Express Talk
uses CBR type of codec and Google Talk and Skype use VBR type of codec. Sixth, CVSS
only predicted the vulnerability score of each VoIP service in the different networks. There
was no attempt to hack the system to see how hard it was to compromise the system. Seven, the
research only obtained the throughput of each VoIP service for every experiments conducted.
Other resources like CPU and memory were not obtained. However, the overall readings of
CPU and memory were available in the CACTI report2. This data might be obsolete overtime
since rrd database was updated every day, therefore the data was not included in the result.
1refer to figure 4.1 on page 90
2refer to D.1.5 on page lxvii
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The research limitations have opened up for some opportunity on the research area. First,
the experiment could be extended for other SIP-based clients, another version of Skype and
Google Talk or other VoIP clients. Second, to locate TR* at a new location and perform
an experiment to validate the previous result. Third is to apply an Application layer security,
using an open source application like ZRTP on our topology and architecture. The survey done
by Keromytis shows the possibility of using ZRTP to protect and encrypt voice at Application
layer for a peer to peer communication [84, 86]. Fourth is to investigate whether the VoIP
media was really protected by the IPSec ESP or OpenVPN TLS or ZRTP. Fifth is to investigate
the effect of VoIP calls to the network equipments, CPU and memory. Subsequent researchers
might also want to duplicate the test rig to confirm the results of this research. The research
method could also be used for performance measurement of wireless network, mobile ad-hoc
network and other interactive and non-interactive real-time applications.
7.3 Different Technologies under Test
We have included several technologies into our test cases concerning VoIP clients, VoIP pro-
tocols, codec types, securities and quality of services. We have tested on three different VoIP
clients that are built on different architectures, i.e. Skype is based on proprietary protocol,
Google Talk is based on XMPP protocol and Express Talk is based on SIP protocol. They
adopt different VoIP signalling protocols. The applications also have different built-in secur-
ities. For example, Skype encrypts any voice message travels from sender to receiver but the
current Google Talk and Express Talk do not. Google Talk, however, has built-in SASL (
i.e. a framework for authentication and data security in Internet protocols) to provide mu-
tual authentication and integrity-checking and Express Talk has embedded DoS prevention,
user-to-user authentication and user-to-proxy authentication security features. On top of that,
we have tested on the effect of TLS and IPSec on the voice quality. We have discussed the
different CVSS scores due to these differences in Section 5.2 on page 128. We also look at
several different codec types. Most of the codecs compress the voice packet at one end of the
transmission channel to conserve the available bandwidth and then decompress the packet at
the other end. This is because the bandwidth is shared with other applications on the Internet.
However, the voice quality degraded due to the extra processing that contributes to the overall
end-to-end delay. Our experiments show that VoIP clients would select which codecs to be
used based on the condition of the network at the time of the transmission. For example, Skype
would adjust on the codec type depending on the network traffic. Skype would use SVOPC,
a lossy speech compression codec when the communication channels suffer from packet loss.
We have discussed this issue in Section 5.3 on page 131. There are also open source codecs
like Speex or iLBC which are categorised as variable bit rate codecs used by Google Talk and
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Skype in a lossy network condition. G.711 is an example of the codecs under ITU-T standard.
G.711 does not compress the payload hence requires more bandwidth to sustain the succession
of any audio signal. Express Talk uses the extended version of G.711. However, ITU-T also
have codecs that compress audio signal like G.729a, G.723 and G.726, refer to figure 3.2 on
page 81. A few of these codecs are supported by the VoIP clients. We used PESQ software
to measure the voice quality of each VoIP client. We can conclude that the quality of these
services are not the same. It depends on the available bandwidth, codec type, security features
and the network traffic conditions. We discussed the effect of one-way delay, jitter and packet
loss to the voice quality in section 5.1 on page 113. In most cases, as long as the one-way
delay or packet loss is within the recommended ITU-T standard range, i.e. one-way delay less
than or equal to 150ms for wired network and packet loss rate less than 1%, then users would
not noticed any conversation difficulty. However, there was no standard range for jitter. We
have designed our own jitter profiles and analysed their effects on the VoIP clients. The result
is tabled in Subsection 5.1.3 on page 121. If time-sensitive applications like VoIP clients ride
on UDP instead of TCP then there would be no error checking and no retransmission for any
packet losses during transmission. Generally, Skype, Google Talk and Express Talk would
transmit the voice packets when there are adequate network resources and drop the packet
when there is a network contention.
7.4 Summary
This chapter concludes the research and this thesis. It summaries the processes involved be-
fore, during and after the experiment has been conducted. It also highlights the research
limitations and the potential related researches that could come out from this research. In
addition we also highlight the different technologies under test. In conclusion, the technique
used in this research could also be used for other performance measurement researches espe-
cially those related to network systems that provide best effort services like wireless network,
mobile network and ad-hoc network. Those systems carry time-sensitive interactive and non-
interactive applications.
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Appendix A
A.1 Network Configuration and Monitoring
A.1.1 Routers’ Scripts
A.1.1.1 Source File: R3 config
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.17/30
description Router3-TR
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:63:bf:2e
speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.1/30
description Router3-Router1
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:96:78:4b
speed auto
}
ethernet eth4 {
address 158.125.253.9/30
description Router3-Router2
duplex auto
hw-id 00:04:23:bd:ab:e5
speed auto
}
ethernet eth5 {
address 172.16.1.2/30
description Router3-HP
duplex auto
hw-id 00:04:23:bd:ab:e4
speed auto
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
i
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network 158.125.253.0/30
network 158.125.253.16/30
network 158.125.253.8/30
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
snmp {
community com-router3 {
authorization ro
network 172.16.1.0/30
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description "Router3-FH community"
location FH
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 172.16.1.1 {
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 172.16.1.1 {
}
}
}
}
service {
ssh {
allow-root false
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
}
system {
host-name Router3
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$wtXXi9t6$pskG.qE07fDz3nIJq.Tg7.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$gEv7VFem$VltvrVNNbJByp0OO2kCsE/
}
level admin
}
}
ntp-server 69.59.150.135
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
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distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "ipsec@1:serial@1:vrrp@1:nat@2:dhcp-relay@1:cluster@1:dhcp-server@3:quagga@1:wanloadbalance@1:webgui@1:firewall@3" === */
/* Release version: VC4.1.4 */
A.1.1.2 Source File: R2 config:IPIP tunnel
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.13/30
description "Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:08:9a
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.10/30
description "Router2 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:07:d7
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 192.168.1.1/24
description "To VLAN management"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:a5
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.5.10/24
address 10.0.11.10/24
description net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.3.10/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.5.10
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.1.18
ttl 255
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}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.7.10/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.11.10
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.9.249
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.12/30
network 192.168.1.0/24
network 10.0.3.0/24
network 158.125.253.8/30
network 10.0.7.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
snmp {
community com-router2 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description Rtr2
location Hzgrave
}
ssh {
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
port 23
}
}
system {
A.1 Network Configuration and Monitoring v
host-name Router2
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:config-management@1:conntrack-sync@1:content-inspection
@2:dhcp-relay@1:dhcp-server@4:firewall@4:ipsec@2:nat@3:qos@1:quagga@2:system@4:vrrp@
1:wanloadbalance@2:webgui@1:webproxy@1:zone-policy@1" === */
A.1.1.3 Source File: R2 config:IPSec tunnel
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.13/30
description "Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:08:9a
speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.10/30
description "Router2 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:07:d7
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 192.168.1.1/24
description "To VLAN management"
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duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:a5
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.5.10/24
address 10.0.11.10/24
description net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.3.10/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.5.10
remote-ip 10.0.1.18
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.7.10/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.11.10
remote-ip 10.0.9.249
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.12/30
network 192.168.1.0/24
network 10.0.3.0/24
network 158.125.253.8/30
network 10.0.7.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
snmp {
community com-router2 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact pg-asaad
description "router2 FH community"
location FH
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
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distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
ssh {
allow-root false
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
allow-root false
port 23
}
}
system {
host-name Router2
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
ntp-server 69.59.150.135
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
vpn {
ipsec {
copy-tos disable
esp-group ESP-IPIP {
compression disable
lifetime 3600
mode tunnel
pfs enable
proposal 1 {
encryption aes128
hash sha1
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}
}
ike-group IKE-IPIP {
aggressive-mode disable
dead-peer-detection {
action hold
interval 15
timeout 120
}
lifetime 28800
proposal 1 {
dh-group 5
encryption aes128
hash sha1
}
}
ipsec-interfaces {
interface eth1
}
site-to-site {
peer 158.125.253.2 {
authentication {
mode pre-shared-secret
pre-shared-secret Allahuakhbar
}
ike-group IKE-IPIP
local-ip 158.125.253.10
tunnel 1 {
allow-nat-networks disable
allow-public-networks disable
esp-group ESP-IPIP
local-subnet 10.0.5.10/32
remote-subnet 10.0.6.2/32
}
}
}
}
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "dhcp-server@3:wanloadbalance@1:cluster@1:nat@2:quagga@1:vrrp@1:
firewall@3:ipsec@1:dhcp-relay@1:serial@1:webgui@1" === */
/* Release version: VC4.1.4 */
A.1.1.4 Source File: R2 config:OpenVPN TLS
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.13/30
description "Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:08:9a
smp_affinity auto
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speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.10/30
description "Router2 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:0e:0c:6d:07:d7
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 192.168.1.1/24
description "To VLAN management"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:a5
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.5.10/24
address 10.0.11.10/24
description net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
}
openvpn vtun0 {
local-address 10.18.1.2
mode site-to-site
remote-address 10.18.1.1
remote-host 158.125.253.2
tls {
ca-cert-file /root/keys/ca.crt
cert-file /root/keys/RRHzgrave.crt
key-file /root/keys/RRHzgrave.key
role active
}
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.3.10/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.5.10
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.1.18
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.7.10/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.11.10
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.9.249
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
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ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.12/30
network 192.168.1.0/24
network 10.0.3.0/24
network 158.125.253.8/30
network 10.0.7.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
static {
interface-route 158.125.253.12/30 {
next-hop-interface vtun0 {
}
}
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.9 {
distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
snmp {
community com-router2 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description Rtr2
location Hzgrave
}
ssh {
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
port 23
}
}
system {
host-name Router2
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
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authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:config-management@1:conntrack-sync@1:content-inspection@2:
dhcp-relay@1:dhcp-server@4:firewall@4:ipsec@2:nat@3:qos@1:quagga@2:system@
4:vrrp@1:wanloadbalance@2:webgui@1:webproxy@1:zone-policy@1" === */
A.1.1.5 Source File: R1 config:IPIP Tunnel
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.5/30
description "Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d2
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.2/30
description "Router1 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d6
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 158.125.253.25/29
description VLAN4
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:09
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.6.2/24
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address 10.0.12.2/24
description net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.8.2/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.12.2
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.10.249
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.4.2/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.6.2
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.2.18
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.4/30
network 158.125.253.24/29
network 10.0.4.0/24
network 158.125.253.0/30
network 10.0.8.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
snmp {
community com-router1 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description Rtr1
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location Hzgrave
}
ssh {
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
port 23
}
}
system {
host-name Router1
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:config-management@1:conntrack-sync@1:content-inspection@2:
dhcp-relay@1:dhcp-server@4:firewall@4:ipsec@2:nat@3:qos@1:quagga@2:system@4:
vrrp@1:wanloadbalance@2:webgui@1:webproxy@1:zone-policy@1" === */
A.1.1.6 Source File: R1 config:IPSec Tunnel
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.5/30
description "Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d2
speed auto
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}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.2/30
description "Router1 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d6
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 158.125.253.25/29
description VLAN4
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:09
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.6.2/24
address 10.0.12.2/24
description net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.8.2/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.12.2
remote-ip 10.0.10.249
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.4.2/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.6.2
remote-ip 10.0.2.18
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.4/30
network 158.125.253.24/29
network 10.0.4.0/24
network 158.125.253.0/30
network 10.0.8.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
snmp {
community com-router1 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact pg-asaad
A.1 Network Configuration and Monitoring xv
description "router1 FH community"
location FH
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
ssh {
allow-root false
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
allow-root false
port 23
}
}
system {
host-name Router1
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
ntp-server 69.59.150.135
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
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vpn {
ipsec {
copy-tos disable
esp-group ESP-IPIP {
compression disable
lifetime 3600
mode tunnel
pfs enable
proposal 1 {
encryption aes128
hash sha1
}
}
ike-group IKE-IPIP {
aggressive-mode disable
dead-peer-detection {
action hold
interval 30
timeout 120
}
lifetime 28800
proposal 1 {
dh-group 5
encryption aes128
hash sha1
}
}
ipsec-interfaces {
interface eth1
}
site-to-site {
peer 158.125.253.10 {
authentication {
mode pre-shared-secret
pre-shared-secret Allahuakhbar
}
ike-group IKE-IPIP
local-ip 158.125.253.2
tunnel 1 {
allow-nat-networks disable
allow-public-networks disable
esp-group ESP-IPIP
local-subnet 10.0.6.2/32
remote-subnet 10.0.5.2/32
}
}
}
}
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:nat@2:vrrp@1:serial@1:firewall@3:wanloadbalance@
1:dhcp-relay@1:quagga@1:ipsec@1:webgui@1:dhcp-server@3" === */
/* Release version: VC4.1.4 */
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A.1.1.7 Source File: R1 config:OpenVPN TLS
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.5/30
description "Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d2
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth1 {
address 158.125.253.2/30
description "Router1 to Router3"
duplex auto
hw-id 00:02:b3:bf:6a:d6
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
ethernet eth2 {
address 158.125.253.25/29
description VLAN4
duplex auto
hw-id 00:07:e9:92:b4:09
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.6.2/24
address 10.0.12.2/24
description net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
}
openvpn vtun0 {
local-address 10.18.1.1
mode site-to-site
remote-address 10.18.1.2
remote-host 158.125.253.10
tls {
ca-cert-file /root/keys/ca.crt
cert-file /root/keys/RHzgrave.crt
dh-file /root/keys/dh1024.pem
key-file /root/keys/RHzgrave.key
role passive
}
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.8.2/24
description IPIP-TR-FJ
disable
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.12.2
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.10.249
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
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address 10.0.4.2/24
description IPIP-TR
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.6.2
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.2.18
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 158.125.253.4/30
network 158.125.253.24/29
network 10.0.4.0/24
network 158.125.253.0/30
network 10.0.8.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
static {
interface-route 158.125.253.4/30 {
next-hop-interface vtun0 {
}
}
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 120
}
}
route 131.231.127.0/24 {
next-hop 158.125.253.1 {
distance 115
}
}
}
}
service {
snmp {
community com-router1 {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description Rtr1
location Hzgrave
}
ssh {
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
port 23
}
}
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system {
host-name Router1
login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$$Ht7gBYnxI1xCdO/JOnodh.
}
level admin
}
}
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:config-management@1:conntrack-sync@1:content-inspection@2:
dhcp-relay@1:dhcp-server@4:firewall@4:ipsec@2:nat@3:qos@1:quagga@2:system@4:vrrp@
1:wanloadbalance@2:webgui@1:webproxy@1:zone-policy@1" === */
A.1.1.8 Source File: TR config: IPIP Tunnel
interfaces {
ethernet eth0 {
address 158.125.253.18/30
description TR-R3
duplex auto
hw-id 00:12:3f:6f:17:e5
smp_affinity auto
speed auto
}
loopback lo {
address 10.0.1.18/24
address 10.0.2.18/24
description net1-R2-net2-R1
}
tunnel tun0 {
address 10.0.3.18/24
description IPIP-tunnel-Router2
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encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.1.18
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.5.10
ttl 255
}
tunnel tun1 {
address 10.0.4.18/24
description IPIP-tunnel-Router1
encapsulation ipip
local-ip 10.0.2.18
multicast disable
remote-ip 10.0.6.2
ttl 255
}
}
protocols {
ospf {
area 100 {
network 10.0.3.0/24
network 10.0.4.0/24
}
log-adjacency-changes {
}
}
static {
route 0.0.0.0/0 {
next-hop 158.125.253.17 {
}
}
route 158.125.253.24/29 {
next-hop 158.125.253.17 {
}
}
}
}
service {
snmp {
community TR {
authorization ro
network 158.125.253.0/27
}
contact ASaad
description TR
location Hzgrave
}
ssh {
port 22
protocol-version v2
}
telnet {
port 23
}
}
system {
host-name TR
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login {
user root {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$YGew3aZJ$7ZIT/bjI0VErFPG5MUATI.
}
level admin
}
user vyatta {
authentication {
encrypted-password $1$oHkhPnB9$8RLQ/cgVzvK9EKA6EVLX81
}
level admin
}
}
package {
auto-sync 1
repository community {
components main
distribution stable
password ""
url http://packages.vyatta.com/vyatta
username ""
}
}
time-zone GMT
}
/* Warning: Do not remove the following line. */
/* === vyatta-config-version: "cluster@1:config-management@1:conntrack-sync@1:content-inspection@2:
dhcp-relay@1:dhcp-server@4:firewall@4:ipsec@2:nat@3:qos@1:quagga@2:system@4:vrrp@
1:wanloadbalance@2:webgui@1:webproxy@1:zone-policy@1" === */
A.1.2 Switch’s Script
A.1.2.1 Source File: switch
interface range ethernet g(3,16-17,20)
flowcontrol on
exit
vlan database
vlan 2-4
exit
interface range ethernet g(13-16)
switchport access vlan 2
exit
interface range ethernet g(17-20)
switchport access vlan 3
exit
interface range ethernet g(7-10)
switchport access vlan 4
exit
interface vlan 2
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name client1
exit
interface vlan 3
name client2
exit
interface vlan 4
name monitor
exit
voice vlan oui-table add 0001e3 Siemens_AG_phone________
voice vlan oui-table add 00036b Cisco_phone_____________
voice vlan oui-table add 00096e Avaya___________________
voice vlan oui-table add 000fe2 H3C_Aolynk______________
voice vlan oui-table add 0060b9 Philips_and_NEC_AG_phone
voice vlan oui-table add 00d01e Pingtel_phone___________
voice vlan oui-table add 00e075 Polycom/Veritel_phone___
voice vlan oui-table add 00e0bb 3Com_phone______________
interface ethernet g3
port monitor g13
port monitor g20
exit
iscsi target port 860 address 0.0.0.0
iscsi target port 3260 address 0.0.0.0
interface vlan 1
ip address 192.168.1.2 255.255.255.0
exit
ip default-gateway 192.168.1.1
hostname switch1
aaa authentication enable default line
aaa authentication login default line
line telnet
password 20b6978f602cf1c18b02e923cadf2bf9 encrypted
exit
line ssh
password 2f36bb1b6e4f736466c80b0a580f2a98 encrypted
exit
line console
password 23b27718e46d81b32d2d37cc72db1ad6 encrypted
exit
username admin password 39d0bb87972d85973ebb8918d58f104e level 15 encrypted
snmp-server engineID local 800002a203001ec9932896
snmp-server location FH
snmp-server contact ASaad
snmp-server community Dell_Network_Manager rw view DefaultSuper
clock summer-time recurring eu
clock source sntp
no ip domain-lookup
A.1.3 DummyNet’s Scripts
A.1.3.1 Bridging and Firewalling
Source File: bridgescript.sh
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#!/bin/bash
#=================================================================#
# #
# FILE: bridgescript.sh
# USAGE: create bridge for client A and setup ipfw
# DESCRIPTION:
#
#
# OPTION:
# REQUIREMENT:
# BUGS:
# NOTES:
# AUTHOR: Amna Saad
# VERSION: 1
# CREATED: 3.3.2010
# REVISION:
#
#+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++#
echo on
echo "setting up bridge"
ifconfig eth1 0.0.0.0
ifconfig eth3 0.0.0.0
brctl addbr mybridge
brctl addif mybridge eth1
brctl addif mybridge eth3
brctl stp mybridge on
ifconfig mybridge up
echo "setting up bridge is completed"
echo "setting ipfw"
cd /lib/modules/2.6.32-14-generic-pae/kernel/net/netfilter
ls -al
insmod /home/pratik/myscript/ipfw3/dummynet2/ipfw_mod.ko
echo off
A.1.3.2 Delay
Source File: ipfw-delayxx.sh
#!/bin/bash
#============================================================#
#
# FILE: ipfwrules.sh
# USAGE: ipfwrule - delay xxms
# DESCRIPTION:
#
#
# OPTION:
# REQUIREMENT:
# BUGS:
# NOTES:
# AUTHOR: Amna Saad
# VERSION: 1
# CREATED: 4.8.2010
# REVISION:
#
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################ Start of IPFW rules file #####################
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush
# Set rules command prefix
cmd="ipfw -q add"
###############################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Not needed unless you have LAN.
# Change xl0 to your LAN NIC interface name
###############################################################
ipfw pipe 100 config delay xxms
$cmd 200 pipe 100 ip from any to any
###############################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement.
###############################################################
$cmd 400 check-state
################ End of IPFW rules file #######################
A.1.3.3 Jitter
Source File: ipfw jitter.sh
#!/bin/bash
#=============================================================#
#
# FILE: ipfwrules.sh
# USAGE: ipfwrule - jitter
# DESCRIPTION:
#
#
# OPTION:
# REQUIREMENT:
# BUGS:
# NOTES:
# AUTHOR: Amna Saad
# VERSION: 1
# CREATED: 4.3.2010
# REVISION:
#
################ Start of IPFW rules file #####################
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush
# Set rules command prefix
cmd="ipfw -q add"
###############################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Not needed unless you have LAN.
# Change xl0 to your LAN NIC interface name
###############################################################
ipfw pipe 100 config delay 100ms
ipfw pipe 200 config delay 200ms
ipfw pipe 300 config delay 300ms
$cmd 100 prob 0.330000 pipe 100 ip from any to any
$cmd 200 prob 0.330000 pipe 200 ip from any to any
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$cmd 300 prob 0.330000 pipe 300 ip from any to any
###############################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement.
###############################################################
$cmd 400 check-state
################ End of IPFW rules file ########################
A.1.3.4 Packet Loss Rate
Source File: ipfw-delay0-plr-xx.sh
#!/bin/bash
#============================================================#
# #
# FILE: ipfwrules.sh
# USAGE: ipfwrule - delay 0 plr xx
# DESCRIPTION:
#
#
# OPTION:
# REQUIREMENT:
# BUGS:
# NOTES:
# AUTHOR: Amna Saad
# VERSION: 1
# CREATED: 4.3.2010
# REVISION:
#
################ Start of IPFW rules file #####################
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush
# Set rules command prefix
cmd="ipfw -q add"
###############################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Not needed unless you have LAN.
# Change xl0 to your LAN NIC interface name
###############################################################
ipfw pipe 100 config delay 0ms plr xx
$cmd 100 pipe 100 ip from any to any
###############################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement.
###############################################################
$cmd 400 check-state
################ End of IPFW rules file #######################
Appendix B
B.1 Semi-automated Scripts
Note:All codes are initiated from Client 1 computer unless stated otherwise.
B.1.1 Common Files
B.1.1.1 Source File: playsox.bat
@Echo off
Echo Test AUDIODRIVER
rem Define AUDIODRIVER or AUDIODEV TYPES
set SIGMA="SigmaTel Audio"
set MICIN="Microsoft Sound Mapper - Input"
set MICOUT="Microsoft Sound Mapper - Output"
set LOGITECH="Logitech USB Headset"
set VAC1="Virtual Cable 1"
set VAC2="Virtual Cable 2"
set VAC3="Virtual Cable 3"
set VAC4="Virtual Cable 4"
set VAC5="Virtual Cable 5"
rem Play - sox infile -t waveaudio AUDIODEVout
set sox="C:\sox-14.3.1\sox.exe"
set infile="C:\Documents and Settings\coas8\Desktop\test_data\sample1234.wav"
rem %sox% %infile% -t waveaudio %VAC2% trim 0 10
%sox% %infile% -t waveaudio %VAC3%
Echo Print today’s date
date /T
B.1.1.2 Source File: recsox.bat
@Echo off
Echo Test AUDIODRIVER
rem Define AUDIODRIVER or AUDIODEV TYPES
set SIGMA="SigmaTel Audio"
set MICIN="Microsoft Sound Mapper - Input"
set MICOUT="Microsoft Sound Mapper - Output"
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set LOGITECH="Logitech USB Headset"
set VAC1="Virtual Cable 1"
set VAC2="Virtual Cable 2"
set VAC3="Virtual Cable 3"
set VAC4="Virtual Cable 4"
set VAC5="Virtual Cable 5"
rem rec - sox -t waveaudio AUDIODEVin outfile
set sox="C:\sox-14.3.1\sox.exe"
rem cut off fractional seconds
set t=%time:˜0,8%
rem replace colons with dashes
set t=%t::=-%
set Year=%Date:˜-4%
set Month=%Date:˜-10,2%
set Day=%Date:˜-7,2%
set Prefix= %1
set FileName=%Prefix%-%Year%-%Month%-%Day%-%t%.wav
set outfile=%FileName%
Echo %outfile% >> D:\amna\logdir\loglist
%sox% -r 96000 -t waveaudio %SIGMA% %outfile% trim 0 10
Echo Print today’s date
date /T
B.1.1.3 Source File: flush-ipfwrule-remotely.bat
@Echo off
set dummynet=158.125.253.27
ssh root@%dummynet% /root/flushout.sh
B.1.1.4 Source File: setipfwrule-remotely.bat
@Echo off
Echo start run setipfw-remotely.bat
rem to run setipfw-remotely ipfwconfig
set dummynet=158.125.253.27
set ipfwconfig = %1
ssh root@%dummynet% /root/%ipfwconfig%
B.1.1.5 Source File: flushout.sh
This code is run in Dummynet computer.
#!/bin/bash
#===================================================#
# #
# FILE: ipfwrules.sh #
# USAGE: ipfwrule -flush out #
# DESCRIPTION: #
# #
# OPTION: #
# REQUIREMENT: #
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################ Start of IPFW rules file ###########
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush
ipfw list
################################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the#
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement. #
################################################################
$cmd 400 check-state
################ End of IPFW rules file ########################
B.1.1.6 Source file: runtcpdump.sh
This code is run from TCPdump computer.
#!/bin/sh
wait=$1
shift 1
tcpdump $* &
pid=$!
sleep $wait
kill $pid
B.1.2 Skype
B.1.2.1 Source File: datacollection.bat
@Echo off
set t=%time:˜0,8%
rem replace colons with dashes
set t=%t::=-%
set Year=%Date:˜-4%
set Day=%Date:˜-10,2%
set Month=%Date:˜-7,2%
set tcpdump=158.125.253.28
set Capturedfile=Skype-IPIP-%Year%-%Month%-%Day%-%t%.pcap
set file=/home/coas8/datacollection/TR/SKYPEPCAP/%Capturedfile%
Echo %Capturedfile% >> D:\amna\logdir\loglistpcap
Echo start run runtcpdump
START /B ssh root@%tcpdump% /root/runtcpdump.sh 15 -i eth0 -w %file%
Echo start run callclient
C:\myscript\latestscript\SkypeA\skypeClientAattach.pl
ECHO end
B.1.2.2 Source File: recandplay.bat
ECHO start run recsox.bat
ECHO THEN start run playsox.bat
START /B C:\myscript\latestscript\common\recsox.bat D:\AMNA\SkypeA\outaudio\temp\Skype-IPIP
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call C:\myscript\latestscript\common\playsox.bat
ECHO End
B.1.2.3 Source File: skypeClientAattach.pl
#!C:\strawberry\perl\bin\perl -w
#All libraries here
use Win32::Skype;
use String;
sub AttachThenCall
{
my $Skype = Win32::Skype->new;
#$Skype->start(1, 0);
$Skype->attach;
while (!$Skype->attach)
{
print "Client A available". $Skype->attach, "\n";
}
print $Skype->userGetFullName;
my $clientB=’amna.saad’;
#my $clientB=’echo123’;
while (!$Skype->userStatus($clientB))
{
print $Skype->userStatus($clientB),"\n";
}
$Skype->call($clientB);
while(!$Skype->callStatus)
{
print $Skype->userSetCallNoAnswerTimeout(5), "\n";
$Skype->call($clientB);
}
system(’"C:\myscript\latestscript\SkypeA\recandplay.bat"’);
$Skype->endCall();
}
AttachThenCall;
B.1.3 SIP
B.1.3.1 Source File: datacollection.bat
@Echo off
set t=%time:˜0,8%
rem replace colons with dashes
set t=%t::=-%
set Year=%Date:˜-4%
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set Day=%Date:˜-10,2%
set Month=%Date:˜-7,2%
set tcpdump=158.125.253.28
set Capturedfile=SIP-IPSEC-plr2to3-%Year%-%Month%-%Day%-%t%.pcap
set file=/home/coas8/datacollection/TR/SIPPCAP/PLR2to3/IPSEC/%Capturedfile%
Echo %Capturedfile% >> D:\amna\logdir\loglistpcap
ECHO start run runtcpdump
START /B ssh root@%tcpdump% /root/runtcpdump.sh 15 -i eth0 -w %file%
ECHO start run callclient
call C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\SIPRegisterNCall.bat
ECHO end
B.1.3.2 Source File: recandplay.bat
ECHO start run recsox.bat
ECHO THEN start run playsox.bat
sleep 5
START /B C:\myscript\latestscript\common\recsox.bat D:\AMNA\SIPA\outaudio\temp\ipsec-plr2to3
call C:\myscript\latestscript\common\playsox.bat
ECHO End
B.1.3.3 Source File: SIPRegisterNCall.bat
ECHO Register and call
START /B C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\clientAcallclientB.exe
call C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\recandplay.bat
call C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\hangupcall.exe
rem call C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\closetray.exe
ECHO End
B.1.3.4 Source File: clientAcallclientB.au3
; clientAcallclientB
#Region --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
Run(’C:\Program Files\NCH Software\Talk\talk.exe’)
_WinWaitActivate("Express Talk","")
Send("coas8{ENTER}")
_WinWaitActivate("coas8@ekiga.net", "")
Send("{F11}")
#RunWait("C:\myscript\latestscript\SIPA\recandplay.bat")
#Region --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
Func _WinWaitActivate($title, $text, $timeout = 0)
WinWait($title, $text, $timeout)
If Not WinActive($title, $text) Then WinActivate($title, $text)
WinWaitActive($title, $text, $timeout)
EndFunc ;==>_WinWaitActivate
#EndRegion --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
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B.1.3.5 Source File:hangupcall.au3
; hangupcall
#Region --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
Send("{ALTDOWN}{F12}")
#Region --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
Func _WinWaitActivate($title, $text, $timeout = 0)
WinWait($title, $text, $timeout)
If Not WinActive($title, $text) Then WinActivate($title, $text)
WinWaitActive($title, $text, $timeout)
EndFunc ;==>_WinWaitActivate
#EndRegion --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
#EndRegion --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
#Region --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
B.1.4 Google Talk
B.1.4.1 Source File: datacollection.bat
@Echo off
set t=%time:˜0,8%
rem replace colons with dashes
set t=%t::=-%
set Year=%Date:˜-4%
set Day=%Date:˜-10,2%
set Month=%Date:˜-7,2%
set tcpdump=158.125.253.28
set Capturedfile=Gtalk-ZRTP-%Year%-%Month%-%Day%-%t%.pcap
set file=/home/coas8/datacollection/TR/GTALKPCAP/%Capturedfile%
Echo %Capturedfile% >> D:\amna\logdir\loglistpcap
ECHO start run runtcpdump
START /B ssh root@%tcpdump% /root/runtcpdump.sh 15 -i eth0 -w %file%
ECHO start run callclient
call C:\myscript\latestscript\Gtalk\GtalkRegisterNCall.bat
ECHO end
B.1.4.2 Source File: recandplay.bat
ECHO start run recsox.bat
ECHO THEN start run playsox.bat
START /B C:\myscript\latestscript\common\recsox.bat D:\AMNA\Gtalk\outaudio\temp\Gtalk-ZRTP
call C:\myscript\latestscript\common\playsox.bat
ECHO End
B.1.4.3 Source File: clientAcallclientB.au3
; clientAcallclientB
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#Region --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
Run(’googletalk’)
_WinWaitActivate("Google Talk", "")
Send("amnasaad20{ENTER}")
_WinWaitActivate("amnasaad20@gmail.com", "")
Send("{F11}")
Sleep(100)
RunWait("C:\myscript\latestscript\Gtalk\recandplay.bat")
Send("{F12}")
_WinWaitActivate("amnasaad20@gmail.com", "")
Send("{CTRLDOWN}{F4}{CTRLUP}")
_WinWaitActivate("Google Talk", "")
Send("{ALTDOWN}{F4}{ALTUP}")
#Region --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
Func _WinWaitActivate($title, $text, $timeout = 0)
WinWait($title, $text, $timeout)
If Not WinActive($title, $text) Then WinActivate($title, $text)
WinWaitActive($title, $text, $timeout)
EndFunc ;==>_WinWaitActivate
#EndRegion --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
B.1.4.4 Source File: clientBacceptsClientA.au3
;clientBaccepts
#region --- Au3Recorder generated code Start ---
Run(’googletalk’)
_WinWaitActivate("azizahcoas8\40googlemail.com@gtalk.jabbin.com","Chat Links")
Send("{F11}")
_WinWaitActivate("azizahcoas8\40googlemail.com@gtalk.jabbin.com","",500)
Sleep (10000)
Send("{CTRLDOWN}{F4}{CTRLUP}")
_WinWaitActivate("Google Talk","")
Send("{CTRLDOWN}{F4}{CTRLUP}")
#region --- Internal functions Au3Recorder Start ---
Func _WinWaitActivate($title,$text,$timeout=0)
WinWait($title,$text,$timeout)
If Not WinActive($title,$text) Then WinActivate($title,$text)
WinWaitActive($title,$text,$timeout)
EndFunc
#endregion --- Internal functions Au3Recorder End ---
Appendix C
C.1 Software Tools
C.1.1 PESQ
C.1.1.1 Link To PESQ source codes
Note:PESQ codes is available from this website http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-P.862-200102-I/en [73].
C.1.1.2 Sample of PESQ run script
Source File: soundtest.bat
pesq + 16000 sample96000.wav sample96000.wav
pesq + 16000 sample96000.wav outtest3a-failed.wav
pesq + 16000 sample96000.wav outtest3a-halfway.wav
pesq + 16000 sample96000.wav outtest3a-halfway2.wav
pesq + 16000 sample96000.wav outtest3a-toosoon.wav
pesq
C.1.1.3 Sample outout of PESQ run
Source File: soundtest.bat
REFERENCE DEGRADED PESQMOS PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE FREQ CRUDE DELAY
sample96000.wav sample96000.wav SQValue=4.500 4.500 0.000 0 16000 0.0000
sample96000.wav outtest3a-failed.wav SQValue=0.998 0.998 0.000 0 16000 -40.6800
sample96000.wav outtest3a-halfway.wav SQValue=-0.186 -0.186 0.000 0 16000 0.1280
sample96000.wav outtest3a-halfway2.wav SQValue=1.765 1.765 0.000 0 16000 -88.3680
sample96000.wav outtest3a-toosoon.wav SQValue=0.523 0.523 0.000 0 16000 -2.9840
C.1.2 Pcap File Processing
C.1.2.1 Sample of Ipsumdump script and rrdtool script
STEP 1: Extract <epoch time> and <payload-len> for traffic travel from <src> to <dst>.
The payload-len is in byte. The payload-len include IP packet length in the dump, not including
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any link-level headers.
ipsumdump -r --no-headers -tL -f " dst 158.125.253.14 && src 158.125.253.6" *.pcap > samplerpt
vi samplerpt
1307039254.818301 32
1307039254.818411 32
1307039254.832169 92
.....
.....
1307039953.693428 172
1307039953.693582 172
1307039953.705148 172
1307039953.705302 172
1307039953.725657 172
Note: Interpretation of the script as follows:
Extract epoch time and payload-len by filtering only IP traffics travel
from source(158.125.253.6)
to destination(158.125.253.14).
STEP 2: Create rrd database, in this sample: plr2to3.rrd. Data is archived for every 1
second and 10 seconds.
Notice that the Data Source(DS) is of type GAUGE, to store the values that are measured
directly as "they are".
rrdtool create plr2to3.rrd \
--start 1307039254 --step 1 \
DS:payload-len:GAUGE:1:U:U \
RRA:AVERAGE:0.5:1:46410 \
RRA:AVERAGE:0.5:10:46410\
RRA:MAX:0.5:1:46410 \
RRA:MAX:0.5:10:46410 \
RRA:MIN:0.5:1:46410 \
RRA:MIN:0.5:10:46410
How to interpret the script:
We created the round robin database called plr2to3.rrd which starts at 1307039254 epoch time. Our
database holds one data source (DS) named "payload-len" that represents a GAUGE. This GAUGE is
read every 1 seconds. In the same database two round robin archives (RRAs) are kept, one averages
the data every time it is read and keeps 46410 samples. The other averages the payload every 10
seconds over 46410 samples.
STEP 3: Update rrd database with <epoch time> and <payload-len>. In this case there are about
46410 lines of data.
Before updating, ensure that there is no duplication in entry.
#rrdtool update test3.rrd <epoch time>:<value>
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039254.818301:32
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039254.818411:32
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039254.832169:92
.....
.....
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039953.693428:172
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039953.693582:172
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039953.705148:172
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039953.705302:172
rrdtool update plr2to3.rrd 1307039953.725657:172
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STEP 4: "Rrdtool fetch" is used to check that the data is update successfully.
rrdtool fetch plr2to3.rrd AVERAGE --start 1307039254 --end 1307039954
STEP 5: Draw the average throughput, maximum throughput and minimum throughput.
rrdtool graph ipsecplr2to3.png \
--start 1307039254 --end 1307039954 \
--vertical-label bps \
DEF:avepayload=plr2to3.rrd:payload-len:AVERAGE \
DEF:maxpayload=plr2to3.rrd:payload-len:MAX \
DEF:minpayload=plr2to3.rrd:payload-len:MIN \
CDEF:avelen=avepayload,8,\*,0,+ \
CDEF:maxlen=maxpayload,8,\*,0,+ \
CDEF:minlen=minpayload,8,\*,0,+ \
LINE5:avelen#00FF00:"Throughput" \
LINE3:maxlen#FF0000:"Maximum" \
LINE1:minlen#0000FF:"Minimum"
C.1.2.2 Sample of Ipaggcreate script
Note: Ipaggcreate can be used to find the total bytes transfer fro src to dst.
ipaggcreate -r -B -s -f "dst 158.125.253.14 && src 158.125.253.6" *.pcap > report
C.1.3 ICMP Ping
C.1.3.1 Sample of ICMP ping command
Note: pinging to a destination provides rtt and packet loss rate. In this example a 100 bytes
payload is sent with the "ping".
ping -l 100 -n 10 158.125.253.14 > ICMPlog
C.1.4 E-model
Note:E-model tutorial available from this website http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/2005-2008/com12/emodelv1/tut.htm[78].
Source File: emodel.java
import java.io.*;
import java.text.DecimalFormat;
//********************************//
// credit to Bill Gao //
// voipcalculator.java //
// http://www.billgao.net/?p=14 //
//********************************//
public class emodel {
/**
* This function returns R value calculated by using the passed in parameters
* See detail of each parameter in ITU-T G.107
* @param T
* @param Ppl
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* @param SLR
* @param RLR
* @param Ds
* @param STMR
* @param Dr
* @param TELR
* @param WEPL
* @param Ie
* @param BPL
* @param BurstR
* @param A
* @param Nc
* @param Ps
* @param Pr
* @param qdu
* @param Nfor
* @return
*/
/******************************************************************************/
public double roundTwoDecimals(double d) {
DecimalFormat twoDForm = new DecimalFormat("#.##");
return Double.valueOf(twoDForm.format(d));
}
//******************************************************************************//
//ReadingFloat
public static double[] readFile(String file, String delimiter)
throws Exception {
return(readValues(new java.io.FileInputStream(file), delimiter));
}
public static double[] readURL(String url, String delimiter)
throws Exception {
java.net.URL addr = new java.net.URL(url);
return(readValues(addr.openStream(), delimiter));
}
public static double[] readValues(java.io.InputStream in, String delimiter)
throws java.io.FileNotFoundException,
java.io.IOException,
java.lang.NumberFormatException {
String thisLine;
java.io.BufferedInputStream s = new java.io.BufferedInputStream(in);
java.io.BufferedReader myInput = new java.io.BufferedReader
(new java.io.InputStreamReader(s));
int j = 0;
double[] values = new double[144]; //change array size here
while ((thisLine = myInput.readLine()) != null) {
// scan it line by line
java.util.StringTokenizer st =
new java.util.StringTokenizer(thisLine, delimiter);
while(st.hasMoreElements())
values[j++] = Double.valueOf(st.nextToken()).doubleValue();
}
return(values);
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}
//*******************************************************************************//
private static double calRValue(double T, double Ppl, double SLR,
double RLR, double Ds, double STMR, double Dr, double TELR,
double WEPL, double Ie, double BPL, double BurstR, double A,
double Nc, double Ps, double Pr, double qdu, double Nfor) {
double LSTR = STMR + Dr,
Tr = 2*T,
Ta = T;
double Nfo = Nfor + RLR;
double OLR = SLR+RLR;
double Pre = Pr + 10*Math.log10(1+Math.pow(10,
((double)(10-LSTR))/(double)10));
double Nor = RLR - 121 +Pre
+ 0.008*Math.pow((Pre-35),2);
double Nos = Ps - SLR -Ds
- 100 +0.004*Math.pow((Ps-OLR -Ds - 14),2);
double No = 10*Math.log10((Math.pow(10, (double)Nc/(double)10))
+Math.pow(10, (double)Nos/(double)10)
+Math.pow(10, (double)Nor/(double)10)
+Math.pow(10, (double)Nfo/(double)10));
double Ro = 15 - 1.5*(SLR+No);
double Q = 37 - 15*(Math.log10(qdu));
double G = 1.07+0.258*Q+0.0602*Math.pow(Q, 2);
double Z = (double)46/(double)30-G/(double)40;
double Y = (double)(Ro-100)/(double)15+46/8.4-G/9;
double Iq = 15*Math.log10(1+Math.pow(10, Y)
+Math.pow(10, Z));
double STMRo = -10*Math.log10(Math.pow(10, -STMR/(double)10)
+ Math.exp(-T/(double)4)*Math.pow(10, -TELR/10));
double Ist = 12*Math.pow((1+Math.pow((STMRo-13)/(double)6, 8)),
1/(double)8)
-28*Math.pow((1+Math.pow((STMRo+1)/19.4, 35)),
1/(double)35)
-13*Math.pow((1+Math.pow((STMRo-3)/33, 13)),
1/(double)13)
+29;
double Xolr = OLR+0.2*(64+No-RLR);
double Iolr = 20* (Math.pow((1+Math.pow((Xolr/8),(double)8)),
((double)1/(double)8))-Xolr/(double)8);
double Is = Iolr + Ist + Iq;
double TERV = TELR - 40*Math.log10((1+T/10)/(1+T/150)
+6*Math.exp(-0.3*Math.pow(T,2)));
double Idd = 0;
if (Ta>100)
{
double X = Math.log10(Ta/(double)100)/Math.log10(2);
Idd = 25 * (Math.pow((1+Math.pow(X, 6)),
1/(double)6)-3*Math.pow((1+Math.pow(X/(double)3, 6)),
1/(double)6)+2);
}
if (STMR<9)
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TERV = TERV + 0.5*Ist;
double Rle = 10.5 * (WEPL+7)*Math.pow(Tr+1, -0.25);
double Idle = (Ro-Rle)/(double)2
+ Math.sqrt(Math.pow(Ro-Rle, 2)/4+169);
double Roe = -1.5*(No-RLR);
double Re = 80+2.5*(TERV-14);
double Idte = ((Roe-Re)/2
+ Math.sqrt(Math.pow(Roe-Re, 2)/(double)4+100) -1)*(1-Math.exp(-T));
if (STMR > 20)
Idte = Math.sqrt(Math.pow(Idte,2)+Math.pow(Ist,2));
double Id = Idte + Idle + Idd;
double Ieef = Ie+(95-Ie)*(Ppl/((Ppl/BurstR)+BPL));
double R = Ro - Is - Id - Ieef +A;
return R;
}
/**
* Using default values recommended by ITU-T in G.107
* @param T mean one-way delay
* @param Ppl packet-loss probability
* @return
*/
public static double calRValue(double T, double Ppl)
{
double SLR = 8,
RLR = 2,
Ds = 3,
STMR = 15,
Dr = 3,
TELR = 65,
WEPL = 110,
Ie = 0,
BPL = 1,
BurstR = 1,
A = 0,
Nc = -70,
Ps = 35,
Pr = 35,
qdu = 1,
Nfor = -64;
return calRValue(T, Ppl, SLR, RLR, Ds, STMR, Dr, TELR, WEPL, Ie, BPL,
BurstR, A, Nc, Ps, Pr, qdu, Nfor);
}
/**
* This function calculates MOS value from R value
* @param R
* @return
*/
public static double calMOSValue(double R)
{
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double mos = 0;
if (R<0)
mos =1;
else if (R>100)
mos = 4.5;
else
mos = 1 + 0.035*R +R*(R-60)*(100-R)*7*Math.pow(10, -6);
return mos;
}
public static void main(String... Args)
{
new emodel().readdata();
}
/*****************************************************************************/
public void readdata() {
try {
// we assume 144 doubles (max)to be read
//Initialise
double T=0;
double Tr=0;
double Ppl=0;
double R = 0;
double MOSValue = 0;
System.out.println( "Round_trip_time(ms) Packet_Loss_Prob(%) R-Factor MOS");
double results [] = readFile("floatwithdelimitercolon.dat", ",");
for(int i = 0; i < results.length; i=i+2 ) {
//System.out.println(results[i]);
Tr=results[i];
T=Tr/2;
Ppl=results[i+1];
R = calRValue(T,Ppl);
MOSValue = calMOSValue(R);
System.out.print(Tr + " ");
System.out.print(Ppl + " ");
System.out.print(roundTwoDecimals(R) + " ");
System.out.println(roundTwoDecimals(MOSValue));
}
System.out.println("One_way_delay(ms) Packet_Loss_Prob(%) R-Factor MOS");
results = readFile("floatwithdelimiterspace.dat", " ");
for(int i = 0; i < results.length; i=i+2 ) {
//System.out.println(results[i]);
T=results[i];
Ppl=results[i+1];
R = calRValue(T,Ppl);
MOSValue = calMOSValue(R);
System.out.print(T + " ");
System.out.print(Ppl + " ");
System.out.print(roundTwoDecimals(R) + " ");
System.out.println(roundTwoDecimals(MOSValue));
}
}
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catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
/******************************************************************************/
}
C.1.5 CVSS
C.1.5.1 Link to CVSS calculator
Note:Two types of CVSS calculators are available from these websites:
i. The first CVSS calculator is from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=(AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:C) [49].
ii. The second CVSS calculator was written by Brandon Dixon as openCVSS classes in Python,
http://www.dueyesterday.net/system/files/openCVSS.py.txt [42].
Appendix D
D.1 Sample Report
D.1.1 Sample Report of PESQ.exe
DEGRADED PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE_FREQ CRUDE_DELAY
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-07-05.wav 2.100 0.000 0 16000 2.5080
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-07-17.wav 2.315 0.000 0 16000 2.4720
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-07-29.wav 2.180 0.000 0 16000 3.1480
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-07-41.wav 2.211 0.000 0 16000 3.5000
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-07-53.wav 2.268 0.000 0 16000 3.4280
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-08-05.wav 2.187 0.000 0 16000 3.3240
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-08-17.wav 2.180 0.000 0 16000 3.3040
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-08-28.wav 3.029 0.000 0 16000 1.8320
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-08-40.wav 2.242 0.000 0 16000 3.3240
Skype-IPIP-2011-16-08-15-08-52.wav 3.070 0.000 0 16000 1.4440
...
transform to
PARAMETER RUN PROTOCOL SECURITY PESQMOS CRUDE_DELAY PESQ-WB MOS-LQO PESQ-LQ
000ms 1 Skype-IPIP None 2.1 2.508 2.11 1.72 1.42
000ms 2 Skype-IPIP None 2.315 2.472 2.36 1.92 1.70
000ms 3 Skype-IPIP None 2.18 3.148 2.20 1.79 1.52
000ms 4 Skype-IPIP None 2.211 3.5 2.24 1.82 1.56
000ms 5 Skype-IPIP None 2.268 3.428 2.31 1.88 1.64
000ms 6 Skype-IPIP None 2.187 3.324 2.21 1.80 1.53
000ms 7 Skype-IPIP None 2.18 3.304 2.20 1.79 1.52
000ms 8 Skype-IPIP None 3.029 1.832 3.31 2.87 2.79
000ms 9 Skype-IPIP None 2.242 3.324 2.28 1.85 1.61
000ms 10 Skype-IPIP None 3.07 1.444 3.37 2.93 2.85
...............................
DEGRADED PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE_FREQ CRUDE_DELAY
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-48-46.wav 3.817 0.000 0 16000 8.2
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-49-19.wav 3.146 0.000 0 16000 5.136
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-49-41.wav 3.323 0.000 0 16000 5.844
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-50-14.wav 2.965 0.000 0 16000 6.54
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-50-47.wav 3.396 0.000 0 16000 1.196
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-51-20.wav 3.587 0.000 0 16000 4.404
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-51-42.wav 3.218 0.000 0 16000 7.108
xli
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sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-52-15.wav 3.336 0.000 0 16000 5.348
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-52-49.wav 3.691 0.000 0 16000 2.416
sip-ipip-dly-0to90-2012-03-05-21-53-17.wav 3.01 0.000 0 16000 2.302
...
transform to
PARAMETER RUN PROTOCOL Security PESQMOS CRUDE_DELAY PESQ-WB MOS-LQO PESQ-LQ
000ms 1 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.817 8.2 4.20 3.96 3.92
000ms 2 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.146 5.136 3.47 3.04 2.97
000ms 3 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.323 5.844 3.69 3.30 3.24
000ms 4 SIP-IPIP IPIP 2.965 6.54 3.23 2.77 2.69
000ms 5 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.396 1.196 3.78 3.41 3.35
000ms 6 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.587 4.404 3.99 3.67 3.62
000ms 7 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.218 7.108 3.56 3.15 3.08
000ms 8 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.336 5.348 3.70 3.32 3.26
000ms 9 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.691 2.416 4.09 3.81 3.76
000ms 10 SIP-IPIP IPIP 3.01 2.302 3.29 2.84 2.76
...............................
DEGRADED PESQMOS SUBJMOS COND SAMPLE_FREQ CRUDE_DELAY
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-43-32.wav 2.577 0.000 0 16000 1.0320
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-43-46.wav 2.895 0.000 0 16000 0.3320
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-44-00.wav 2.796 0.000 0 16000 1.3200
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-44-49.wav 2.845 0.000 0 16000 1.4640
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-03.wav 2.811 0.000 0 16000 1.3800
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-17.wav 2.815 0.000 0 16000 1.4680
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-32.wav 2.766 0.000 0 16000 1.3440
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-45-46.wav 2.841 0.000 0 16000 1.4400
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-46-01.wav 2.802 0.000 0 16000 1.2360
Gtalk-delay0to90-2011-22-08-16-46-15.wav 2.790 0.000 0 16000 1.5440
...
transform to
PARAMETER RUN PROTOCOL SECURITY PESQMOS CRUDE_DELAY PESQ-WB MOS-LQO PESQ-LQ
000ms 1 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.577 1.032 2.70 2.23 2.09
000ms 2 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.895 0.332 3.13 2.67 2.58
000ms 3 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.796 1.32 3.00 2.53 2.42
000ms 4 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.845 1.464 3.07 2.60 2.50
000ms 5 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.811 1.38 3.02 2.55 2.45
000ms 6 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.815 1.468 3.02 2.55 2.45
000ms 7 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.766 1.344 2.96 2.48 2.38
000ms 8 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.841 1.44 3.06 2.59 2.49
000ms 9 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.802 1.236 3.01 2.53 2.43
000ms 10 Gtalk-IPIP None 2.79 1.544 2.99 2.52 2.41
...................................
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D.1.2 ICMP log
Note: ICMP pings are performed in a control environment without any internetworking or transport layer security on the network.
Delay0ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 1ms, Average = 0ms
Delay20ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=45ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 45ms, Maximum = 45ms, Average = 45ms
Delay40ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=78ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=77ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=80ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=79ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=78ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=77ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=80ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=79ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=78ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=77ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 77ms, Maximum = 80ms, Average = 78ms
Delay60ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=125ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 125ms, Maximum = 125ms, Average = 125ms
Delay80ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=158ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=157ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=156ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=159ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=158ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=157ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=159ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=158ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=156ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=159ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 156ms, Maximum = 159ms, Average = 157ms
Delay100ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=205ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=204ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=207ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=206ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=204ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=207ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=205ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=204ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=207ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=205ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 204ms, Maximum = 207ms, Average = 205ms
Delay120ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=237ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=240ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=239ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=238ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=237ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=236ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=239ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=238ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=237ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=236ms TTL=125
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 236ms, Maximum = 240ms, Average = 237ms
Delay140ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=285ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=284ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=287ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=286ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=285ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=284ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=287ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=286ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=285ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=284ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 284ms, Maximum = 287ms, Average = 285ms
Delay160ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=317ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=320ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=319ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=318ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=317ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=316ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=319ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=318ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=317ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=316ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 316ms, Maximum = 320ms, Average = 317ms
Delay180ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=365ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=364ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=367ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=366ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=364ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=367ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=365ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=364ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=367ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=366ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 364ms, Maximum = 367ms, Average = 365ms
Delay200ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=399ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=399ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 396ms, Maximum = 399ms, Average = 397ms
Delay220ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=446ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=445ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=444ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=448ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=447ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=446ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=444ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=448ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=447ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=446ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 444ms, Maximum = 448ms, Average = 446ms
Delay240ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=477ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=476ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=480ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=479ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=478ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=477ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=476ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=480ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=479ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=479ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 476ms, Maximum = 480ms, Average = 478ms
Delay260ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=528ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=527ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=525ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=525ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=525ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=527ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=526ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=524ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=528ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 9, Lost = 1 (10\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 524ms, Maximum = 528ms, Average = 526ms
Delay280ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=559ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=558ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=557ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=556ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=559ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=558ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=557ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=556ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 8, Lost = 2 (20\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 556ms, Maximum = 559ms, Average = 557ms
Delay300ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=606ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=605ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=604ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=607ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=606ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=605ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=604ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=607ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=606ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=605ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 604ms, Maximum = 607ms, Average = 605ms
Delay320ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=637ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=636ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=639ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=638ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=637ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=636ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=639ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=638ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=638ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=637ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 636ms, Maximum = 639ms, Average = 637ms
Delay340ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=686ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=686ms TTL=125
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=685ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=684ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=687ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=686ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=686ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=685ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=688ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=688ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 684ms, Maximum = 688ms, Average = 686ms
Delay360ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=716ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=719ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=719ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=718ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 716ms, Maximum = 719ms, Average = 718ms
Delay380ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=765ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=764ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=767ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=766ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=765ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=764ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=767ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=767ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=766ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=766ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 764ms, Maximum = 767ms, Average = 765ms
Delay400ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=796ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=796ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 796ms, Maximum = 799ms, Average = 797ms
Delay420ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=844ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=848ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=847ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=846ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=845ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=848ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=847ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=846ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=845ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=848ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 844ms, Maximum = 848ms, Average = 846ms
Delay440ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=877ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 877ms, Maximum = 877ms, Average = 877ms
Delay460ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=927ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=926ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=925ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=924ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=927ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=926ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=925ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=924ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=927ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 9, Lost = 1 (10\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 924ms, Maximum = 927ms, Average = 925ms
Delay480ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=958ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=956ms TTL=125
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=958ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=957ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=959ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=959ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=958ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=956ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=959ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=958ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 956ms, Maximum = 959ms, Average = 957ms
Delay500ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1006ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1007ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1006ms, Maximum = 1007ms, Average = 1006ms
Delay520ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1040ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1039ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1039ms, Maximum = 1040ms, Average = 1039ms
Delay540ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1086ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1087ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1087ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1087ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1087ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1087ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 6, Lost = 4 (40\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1086ms, Maximum = 1087ms, Average = 1086ms
Delay560ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1117ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1119ms TTL=125
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1117ms, Maximum = 1119ms, Average = 1118ms
Delay580ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1165ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1167ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1165ms, Maximum = 1167ms, Average = 1166ms
Delay600ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1198ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1198ms, Maximum = 1199ms, Average = 1198ms
Delay620ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1248ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1247ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 8, Lost = 2 (20\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1247ms, Maximum = 1248ms, Average = 1247ms
Delay640ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1279ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1279ms, Maximum = 1279ms, Average = 1279ms
Delay660ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1325ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1327ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1325ms, Maximum = 1327ms, Average = 1326ms
Delay680ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1359ms TTL=125
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1359ms, Maximum = 1359ms, Average = 1359ms
Delay700ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1407ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1407ms, Maximum = 1407ms, Average = 1407ms
Delay720ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1437ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1439ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1437ms, Maximum = 1439ms, Average = 1438ms
Delay740ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1486ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1487ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1486ms, Maximum = 1487ms, Average = 1486ms
Delay760ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
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Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1519ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 6, Lost = 4 (40\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1519ms, Maximum = 1519ms, Average = 1519ms
Delay780ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1565ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1567ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1567ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1567ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1568ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1566ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1567ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1565ms, Maximum = 1568ms, Average = 1566ms
Delay800ms
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1600ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1599ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 9, Lost = 1 (10\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 1599ms, Maximum = 1600ms, Average = 1599ms
Plr 0 percent
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=124
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 1ms, Average = 0ms
Plr 1 percent
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 1ms, Average = 0ms
Plr 2 percent
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 9, Lost = 1 (10\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 2ms, Average = 1ms
Plr 3 percent
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=2ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 7, Lost = 3 (30\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 2ms, Average = 1ms
Jitter0
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
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Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=699ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=498ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=897ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=600ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=800ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=400ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 6, Lost = 4 (40\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 400ms, Maximum = 897ms, Average = 649ms
Jitter 1
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=897ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=497ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=600ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=899ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=199ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=698ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=696ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=499ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 199ms, Maximum = 899ms, Average = 618ms
Jitter 2
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time<1ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=496ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=399ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=97ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=496ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=399ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 8, Lost = 2 (20\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 0ms, Maximum = 496ms, Average = 335ms
Jitter 3
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=197ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=700ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=599ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=98ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=400ms TTL=124
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
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Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 6, Lost = 4 (40\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 98ms, Maximum = 700ms, Average = 398ms
Jitter 4
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=499ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=496ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=897ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=496ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=700ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 396ms, Maximum = 897ms, Average = 587ms
Jitter 5
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Request timed out.
Request timed out.
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=498ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=598ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=97ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=496ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=198ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 8, Lost = 2 (20\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 97ms, Maximum = 799ms, Average = 434ms
Jitter 6
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=797ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1097ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=698ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=396ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=599ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1098ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=899ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 396ms, Maximum = 1098ms, Average = 737ms
Jitter 7
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1097ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=899ms TTL=125
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Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=898ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=997ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1200ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1199ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=899ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=1098ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=899ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 898ms, Maximum = 1200ms, Average = 1038ms
Jitter 8
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=597ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=796ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=800ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=800ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=700ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=799ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=798ms TTL=125
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 597ms, Maximum = 800ms, Average = 768ms
Jitter 9
Pinging 158.125.253.14 with 100 bytes of data:
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=125
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=298ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=298ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=398ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=297ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=297ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=124
Reply from 158.125.253.14: bytes=100 time=397ms TTL=124
Ping statistics for 158.125.253.14:
Packets: Sent = 10, Received = 10, Lost = 0 (0\% loss),
Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds:
Minimum = 297ms, Maximum = 398ms, Average = 357ms
D.1.3 Sample Report of emodel.java
Term:
Send Loudness Rating(SLR)
Receive Loudness Rating(RLR)
D-factor(Send) Ds
Sidetone Masking Rating(STMR)
D-factor (Receive)Dr
Talker Echo Loudness Rating(TELR)
Weighted Echo Path Loss(WEPL)
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Equipment Impairment Factor(Ie)
Packet-loss Robustness Factor(BPL)
Burst Ratio(BurstR)
Advantage Factor(A)
Electric Circuit Noise(Nc)
Room Noise (Send)Ps
Room Noise (Receive)Pr
Quantizing Distortion Units(qdu)
and Noise Floor(Nfor)
The default setting:
SLR = 8dB;RLR = 2dB;Ds = 3; STMR = 15dB;Dr = 3; TELR = 65dB;WEPL = 110dB; Ie = 0; BPL = 1
BurstR = 1; A = 0; Nc =  70dBm0p; Ps = 35dB; Pr = 35dB; qdu = 1; Nfor =  64dBmp
One_way_delay(ms) Packet_Loss_Prob(%) R-Factor MOS
0 0 93.21 4.41
10 0 92.85 4.4
20 0 92.53 4.4
30 0 92.25 4.39
40 0 92 4.38
50 0 91.76 4.38
60 0 91.52 4.37
70 0 91.3 4.37
80 0 91.08 4.36
90 0 90.87 4.36
100 0 90.66 4.35
110 0 90.46 4.35
120 0 90.26 4.35
130 0 90.06 4.34
140 0 89.83 4.33
150 0 89.54 4.33
160 0 89.14 4.32
170 0 88.58 4.3
180 0 87.83 4.28
190 0 86.9 4.26
200 0 85.8 4.22
210 0 84.58 4.18
220 0 83.28 4.14
230 0 81.92 4.09
240 0 80.55 4.04
250 0 79.18 3.99
260 0 77.82 3.94
270 0 76.48 3.88
280 0 75.18 3.83
290 0 73.9 3.77
300 0 72.67 3.72
310 0 71.47 3.66
320 0 70.3 3.61
330 0 69.17 3.56
340 0 68.08 3.51
350 0 67.03 3.45
360 0 66.01 3.4
370 0 65.02 3.36
380 0 64.06 3.31
390 0 63.14 3.26
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400 0 62.25 3.22
0 0 93.21 4.41
0 0.1 84.57 4.18
0 0.2 77.37 3.92
0 0.3 71.28 3.66
0 0.4 66.06 3.41
0 0.5 61.54 3.18
0 0.6 57.58 2.97
0 0.7 54.09 2.79
0 0.8 50.98 2.63
0 0.9 48.21 2.48
0 1 45.71 2.35
0 1.1 43.44 2.24
0 1.2 41.39 2.13
0 1.3 39.51 2.04
0 1.4 37.79 1.96
0 1.5 36.21 1.88
0 1.6 34.74 1.82
0 1.7 33.39 1.75
0 1.8 32.13 1.7
0 1.9 30.96 1.65
0 2 29.87 1.6
0 2.1 28.85 1.56
0 2.2 27.89 1.52
0 2.3 26.99 1.49
0 2.4 26.15 1.46
0 2.5 25.35 1.43
0 2.6 24.6 1.4
0 2.7 23.88 1.38
0 2.8 23.21 1.35
0 2.9 22.57 1.33
0 3 21.96 1.31
D.1.4 Router log
D.1.4.1 TR
vyatta@TR:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [1/0] via 158.125.253.17, eth0
C>* 10.0.1.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.2.0/24 is directly connected, lo
O 10.0.3.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun0, 01w5d00h
C>* 10.0.3.0/24 is directly connected, tun0
O 10.0.4.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun1, 01w5d00h
C>* 10.0.4.0/24 is directly connected, tun1
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
C>* 158.125.253.16/30 is directly connected, eth0
S>* 158.125.253.24/29 [1/0] via 158.125.253.17, eth0
vyatta@TR:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.18/30 up up TR-R3
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lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net1-R2-net2-R1
lo 10.0.1.18/24 up up net1-R2-net2-R1
lo 10.0.2.18/24 up up net1-R2-net2-R1
lo ::1/128 up up net1-R2-net2-R1
tun0 10.0.3.18/24 up up IPIP-tunnel-Router2
tun1 10.0.4.18/24 up up IPIP-tunnel-Router1
tunl0 - admin down down
vyatta@TR:˜$
D.1.4.2 Router1
Log on IPIP connectivity:
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
O>* 10.0.3.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 3d23h33m
O 10.0.4.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun1, 03w6d02h
C>* 10.0.4.0/24 is directly connected, tun1
C>* 10.0.6.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.12.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
O 158.125.253.0/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 03w6d02h
C>* 158.125.253.0/30 is directly connected, eth1
C>* 158.125.253.4/30 is directly connected, eth0
O 158.125.253.4/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 03w6d02h
O>* 158.125.253.8/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 01w5d21h
O>* 158.125.253.12/30 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 3d23h33m
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 6d01h29m
O 158.125.253.24/29 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 6d00h07m
C>* 158.125.253.24/29 is directly connected, eth2
O>* 192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 3d23h33m
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.5/30 up up Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1
eth1 158.125.253.2/30 up up Router1 to Router3
eth2 158.125.253.25/29 up up VLAN4
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.6.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.12.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.8.2/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tun1 10.0.4.2/24 up up IPIP-TR
tunl0 - admin down down
Log on IPSec connectivity:
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show vpn ipsec sa
D.1 Sample Report lxii
Peer Tunnel# Dir SPI Encrypt Hash NAT-T A-Time L-Time
------- ------- --- --- ------- ---- ----- ------ ------
158.125.253.18 1 in e5eed198 aes128 sha1 No 1895 3600
158.125.253.18 1 out 1e5bcfbe aes128 sha1 No 1895 3600
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show vpn ipsec sa statistics
Peer Dir SRC Network DST Network Bytes
------- --- ----------- ----------- -----
158.125.253.18 in 10.0.6.2/32 10.0.2.18/32 97156
158.125.253.18 out 10.0.2.18/32 10.0.6.2/32 30060
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show vpn ipsec status
IPSec Process Running PID: 7673
1 Active IPsec Tunnels
IPsec Interfaces :
eth1 (158.125.253.2)
IKE Process Running
PID: 7673
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show vpn ike sa
Local Peer State Encrypt Hash NAT-T A-Time L-Time
-------- ------- ----- ------- ---- ----- ------ ------
158.125.253.2 158.125.253.18 up aes128 sha1 No 7072 28800
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
K>* 10.0.2.18/32 is directly connected, eth1
O>* 10.0.3.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 00:00:20
O 10.0.4.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun1, 6d00h32m
C>* 10.0.4.0/24 is directly connected, tun1
C>* 10.0.6.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.12.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
O 158.125.253.0/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 6d00h10m
C>* 158.125.253.0/30 is directly connected, eth1
O 158.125.253.4/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 5d23h20m
C>* 158.125.253.4/30 is directly connected, eth0
O>* 158.125.253.8/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 5d22h37m
O>* 158.125.253.12/30 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 00:00:20
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 6d00h09m
O 158.125.253.24/29 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 6d00h08m
C>* 158.125.253.24/29 is directly connected, eth2
O>* 192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 00:00:20
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.5/30 up up Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1
eth1 158.125.253.2/30 up up Router1 to Router3
eth2 158.125.253.25/29 up up VLAN4
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
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lo 10.0.6.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.12.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.8.2/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tun1 10.0.4.2/24 up up IPIP-TR
tunl0 - admin down down
Log on OpenVPN TLS connectivity:
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
O>* 10.0.3.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 5d23h10m
O 10.0.4.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun1, 04w1d01h
C>* 10.0.4.0/24 is directly connected, tun1
C>* 10.0.6.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.12.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.18.1.2/32 is directly connected, vtun0
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.1, eth1
O 158.125.253.0/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 04w1d01h
C>* 158.125.253.0/30 is directly connected, eth1
S 158.125.253.4/30 [1/0] is directly connected, vtun0
C>* 158.125.253.4/30 is directly connected, eth0
O 158.125.253.4/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 04w1d01h
O>* 158.125.253.8/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 02w0d20h
O>* 158.125.253.12/30 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 5d23h10m
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 01w1d01h
O 158.125.253.24/29 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 01w0d23h
C>* 158.125.253.24/29 is directly connected, eth2
O>* 192.168.1.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.1, eth1, 5d23h10m
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.5/30 up up Router1 to segment 158.125.253.4/30-PC1
eth1 158.125.253.2/30 up up Router1 to Router3
eth2 158.125.253.25/29 up up VLAN4
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.6.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.12.2/24 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net6-TR-net12-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.8.2/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tun1 10.0.4.2/24 up up IPIP-TR
tunl0 - admin down down
vtun0 10.18.1.1 up up
vyatta@Router1:˜$ show interfaces openvpn vtun0 brief
Interface IP Address State Link Description
vtun0 10.18.1.1 up up
D.1.4.3 Router2
Log on IPIP connectivity:
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vyatta@Router2:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
O 10.0.3.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun0, 03w6d02h
C>* 10.0.3.0/24 is directly connected, tun0
O>* 10.0.4.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 3d23h32m
C>* 10.0.5.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.11.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
O>* 158.125.253.0/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 03w6d02h
O>* 158.125.253.4/30 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 3d23h32m
O 158.125.253.8/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 03w6d02h
C>* 158.125.253.8/30 is directly connected, eth1
O 158.125.253.12/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 6d00h05m
C>* 158.125.253.12/30 is directly connected, eth0
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 6d01h28m
O>* 158.125.253.24/29 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 3d23h32m
O 192.168.1.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 03w6d02h
C>* 192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, eth2
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.13/30 up up Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2
eth1 158.125.253.10/30 up up Router2 to Router3
eth2 192.168.1.1/24 up up To VLAN management
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.5.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.11.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.3.10/24 up up IPIP-TR
tun1 10.0.7.10/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tunl0 - admin down down
Log on IPSec connectivity:
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
K>* 10.0.1.18/32 is directly connected, eth1
O 10.0.3.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun0, 6d01h53m
C>* 10.0.3.0/24 is directly connected, tun0
O>* 10.0.4.0/24 [110/20] via 10.0.3.18, tun0, 00:00:45
C>* 10.0.5.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.11.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
O>* 158.125.253.0/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 5d22h31m
O>* 158.125.253.4/30 [110/30] via 10.0.3.18, tun0, 00:00:45
* via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 00:00:45
O 158.125.253.8/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 5d22h32m
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C>* 158.125.253.8/30 is directly connected, eth1
O 158.125.253.12/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 5d22h32m
C>* 158.125.253.12/30 is directly connected, eth0
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 5d22h31m
O>* 158.125.253.24/29 [110/30] via 10.0.3.18, tun0, 00:00:45
* via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 00:00:45
O 192.168.1.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 5d22h33m
C>* 192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, eth2
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show vpn ipsec status
IPSec Process Running PID: 8832
1 Active IPsec Tunnels
IPsec Interfaces :
eth1 (158.125.253.10)
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show vpn ipsec sa
Peer Tunnel# Dir SPI Encrypt Hash NAT-T A-Time L-Time
------- ------- --- --- ------- ---- ----- ------ ------
158.125.253.18 1 in fee591cb aes128 sha1 No 1061 3600
158.125.253.18 1 out 71f6d70b aes128 sha1 No 1061 3600
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show vpn ipsec sa statistics
Peer Dir SRC Network DST Network Bytes
------- --- ----------- ----------- -----
158.125.253.18 in 10.0.5.10/32 10.0.1.18/32 32389
158.125.253.18 out 10.0.1.18/32 10.0.5.10/32 18692
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show vpn ike sa
Local Peer State Encrypt Hash NAT-T A-Time L-Time
-------- ------- ----- ------- ---- ----- ------ ------
158.125.253.10 158.125.253.18 up aes128 sha1 No 24362 28800
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.13/30 up up Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2
eth1 158.125.253.10/30 up up Router2 to Router3
eth2 192.168.1.1/24 up up To VLAN management
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.5.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.11.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.3.10/24 up up IPIP-TR
tun1 10.0.7.10/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tunl0 - admin down down
Log on OpenVPN TLS connectivity:
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show ip route
Codes: K - kernel route, C - connected, S - static, R - RIP, O - OSPF,
I - ISIS, B - BGP, > - selected route, * - FIB route
S>* 0.0.0.0/0 [120/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
O 10.0.3.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, tun0, 04w1d01h
C>* 10.0.3.0/24 is directly connected, tun0
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O>* 10.0.4.0/24 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 5d23h05m
C>* 10.0.5.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.0.11.0/24 is directly connected, lo
C>* 10.18.1.1/32 is directly connected, vtun0
C>* 127.0.0.0/8 is directly connected, lo
S>* 131.231.127.0/24 [115/0] via 158.125.253.9, eth1
O>* 158.125.253.0/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 04w1d01h
O>* 158.125.253.4/30 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 5d23h05m
O 158.125.253.8/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth1, 04w1d01h
C>* 158.125.253.8/30 is directly connected, eth1
S 158.125.253.12/30 [1/0] is directly connected, vtun0
O 158.125.253.12/30 [110/10] is directly connected, eth0, 01w0d23h
C>* 158.125.253.12/30 is directly connected, eth0
O>* 158.125.253.16/30 [110/20] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 01w1d01h
O>* 158.125.253.24/29 [110/30] via 158.125.253.9, eth1, 5d23h05m
O 192.168.1.0/24 [110/10] is directly connected, eth2, 04w1d01h
C>* 192.168.1.0/24 is directly connected, eth2
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show interfaces
Interface IP Address State Link Description
eth0 158.125.253.13/30 up up Router2 to sgment 158.125.253.12/30-PC2
eth1 158.125.253.10/30 up up Router2 to Router3
eth2 192.168.1.1/24 up up To VLAN management
lo 127.0.0.1/8 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.5.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo 10.0.11.10/24 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
lo ::1/128 up up net5-TR-net11-TR-TJ
tun0 10.0.3.10/24 up up IPIP-TR
tun1 10.0.7.10/24 admin down down IPIP-TR-FJ
tunl0 - admin down down
vtun0 10.18.1.2 up up
vyatta@Router2:˜$ show interfaces openvpn vtun0 brief
Interface IP Address State Link Description
vtun0 10.18.1.2 up up
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D.1.5 CACTI report:Snapshots
Figure D.1: List of devices on CACTI
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Figure D.2: Snapshot of TR memory usage and CPU usage
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Figure D.3: Snapshot of Router1 memory usage and CPU usage
Figure D.4: Snapshot of Router2 memory usage and CPU usage
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D.1.6 Validation: Box and Whisker Graphs
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Figure D.5: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.6: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.7: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.8: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
D.1 Sample Report lxxiii
plr0.0% plr0.4% plr0.8% plr1.2% plr1.6% plr2.0% plr2.4% plr2.8%
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
3.
0
Google Talk over IPSec tunnel:box and whisker plot over 10 runs
Packet Loss Rate
PE
SQ
−W
B
Figure D.9: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.10: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.11: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.12: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.13: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.14: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.15: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.16: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.17: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.18: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.19: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.20: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.21: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.22: Graph of Jitter versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.23: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.24: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.25: Graph of Packet Loss Rate versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.26: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.27: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
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Figure D.28: Graph of Delay versus PESQ-WB
Appendix E
E.1 Framework
The aim of this framework is to provide a tool that allow us to monitor and measure VoIP
performance as follows:
i) The framework consists of a live testbed using a wired network with instrumentation
data being polled in real time.
ii) The network is designed in such a way that the system and design are in full control and
yet still transmit over the Internet.
iii) A packet interceptor is used to simulate various testing conditions.
iv) The research is conducted on different types of VoIP services.
v) The processes involve are listed in a systematic way.
vi) The overall performance score is based on the scores on MOS, R-factor and CVSS
Based Metrics.
The testbed designed is shown in figure E.1 on page lxxxv. R1, R2 and R3 are the gateway
routers to the Loughborough University network. R1-Secure and R2-Secure are the routers
that are placed in the laboratory. R1-Secure is connected to R1 and R2-Secure is connected
to R2, respectively. A secure tunnel (i.e. IPSec) is created from R1-Secure to R2-Secure. The
sender and monitoring devices are connected to a switch that connect to R1-Secure. Similarly,
the receiver and monitoring devices are connected to a switch that connect to R2-Secure. The
hybrid testbed can be used for other types of VoIP services. The testbed is not limited by time
and place. It is possible to place Router R3 at any designated place. However, to simplify
the testbed and to have more control on the network and parameters, a packet interceptor to
simulate various conditions and distances is used. This architecture gives more control of the
testbed and create a more realistic environment for the experiment. For example to simulate
lxxxiv
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Figure E.1: Testbed Architecture
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the distance between the sender and receiver from United Kingdom to Malaysia one can get
the RTT value through ICMP then set the extra delay value into a packet interceptor.
In the design we include a link to the Internet as SIP Proxy, Skype server, YMSG server
and Google Talk Server are in the external network. The aim is to be able to instrument
the VoIP call performance in use and yet still make use of Internet-wide directory services.
As each VoIP service has a different mechanism for NAT- and firewall-traversal unfirewalled
public IP addresses are used for these experiments. Next the packet interceptor is placed
between the sender PC and switch-to-R1-secure. Dummynet is used to simulate bandwidth
contention with data packets[141]. Quality of service (QoS) scenario is simulated using this
tool as well.
Wireshark is installed into the monitoring device at sender/receiver end. Wireshark is
a packet analyser that can capture and interpret live data as it flows across a network[148].
Wireshark is used to analyse the existence of VoIP traffic within the network. The perform-
ance monitoring tool CACTI is installed at the receiver/sender end. Section 4.2 on page 92
describes the installation process in detail. Wireshark is used to prove that VoIP call is made
and CACTI is used to capture the transmission from sender to receiver. CACTI is used to
capture live traffic from sender to receiver and plot graphs. Data collected are presented as
graphs of one-way delay or RTT delay, jitter, packet loss, available CPU, memory, buffer size
of the end devices and bandwidth utilisation at gateway (i.e. R1 and R2). From these data
the R factor of each VoIP service can be calculated. The network trend of each VoIP service
can be deduced from these data. The results are verified against other related work from other
researchers[134, 25].
